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I. INTRODUCTION
As the filing of federal asbestos personal injury and product
liability cases continues, the asbestos litigation crisis is still upon
the federal courts.' On January 1, 1990, 29,466 asbestos cases
were pending in all districts of the federal court system.2 Al-
though courts have terminated a significant number of asbestos
cases through various means,3 statistics reflect a steady flow of
new cases into the system, which creates a total net increase in
pending cases. 4 In this sense, asbestos litigation has become the
Sisyphean task of the federal court system: no matter how
1. See infra Tables 1-4, containing statistical data on the incidence of federal asbestos
personal injury and products liability cases through January 1, 1990. Ms. Pat Lombard,
Senior Research Associate at the Federal Judicial Center, compiled this data on a calendar
year basis. She obtained the statistics relating to asbestos litigation by using the
Administrative Office of the United States' nature-of-suit code for asbestos cases. For
more information regarding the asbestos nature-of-suit code, see T. WILLGING, TRENDS IN
ASBESTOS LITIGATION 13 n.45 (1987).
See generally Walsh, Judges' Accord May End Logjam of Asbestos Suits, Panel Acts to
Consolidate Thousands of Cases, Wash. Post, Aug. 14, 1990, S D, at 1, col. 2 (discussing
judges' August 10th consolidation and cass action order for multicourt cooperative effort
to handle federal court caseload of pending and future asbestos personal injury cases);
Labaton, 10 Federal Judges Agree on Plan to Consolidate Asbestos Litigation, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 11, 1990, § 1, at 1, col. 2 (discussing unprecedented August 10th order for judicial
cooperation regarding asbestos litigation); Labaton, Judicial Struggle in Asbestos Cases,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1990, S D, at 2, col. 1 (discussing earlier efforts to coordinate judicial
action regarding asbestos litigation).
2. See infra Tables 1 & 2.
3. See infra Tables 2 & 3 (21,853 terminations out of 51,319 cases). For the compilation
of these statistics, termination in cases involving multiple defendants meant termination
of the case as to all defendants.
4. See infra Table 2 (average net increase of over 4,000 new asbestos filings each
calendar year with total net increase of 29,466 pending cases over 21,853 terminations).
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efficiently the courts process asbestos lawsuits,5 additional cases
continue to enter the federal system without any sign of respite.
In addition to this steady flow of new asbestos cases, statistics
reveal that plaintiffs are filing asbestos lawsuits throughout the
federal court system, rather than in a few clustered districts.6
At the time of the first Federal Judicial Center Conference on
Asbestos Litigation in 1984,7 asbestos litigation centered in a
handful of district courts: Massachusetts, the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, the Southern District of Mississippi, the Eastern
District of Texas, and the Northern District of Ohio.3 The asbestos
docket in these five districts had, and continues to have, thou-
sands of case filings. In the last six years, however, many other
districts witnessed a marked increase in new asbestos cases. For
example, the Southern District of West Virginia had a total of
342 asbestos cases through 1988; in 1989, 233 new asbestos cases
were filed, representing sixty-eight percent of the court's entire
previous asbestos caseload.9
The Southern District of West Virginia is not alone in this
phenomenon. Many other federal district courts now have mul-
tiple asbestos cases on their dockets. Whereas the asbestos
litigation crisis burdened a few districts with thousands of cases
in 1984, thirty-four federal district courts now have over one
hundred asbestos cases pending.10 With the horizontal dispersion
of these cases throughout the federal court system, the expedi-
tious, inexpensive, and fair disposition of asbestos litigation is
truly a systemwide problem affecting a substantial portion of the
federal judiciary.
This study was prepared against this backdrop of changing
asbestos demographics. In 1984, when asbestos litigation began
5. See snfra Table 4 (reflecting disposition time for asbestos cases, analyzed by dispo-
sition method (such as uncontested cases, motions before trial, settlement, trial, and other
dispositions)). The average time from filing to termination is close to three years, whether
cases settle or go to trial. See 2d.
6. See generally snfra Table 1 (district-by-district breakdown of pending asbestos cases).
7. This was the first of three asbestos conferences conducted by the Federal Judicial
Center to inform judges, magistrate judges, clerks, special masters, asbestos attorneys,
and academicians about developments in federal court administration of asbestos litigation.
See generally T. WILLGING, ASBESTOS CASE MANAGEMENT: PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PROCEDURES
(1985) (report of conclusions from the first asbestos conference held in June 1984 in
Baltimore, Maryland); T. WILLGING, suYpra note 1, at 3 n.4. The second Federal Judicial
Center workshop, "Asbestos and Beyond: Information and Systems for Case Management,"
was held on November 14-15, 1988, in Atlanta, Georgia. The third conference, "Asbestos
Conference," was held on June 25, 1990, in Washington, D.C.
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to emerge as a distinct judicial administration problem, the
Federal Judicial Center prepared a preliminary study discussing
asbestos case management techniques for pretrial and trial pro-
cedures." In 1987, with an exponential growth of asbestos cases
in certain districts, the Center issued a second study, which
explored innovative case management techniques, the use of
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms, and the devel-
opment of asbestos litigation expertise by judges and practition-
ers. 12 Of particular interest was the finding of a lack of incentives
for districtwide, statewide, or nationwide consolidation of cases.'3
At the time of this 1987 study, the circuit courts had certified
and approved for class action treatment only two asbestos class
actions.14
While federal courts grapple daily with the real problems of
asbestos cases, the broader legal community searches simulta-
neously for innovative solutions to mass tort litigation. Asbestos
11. See T. WMLLGING, supra note 7.
12. See T. WILLGING, supra note 1.
13. Id. at 131. Willging concluded:
In states with multiple districts, there is no incentive for a single district
to use consolidation or class action procedures on a statewide basis. The
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has not used its apparent authority
to divide cases into subgroups at the state level. The multidistrict procedure
also lacks clear authority to consolidate cases for trial in a form other than
a class action (if the transferee district is not a proper venue for all of the
cases).
Id.
During its 1989-90 session, the House of Representatives approved the Multiparty,
Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 1990, amending 28 U.S.C. S 1407, to ease some of the
procedural limitations on the use of multidistrict transfers. H.R. 3406, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess., 136 CONG. REc. H3116 (daily ed. June 5, 1990). The bill governs multiparty,
multiforum jurisdiction and provides minimal diversity jurisdiction for single accident
events involving more than 25 persons, each with injuries over $50,000. The bill also
provides for trial of liability in the transferee forum, with a remand to the transferor
forum for determination of damages; liberalized removal of actions; and unified choice-of-
law. Congress did not specifically direct this legislation at asbestos litigation, and the
legislation's conditions seem to exclude asbestos litigation. See also Multiparty, Multiforum
Jursdiction Act of 1989: Hearng Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property,
and the Admrnsstration of Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Representatives
on H.R. 8406, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
14. See In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986); Jenkins v. Raymark
Indus., 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986). Two other mass tort litigations involving Agent
Orange and the Dalkon Shield have been certified as settlement class actions, but these
settlement classes are an anomalous use of the class action rule and provide little guidance
for litigants or judges proceeding with pretrial case management of mass tort litigation
under class action procedures. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989); In
re "Agent Orange" Prods. Liab. Litig., 506 F Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), modified, 100
F.R.D. 718 (1983), mandamus dened sub nom. In re Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 725
F.2d 858 (2d Cir.), cert. dewmed, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984).
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cases present one type of mass tort litigation that raises issues
of aggregative procedure. Although complex litigation always has
been a part of the litigation landscape, only since the 1980's has
the distinct phenomenon of mass tort litigation engaged the
attention of the academic community, 5 the organized bar, 6 the
bench,'17 institutional law reform groups, 8 judicial administration
15. See generally Mullenix, Complex Litigation Reform and Article III Jurisdiction, 58
FORDeHAM L. REV. 169, 169 n.1 (1990) (reviewing academic literature on mass tort litigation).
As that footnote states, the academic literature on mass tort litigation is vast and
continues to expand as academic commentators debate proposed resolutions for mass tort
cases.
16. See, e.g., Report to the House of Delegates, 1989 A.B.A. COMM'N ON MASS TORTS REP.
126. The American Bar Association (ABA) House of Delegates did not approve this
lengthy report which called for comprehensive new federal legislation to address mass
tort litigation. See 58 U.S.L.W 1030 (Aug. 22, 1989). The Commission issued a revised
report during the February 1990 midyear meeting. See Report to the House of Delegates,
1990 A.B.A. COMM'N ON MASS TORTS REV. REP. 116. This report contained a detailed set
of recommendations on processing mass torts, with broad ramifications for mandatory
consolidation of state and federal actions, expanded removal jurisdiction, choice-of-law,
punitive damages, burden of proof, issue preclusion, expanded expert witness input,
broadened use of alternative dispute resolution mechamsms (including settlement), and
increased regulation of attorneys' fees. The delegates instead considered a proposal from
the Standing Committee on Federal Judicial Improvements that was similar to proposals
in the REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE (1990) and the Multiparty,
Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 1990, H.R. 3406, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC.
H3116 (daily ed. June 5, 1990). Despite the support of the sections on litigation and tort
and insurance practice, the proposal was defeated. See 58 U.S.L.W 2474, 2477 (Feb. 20,
1990); see also Committee on Federal Courts of the New York Bar Association, Improinng
Jury Comprehenswn sn Complex Civil Litigation, 62 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 549 (1988).
17. See, e.g., Pointer, Complex Litigation: Demonstration of Pretral Conference, 6 REV.
LrriG. 285 (1987); Rubin, Mass Torts and Litigation Dsasters, 20 GA. L. REv. 429 (1986);
Weinstein, Preliminary Reflections on the Law's Reaction to Dwsasters, 11 COLUM. J. ENVTL.
L. 1 (1986); Weinstein, Procedural and Substantive Problems in Complex Litigation Armsng
from Disasters, 5 TOURo L. REV. 1 (1988); Williams, Mass Tort Class Actions: Going, Going,
Gone?, 98 FR.. 323 (1983); see also Annual Judical Conference Second Judicial Circuit
of the United States, Innovative Techniues for Resoling Complex Litigation, 115 F.R.D.
374 (1987) [hereinafter Innovative Technzques].
18. See, e.g., COMPLEX LITIG. PROJECT (Tent. Draft No. 1, Apr. 14, 1989); %d. (Prelim.
Draft No. 2, Sept. 13, 1989); zd. (Council Draft No. 2, Nov. 14, 1989) (dealing with problems
of complex litigation, federal intrasystem consolidation, federal intersystem consolidation,
and proposed complex litigation statutes). Future drafts will address applicable law and
the relationship of proposed procedural changes to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (Rule)
23.
The REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 16, also contains
recommendations for complex litigation reform which parallel in significant respects the
recommendations of the ABA and the American Law Institute (ALI). Id. at 44-46.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws is considering a
Transfer of Litigation Act. At its July 1990 meeting, the National Conference of Com-
missioners considered a proposal that would establish a framework for transferring and
consolidating cases in state courts, supplant forum non convemens principles, and require
joint consent of the transferring and receiving courts. For other detailed provisions, see
Transfer of Litigation Act, Nat'l Conf. of Comm'rs on Uniform St. Laws (Draft, July 1990).
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research organizations, 19 and Congress.20 Each of these groups is
studying alternative approaches to coping with massive disaster
and products liability litigation. Taken together, their efforts
represent many different avenues for possible resolution of the
mass tort litigation criss.2
Without a doubt, the judicial administration problems pre-
sented by mass tort litigation are of great current concern. This
study was prepared partially in response to the recommendation
in the Federal Courts Study Committee Report of April 1990 that
Iflor the small number of instances in which extraordinarily
high numbers of injuries may have been caused by a single
product or event, the courts should explore, and the Federal
Judicial Center should analyze and disseminate information
about, tailored procedures to avoid undue re-litigation of per-
tinent issues and otherwise facilitate prompt, economical and
just disposition of clains.2
In commenting on the deluge of asbestos cases in the federal
courts, the Committee noted that some federal courts "deter-
mined that alternative procedures to reduce re-litigation are
essential" and that they managed asbestos caseloads through
mass trials, class certification, and heavy involvement in class-
wide settlements.23 Citing other innovative resolution techniques,
the Committee concluded that "[t]he Federal Judicial Center
19. See D. HENSLER, W FELSTINER, M. SELVIN, & A. EBENER, ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS:
THE CHALLENGE OF MASS ToxIc TORTS (1985); J. KAKALIK, P EBENER, W FELSTINER, &
M. SHALEY, COSTS OF ASBESTOS LITIGATION (1983); J. KAKALIK, P EBENER, W FELSTINER,
& M. SHALEY, VARIATION IN ASBESTOS COMPENSATION AND EXPENSES (1984); M. PETERSON
& M. SELVIN, RESOLUTION OF MASS TORTS: TOWARD A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATION OF
AGGREGATIVE PROCEDURES (1988); M. SELVIN & L. PINCUS, THE DEBATE OVER JURY PER-
FORMANCE: OBSERVATIONS FROM A RECENT ASBESTOS CASE (1987); Hensler, Resolhng Mass
Tone Torts, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 89.
20. See H.R. 3406, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. H3116 (daily ed. June 5, 1990).
21. Professor Francis McGovern outlined seven possible solutions for mass tort litiga-
tion: (1) no judicial or legislative interference-a race to the courthouse, with early
litigants overcompensated, later plaintiffs undercompensated, and attorneys handsomely
compensated; (2) legislative solution, such as the Swine Flu statute; (3) legislative tinkering,
exemplified by the ABA and ALI projects; (4) judicial solutions, such as Rule 23 class
action certifications; (5) judicial tinkering, such as managerial techniques that expedite
cases; (6) judicial consensus, by which judges choose the best tinkering techmques and
combine them in a national approach, such as a claimant registry; and (7) consensus
among the parties, or bringing the parties together to formulate a mutually acceptable
approach. F McGovern, Remarks at the Federal Judicial Center Asbestos Conference
(June 25, 1990).
22. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 16, at 46.
23. Id.
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should collect and analyze data on the new methods and, as it
thinks best, disseminate information to judges before whom such
litigation is pending."24
In contrast to the sweeping reforms contained in other mass
tort litigation proposals, the scope of this study is narrow. It
analyzes the problems and procedures utilized in two federal
asbestos mass tort litigations certified for adjudication under
Rule 23 class action procedures. This report examines the man-
agement techniques used by Judge Robert M. Parker in Cimsno
v. Raymark Industmes, Inc.25 and Judge James McGirr Kelly in
In re School Asbestos Litigatwon.26 Cimsno and School Asbestos
Litsgatwn provide two very different examples of class action
treatment of mass tort litigation. Thus, this research expands on
prior Federal Judicial Center studies of alternative trial struc-
tures for handling asbestos litigation.27
A. The Problem of Postaggregatsve Mass Tort Procedure
The major purpose of this study-to provide detailed infor-
mation about consolidated handling of mass tort litigation-is
achieved by identifying issues and by describing and assessing
postaggregative procedure and alternative trial structures. The
focus is on management techniques after aggregation of claims,
either by class action rule or by Rule 42 consolidation.28 Because
24. Id. The Committee's recommendation also stated that legislative solutions might
result from such judicial innovation:
Studies of such alternatives might suggest wider applications for them, and
at some point, Congress may wish to facilitate the resolution of mega-cases
by altering the substantive terms for relief or establishing alternative remedy
schemes. Such legislation might aid not only the federal courts but also state
systems, which sometimes carry the lion's share of mega-case burdens.
Id.
25. No. B-86-0456-CA (ED. Tex. Nov. 12, 1990). This study designates all further
citations to this case by document or order number, docket page number, and date. The
docket entries were not assigned individual docket numbers.
26. No. 8-0268 (ED. Pa. filed Jan. 17, 1983). This study designates all further citations
to this case by document or order number, docket number, and date. The court clerk
assigned consecutive docket numbers to each docket entry.
27. In his 1987 study, TRENDS IN ASBESTos LITIGATION, supra note 1, Tom Willging
observed that the Eastern District of Texas, in Jenkins v. Raymark Industries, Inc., and
the Eastern District of Pennsylvama, in In re School Asbestos Litigation, were the only
two federal courts to alter the trend of federal court reluctance to certify mass tort cases
for class action treatment. Id. at 93-98.
28. Although originally intended to analyze the efficacy of the class action model,
during the course of litigation, Cimzno was transformed from a class action into a combined
class action and Rule 42 consolidation. See infra notes 72-95 and accompanying text.
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of federal courts' long-standing resistance to certifying mass tort
claims under the federal class action rule,29 there is a paucity of
information about class action management of mass tort litiga-
tion.30 This project is therefore a case study of two seminal
examples of class action management of mass tort claims.
Until fairly recently, almost all discussion of mass tort litigation
centered on joinder problems in federal and state court systems.
Reformers have directed their efforts at innovative jurisdictional
proposals to enhance consolidation possibilities. 31 They have di-
rected very little attention, if any, toward the significant issues
relating to postaggregative case management. Although many
federal judges have experience handling other types of complex
litigation, such as antitrust suits or institutional reform litigation,
very few have experience handling consolidated personal injury
or property damage cases. Cimsno and School Asbestos Liftgatswn
illustrate postconsolidation aggregative procedure in this sub-
stantive setting.
The first portion of this study sketches the joinder and con-
solidation issues involved in these two cases. It canvasses class
certification problems, as well as issues relating to opt-m and
opt-out litigants and subclasses. This discussion centers on dis-
trict court class certification decisions and their appellate ap-
proval and explores jurisdictional issues, such as personal
jurisdiction in a nationwide class action and the presence of
foreign defendants with sovereign immunity defenses. This sec-
tion also discusses briefly the choice-of-law problems presented
in asbestos mass tort class actions.
The next sections review aspects of judicial management, in-
cluding pretrial conferences and procedure, discovery plans, the
role of magistrate judges, special masters, and court-appointed
expert witnesses, the motivations for settlement, and the judi-
ciary's role in settlement. The formulation of polyfurcated trial
plans implemented through reverse bifurcation or trifurcation
receives special attention. This discussion also addresses tech-
niques for aiding jury comprehension and other problems that
arise during the course of these litigations, such as recourse to
ADR techniques, organization of counsel and attorneys' fees, and
29. See infra note 127.
30. Virtually no models of class action treatment of mass tort litigation exist. The few
mass tort litigations that invoked the class action rule did so as part of a settlement. See
P SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL (1986); supra note 14 and accompanying text.
31. See supra notes 15-21.
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recusal of a magistrate judge. Finally, the study describes the
broader constitutional law issues implicated by these two class
actions, particularly due process concerns and seventh amend-
ment jury trial issues.
In theory, postaggregative procedural problems in class actions
are essentially the same as those in simple two-party litigation.
A central question of this study is the extent to which mass tort
class actions require either the adaptation of familiar procedure
or the innovation of postaggregative procedure. Because Cimno
and School Asbestos Litgattwn are the first two asbestos cases
fully adjudicated under class action rules, they illustrate certain
problems involved in consolidated postaggregative procedure.32
Questions relating to consolidated postaggregative procedure
are the next conceptual and practical frontiers of mass tort
adjudication. Rapidly changing events impel a united, aggregative
approach to handling asbestos claims. On July 16, 1990, Judge
Thomas D. Lambros of the Northern District of Ohio issued an
interim order establishing a nationwide asbestos personal injury
class action-the first of a series of orders establishing coordi-
nated federal handling of asbestos personal injury litigation.-3
Likewise, Judge Jack Weinstein of the Southern District of New
York, who was assigned the Brooklyn Navy Yard asbestos cases
in the spring of 1990, indicated that the need for a national
uniform plan for asbestos litigation may result in class action
treatment.is In late July 1990, parties in that litigation moved
32. See M. PETERSON & M. SELVIN, supra note 19, at x-xi (model for aggregative
procedure). Many of the conceptual questions raised in this study are pertinent: (1) What
is the litigation about? (2) Who are the participants? (8) What is the formal organization
of the litigation? (4) What aggregative procedures are used? (5) What are the features of
those aggregative procedures? (6) What procedural actions have been taken? (7) How
have those actions been carried out? (8) What informal actions have been taken? Id.
33. Interim Order Establishing and Maintaimng a National Class Action in Asbestos-
related Personal Injury and Wrongful Death Actions Under Rule 23(bI)(B) Because of a
Limited Fund and to Preserve the Jurisdiction of This and Other Federal and State
Courts, In re Ohio Asbestos Litig., OAL Order No. 96 (N.D. Ohio July 16, 1990); see also
Ohw Asbestos Litig., OAL Order Nos. 96a-96e (July 20-Aug. 6, 1990) (establishing, among
other things, a court-annexed consolidated claims center as a short-term national solution
while an ad hoc committee of judges explored long-term solutions); Walsh, Asbestos Class
Action is Ordered, Ruling Could Mean Judicial Tug-of-War, Wash. Post, July 17, 1990, S
C, at 1, col. 2.
34. Order Pertaimng to Manville Trust, In re New York City Asbestos Litig., Index
No. 40000 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 1, 1990). This represents an unusual coordination of federal
and state asbestos cases and is captioned also as In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos
Litig. (E.D.N.Y. June 1, 1990), repmnted in 5 Mealey's Litig. Rep. Asbestos C-2 - C-5 (June
15, 1990). See generally Lambert, Control of Manville Reorganization Is Turned Over to
Judge Wemnsten, Wall St. J., July 23, 1990, S B, at 5, col. 1 (discussing Wemstei's role
[Vol. 32:475
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for certification of a nationwide class action of asbestos personal
injury cases, and Judge Lambros stayed his own class action
order pending a determination of the motion.35 Plaintiffs filed
similar motions for nationwide class certification in the Eastern
District of Texas. 8 Finally, on August 10, 1990, ten federal judges
issued an unprecedented joint order establishing a multicourt
cooperative effort for handling personal injury asbestos cases,
utilizing consolidation and class action rules to effect a national
approach to this litigation crisis.r In light of this resurgence of
interest in using Rule 23 class actions as a vehicle for adjudicating
asbestos claims,38 this study provides guidance to judges and
litigants who may soon be involved in judicial resolution of
asbestos mass tort cases in similar consolidated proceedings. 9
B. Methodology: The Comparative Case Study
This case study of two massive, consolidated asbestos class
action litigations describes and analyzes innovative use of class
in administering a bankruptcy plan for an asbestos personal injury trust); Walsh, Asbestos
Cases at Another Crossroads, Judge's Threat to Impose Settlement on Manville Claims Seen
as Rebuke to Legin of Lawyers, Wash. Post, July 15, 1990, S H, at 1, col. 2 (reporting on
Judge Weinstem's threat to Impose a settlement); Labaton, The Bitter Fight Over the
Manville Trust, N.Y. Times, July 8, 1990, S 3, at 1, col. 2 (indicating that Judge Weinstein
was prepared to move thousands of cases to his Brooklyn docket).
35. See supra note 33.
36. Motion of Plaintiffs for Class Action Under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) Against Celotex Corp.
and Carey Canada, Inc., Cimmo v. Raymark Indus., No. B-6-0456-CA, Docket at 409 (E.D.
Tex. July 16, 1990); Motion to Certify a National Class Action Filed in Cimino, 5 Mealey's
Litig. Rep. Asbestos 9-10 (July 20, 1990) (plaintiffs' request to certify a Rule 23(b)(3)
nationwide class action in the Eastern District of Texas on liability and punitive damages
in asbestos personal injury cases).
37. Order, In re National Asbestos Litig., Nos. 1:90 CV 11,000 (NJD. Ohio Aug. 10, 1990)
& 1:90 CV 5,000 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 1990) (consolidation and class action order for
multicourt cooperative effort).
38. See, e.g., Rosenberg, Class Actions For Mass Torts: Doing Indivndual Justice by
Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561 (1987) [hereinafter Rosenberg, Class Actions For Mass
Torts] (advocating class action model as consonant with public law model); Rosenberg, Of
End Games and Openings in Mass Tort Cases, 69 B.U.L. REv. 695, 727-30 (1989) [hereinafter
Rosenberg, Of End Games and Openings] (favoring mandatory class action model for
adjudication of mass tort claims).
39. State courts dealing with heavy asbestos caseloads also need consolidation models.
See, e.g., New Developments, Mass Torts: Baltimore Judge Orders Consolidation If ADR
Solution to Asbestos Suits Fails, 4 Alt. Dis. Res. Rep. (BNA) 163-64 (May 24, 1990) (updating
ADR procedures in Maryland state asbestos cases); Bulletin, Baltimore Judge Consolidates
5,000 Cases For Tial, Mealey's Litig. Rep. Asbestos (Apr. 25, 1990) (state consolidation
of 5,000 cases for trial slated for Feb. 1, 1991); New Developments, Mass Torts: Court-
Appointed Master in Baltimore Expands Asbestos ADR Plans to State, 4 Alt. Dis. Res.
Rep. (BNA) 19-20 (Jan. 18, 1990) (Special Master Feinberg's efforts to structure Maryland
state asbestos claims).
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action and consolidated procedure as one alternative management
technique for aggregative handling of numerous individual claims.
As such, it is part of a growing literature of case studies con-
cerning asbestos litigation and other complex mass tort cases.40
As Professor McGovern describes, these studies aim "to expand
the analytic literature describing new case management tech-
niques" so that "[w]ith a sufficient database of case histories, it
may be possible by reasoning inductively to develop a functional
approach for the judicial management of complex cases."'41
Although this study analyzes Cimino and School Asbestos Lst-
gatwn because they were the only two ongoing certified asbestos
class action litigations at the time of the research, these cases
provide good counterpoints for comparison. For example, Cimsno
was a districtwide class action consolidating over 3,000 individual
asbestos personal injury claims, whereas School Asbestos Litga-
twn represents a nationwide class action of over 35,000 school
district claims for property damage resulting from asbestos use.
The class actions implicated different questions of joinder, cer-
tification, jurisdiction, legal theory, applicable law, and damages.
Moreover, the judicial management styles provide an interesting
contrast: Judge Parker assumed the role of a highly activist,
managerial judge, whereas Judge Kelly assumed a reactive, non-
interventionist posture. Each judge used a different philosophical
and practical approach to handle his respective class action, which
affected the course of those litigations.
This comparative study was accomplished by resort to original
records consisting of party filings and docket sheets, published
and unpublished court orders, masters' reports, and appellate
decisions. In addition to written records, the author interviewed
many of the judicial officers involved in these cases, including
Judges Parker 42 and Kelly,4 Magistrate Judges Earl S. Hines
40. See, e.g., McGovern, Resolmng Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U.L. REv. 659
(1989) [hereinafter McGovern, Mature Mass Tort] (case studies of Jenkins v. Raymark
Industrmes, Inc. and In re All. Robzns Co.); McGovern, Toward a Functional Approach for
Managing Complex Litigation, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 440 (1986) [hereinafter McGovern,
Functional Approach] (case studies of Michigan fishing rights litigation, Alabama utility
ratemaking, and Ohio asbestos litigation); Schuck, The Role of Judges zn Settling Complex
Cases: The Agent Orange Example, 53 U. CHi. L. REv. 337 (1986) (case study of Agent
Orange litigation with focus on settlement techiques).
41. McGovern, Functional Approach, supra note 40, at 441-42.
42. Judge Parker was interviewed several times throughout January to August 1990
to ascertain his role in pretrial case management, his goals in structuring the litigation,
and his expectations concerning the trial process pursuant to his trial plan. He was
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and Edwin E. Naythons, and Special Master Jack Ratliff.4 The
author also discussed aspects of the cases with the judges' law
clerks and court personnel in the clerks' offices of these two
districts. In addition, the author interviewed ten lawyers for
parties who settled and were no longer involved in the ongoing
litigations. 45
Finally, the time frame in which the research was conducted
limits this study and mandates that it center on pretrial case
management and trial structuring. At the time of writing, Phase
I of the Cimsno trial was completed. In July 1990, Judge Parker
began adjudicating Phase III of Cimsno, using a reverse trifur-
cation procedure. Phase II will follow School Asbestos Litgatson
was proceeding with expert witness discovery, with an expected
trial date of spring 1991. Time constraints limited the ability to
assess the outcomes of the trial plans and to examine the cluster
of interesting questions surrounding final adjudication of these
actions.46 Moreover, because these cases have not disposed of all
claims, the study is circumscribed by a lack of ultimate appellate
resolution of many of the procedural issues.
reinterviewed a number of times subsequent to the trial of Phase I in order to learn us
impressions of that portion of the trial and his thoughts concermng management of the
remainmng two trial phases. All interviews were conducted with the understanding that
no material would be published that might be in derogation of the ongoing litigation.
43. Judge Kelly was interviewed twice during February 1990 to discover the same
information about pretrial case management. Because no trial is anticipated in School
Asbestos Litigation before spring 1991, the information learned from Judge Kelly describes
pretrial management rather than trial management.
44. Special Master Jack Ratliff, Professor of Law at The Umversity of Texas (Austin),
was interviewed on February 1, 1990. Professor McGovern, retained as an expert witness
for Phase III of Cim-tw, declined to be interviewed because of his role as a witness in
the litigation.
45. This project is somewhat umque because it involves the investigation of ongoing
litigation. In general, the Federal Judicial Center avoids investigation of open cases
because of concern about the reliability of data due to the parties' reluctance to divulge
information in such circumstances, problems relating to privileged information, and the
fear of being a possible messenger for ex parte commumcations. In order to preserve
confidentiality among the litigants and judicial officers, neither the parties nor the lawyers
involved in these cases were interviewed prior to final disposition or settlement of issues
and claims involving those parties or lawyers.
46. See, e.g., M. PETERSON & M. SELVIN, supra note 19, at xi (describing conceptual
model for assessing outcomes in mass tort litigation, including. (1) Has the litigation been
resolved? (2) Was the resolution comprehensive? (3) How was compensation distributed
among plaintiffs? (4) What were the defendants' relative contributions? (5) How satisfied
were the parties with the outcome? (6) How much did the litigation cost? (7) How long
did the litigation take?).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
C. Procedural History: Jenkins v. Raymark Industries, Inc.,
Cimino v. Raymark Industries, Inc., and In re School
Asbestos Litigation
As class action adjudications of thousands of individual claims,
Cimino and School Asbestos Lstsgatwn have progressed along
closely parallel procedural tracks. The original complaint in Cim-
bno was filed in May 1986, and the Cimsno class action was
provisionally certified on February 8, 1989. The original complaint
in School Asbestos Lstsgatwn was filed in 1983, and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit approved the class
action in 1986.47 Between 1986 and 1989, the parties in both
litigations engaged in routine motion practice,4 massive discov-
ery, ADR, and settlement negotiations. During 1989 and 1990,
both litigations centered on formulating trial plans under the
class action rule. Cimsno, however, illustrates how an actively
managed class action can lead to expeditious resolution of thou-
sands of consolidated cases in a fairly short time.49 Cimsno was
completely adjudicated by the end of 1990; School Asbestos Lits-
gatwn is scheduled for trial in the spring of 1991.
1. Jenkins v Raymark Industries, Inc. as Background to
Cimino v Raymark Industries, Inc.
Cimsno v. Raymark Industmes, Inc. is difficult to understand
outside of the context of Judge Parker's handling of asbestos
litigation in the Eastern District of Texas over a ten-year period.
Judge Parker's evolutionary progression of asbestos case man-
agement has been reported extensively, 50 but a brief reprise here
assists in comprehending Judge Parker's innovative procedures
in Cimno.
The first significant appellate decision affirming a plaintiffs
victory in asbestos litigation occurred in 1973. 51 Judge Parker
47. In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986).
48. Chiefly motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction or venue under FED. R. Crv. P
12, or for such defenses as statute-of-limitations or immunity. See snfra notes 185-218 and
accompanying text.
49. From provisional certification to the end of trial, Cimsno will have taken approxi-
mately two years; School Asbestos Litigation is in its seventh year of proceedings, with
trial almost a year away.
50. See, e.g., T. WILLGING, supra note 1, at 89; Arthurs, Texas Judge Rides Herd on
Asbestos Suits, Legal Times, May 19, 1986, at 1.
51. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973); see generally
P BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL (1985) (discussing
difficulties of early asbestos litigation).
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was appointed to the federal bench in the Eastern District of
Texas in 1979, and he began experimenting with different meth-
ods of processing asbestos cases in 1980.52 Judge Parker first
tried small consolidations of three to six cases and issued rulings
precluding jury consideration of common issues.P In 1981, he
attempted to use the collateral estoppel doctrine to prevent
defendants from raising certain defenses that other defendants
had raised in earlier asbestos litigation, but the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected this use of the
doctrine.5 Judge Parker's next experiment used five juries sitting
simultaneously to hear evidence on common issues of causation
and the manufacturer's duty to warn, but the juries returned
different verdicts and Judge Parker declared this experiment a
failure. 15 He then attempted to consolidate groups of thirty cases
for resolution. In this format, four cases were presented to a
single jury on common issues; if the jury found the defendants
liable, the remaining twenty-six cases were to have mmitrials on
the issues of exposure and damages. After the parties tried four
representative cases, the defendants agreed to settle all thirty
cases for a lump sum.se
Although this format proved successful, Judge Parker believed
he had reached the maximum consolidation feasible, yet hundreds
of asbestos cases remained on the Eastern District of Texas
docket. Judge Parker therefore invited a motion to class certify
all asbestos personal injury cases pending in the district. In
October 1985, he certified a Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out class action for
approximately 755 cases and permitted the defendants an inter-
locutory appeal to the Fifth Circuit17 which affirmed the certifi-
cation. This procedure became known as Jenkins L
52. Judge Parker progressed in what Willging called a "step-ladder effect." T. WILLGING,
supra note 1, at 98.
53. See, e.g., Migues v. Nicolet Indus., 493 F Supp. 61 (EmD. Tex. 1980) (ruling that
asbestos products are inherently dangerous and defective as a matter of law), rev'd sn
part, Migues v. Fibreboard Corp., 662 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1981); Flatt v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 488 F Supp. 836 (E.D. Tex. 1980) (same).
54. Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F Supp. 1353, 1361-63 (E.D. Tex. 1981)
(asbestos defendants not parties to prior litigation are collaterally estopped from raising
defenses rejected in prior litigation), rev'd sn part, 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982).
55. See T. WILLGING, supra note 1, at 89.
56. Newman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. M-79-124-CA (E.D. Tex.), mandamus
dented sub nom. In re Armstrong World Indus., No. 84-2690 (5th Cir. 1984). The class
representatives' cases resulted in an average of one million dollars in actual damages
and one million dollars in punitive damages. Following these verdicts, the defendants
agreed to settle all 30 cases for approximately $12.5 million. See M. SELVIN & L. Pxucus,
supra note 19, at 22; T. WMLGING, supra note 1, at 89; Arthurs, supra note 50.
57. Memorandum and Order, Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., No. M-84-193-CA (E.D. Tex.
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The trial of Jenksns I consisted of thirteen named class rep-
resentatives, thirteen defendants, and a tightly organized attor-
ney committee structure.5 The Fifth Circuit approved a class
action to resolve common defense issues and the defendants'
culpability for possible punitive damages, with individual issues
of unnamed members to be resolved in later minitrials of seven
to ten plaintiffs. 59 Judge Parker appointed Professor McGovern
as special master to compile information about each class member
and to create an aggregate profile of the class. According to
Professor McGovern, the'purpose of this study was to enable the
jury to analyze the proportionality of punitive damages awards
and to better appreciate the typicality of the named class rep-
resentatives ° The Jenksns I trial began in March 1986, but before
the defendants began their case and after only sixteen days of
trial, the litigation settled for 137 million dollars. 61
Although Jenkins I settled 755 cases, approximately 1,000 cases
still remained on the Eastern District of Texas docket, and
plaintiffs were filing approximately 150 to 200 new cases each
month.62 In June 1986, Judge Parker issued a preliminary ADR
order and, after the defendants' objections and appeals to modify
that order, the attorneys signed an ADR agreement in September
1986.63 This agreement set up an ADR mechanism for handling
Oct. 16, 1985). Judge Parker believes that interlocutory appellate resolution of procedural
issues raised by innovative judicial trial management techniques is useful because it
induces early resolution and avoids waste if management decisions are invalidated
subsequent to trial. In certifying an order for appeal, he stated, "The Court will not view
any party's appeal of this Order or efforts to seek mandamus review as a tactic designed
-to delay or impede this litigation. In fact the Court encourages such action." Memorandum
and Order at 17, Cimino v. Raymark Indus., No. B-86-0456-CA, Docket at 159 (E.D. Tex.
Mar. 5, 1990) (certifying trial plan for immediate appeal under 28 U.S.C. S 1292(b)).
58. For a detailed description of the Jenkins I trial, see McGovern, Mature Mass Tort,
supra note 40, at 660-75.
59. Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468, 471 (5th Cir. 1986). For a discussion of
class certification issues, see snfra notes 128-59 and accompanying text.
60. McGovern, Mature Mass Tort, supra note 40, at 669.
61. Id. at 671. McGovern reports that the settlement provided that the plaintiffs'
attorneys would allocate the award money among class members, subject to Judge
Parker's review. Judge Parker reviewed the award to each class member in light of the
data that Professor McGovern compiled and made several changes in awards. The
settlement also included a separate amount for each plaintiffs attorney, but Judge Parker
limited the attorneys' fees to no more than, 20%, with lead counsel receiving 1% of the
settlement for his role in the trial. Id. According to McGovern, the average value of the
class action cases was 25% lower than the mean of prior settlement values. Id. Judge
Parker stated that one reason he prefers class action treatment of asbestos cases is that
the rule enables him to exercise control over the award of attorneys' fees.
62. T. WILLGING, supra note 1, at 89, 118.
63. See Order, Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., No. M-84-193-CA (E.D. Tex. Sept. 19, 1986)
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all asbestos cases filed in that district from January 1, 1985, until
April 1, 1986. The agreement included cases filed after the
Jenkins I class certification. In the fall of 1986, Judge Parker
created a new class, called Jenkns II, for all Beaumont Division
cases filed from January 1, 1985, through March 31, 1986,64 and
issued an order staying all asbestos cases pending in the district.65
He viewed the ADR process as administratively efficient and
beneficial to the defendants because it reduced their exposure to
future damages and their transaction costs.
The Jenkhns II ADR agreement 66 detailed a three-stage process
for handling newly filed claims in the district. In the first stage,
plaintiffs' attorneys certified to an ADR monitor the asbestos
cases eligible for ADR treatment, the monitor referred sixty
cases a month to the defendants for an eligibility agreement, and
the defendants had sixty days to consent. If eligibility was agreed
upon, the parties had forty days to negotiate a settlement in the
second stage of the process. If settlement did not occur, the
parties had ninety days for arbitration in the third stage. If
arbitration did not result in settlement, the plaintiff had the
option of filing suit in district court, except that the ADR agree-
ment permitted no discovery relating to punitive damages or the
state-of-the-art defense. 67
The Jenkins II ADR process began in late 1986 and functioned
until early 1988. Magistrate Judges McKee and Hines served as
ADR monitors, and Magistrate Judge Hines set up an elaborate
calendaring system that clustered asbestos filings into ADR
groups.68 The original Cimzno complaint was filed on May 12,
1986, and ultimately received a monitor's certification of eligibil-
ity as part of an ADR group.6 9 However, Cimsno never advanced
beyond the first stage of the ADR process because, by late 1988,
(order for ADR). See generally Comment, Alternative Dispute Resolution sn Complex
Litigation, 57 UMKC L. REV. 839 (1989) (describing techmques of summary jury trials,
minitrials, and court-annexed arbitration).
64. Order Expanding the Class, Jenkins, No. M-84-193-CA (Sept. 19, 1986).
65. Order, Jenkins, No. M-84-193-CA (Oct. 10, 1986) (stay order); Order, Jenkins, No. M-
84-193-CA (June 24, 1986) (same). After Judge Parker concluded that the ADR process
had broken down, he lifted these stay orders. Order, Cimino v. Raymark Indus., No. B-
86-0456-CA, Docket at 5 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 5, 1988).
66. Order, Jenkins, No. M-84-193-CA (Sept. 19, 1986) (approving the Alternate Dispute
Resolution Agreement of Sept. 5, 1986); see snfra Appendix.
67. See snfra Appendix.
68. Id., see, e.g., Monitor's Certification of Negotiation Eligibility ADR Group 16,
Jenkins, No. M-84-193-CA (Jan. 14, 1988).
69. Monitor's Certification of Negotiation Eligibility of ADR Group 17, Cimsno, Docket
at 5 (Dec. 12, 1988).
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Judge Parker and Magistrate Judge Hines agreed that the ADR
process was failing and that something needed to be done to
handle the ever growing number of new asbestos filings in the
district.70 Although Judge Parker successfully settled some 600
additional cases by the time Cimino was certified for ADR
eligibility in 1988, over 2,300 asbestos cases remained on the
Eastern District of Texas docket. Convinced that the Jenkns 11
ADR was not working and that newly filed claims were swamping
the court, Judge Parker initiated the Cimsno class certification
by requesting plaintiff's counsel to file for class certificaton.71
2. Cimino v. Raymark Industries, Inc.: The Ditntunde Class
Actwn
Against the backdrop of the Jenkrns I class action settlement
and the Jenkns II ADR process, Judge Parker initiated the
Cimino class action in late 1988 by requesting a motion for
certification of a districtwide class action. Once he decided to
abandon the ADR structure, Judge Parker moved quickly to
expedite consolidated procedure.
After the plaintiffs moved for certification under Rule 23 on
December 15, 1988,72 Judge Parker held a hearing on February
1, 1989, giving the parties thirty days to conduct discovery on
the class representatives. On February 8, 1989, he granted pro-
visional class certification of all asbestos cases pending in the
Beaumont Division and ordered the parties to submit motions
for proposed subclasses no later than February 15, 1989.73 On
70. Judge Parker believed that the ADR mechanism was set up primarily to benefit
the defendants, but that some defendants frustrated the process by withdrawing from
it.
Magistrate Judge Hines likewise noted that not all of the defendants participated in
the ADR process. The slowness of the ADR program and the volume of new filings
doomed the ADR; the agreement contemplated settling 60 cases a month, but only 30
cases a month settled, whereas 200 or more new cases a month were filed. Characterizing
the ADR agreement as a great idea that simply did not work, Magistrate Judge Hines
also indicated that some plaintiffs either never recovered damages or died before recovery
because of the backlog. Initially, Magistrate Judge Hines first referred the oldest cases
for ADR eligibility; but over time, in consultation with the plaintiffs' attorneys, he moved
the most seriously Ml plaintiffs to the head of the ADR process. Notwithstanding the
court's dissatisfaction with the ADR process, Magistrate Judge Hines believed that the
parties liked it.
71. Judge Parker reported that plaintiff's counsel was willing to do whatever was
necessary to move the backlog of cases.
72. Motion of Plaintiffs for Certification of Class Under Rule 23, Cimsno, Docket at 6
(Dec. 15, 1988).
73. Order, Cimsno, Docket at 9 (Feb. 8, 1989).
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February 9, 1989, Judge Parker issued a memorandum and order
indicating that he contemplated a class action that would dispose
of all claims in a single trial with three phases. 4 The same order
certified two attorneys as class counsel, appointed Professor Jack
Ratliff as a special master to assist in formulating a class action
trial plan, and required that the master's preliminary report be
filed by May 1, 1989. 5 From mid-February through fall 1989,
Judge Parker heard motions for proposed subclasses, designated
one additional class counsel, issued a scheduling order for motions
and responses, and directed Magistrate Judge Hines to coordinate
discovery.78 The plaintiffs filed second and third amended class
action complaints7 7 and the court approved settlements with
various defendants belonging to the Center for Claims Resolu-
tion.78
During fall 1989, Judge Parker pushed Cimsno closer to trial
through a rapid succession of events. On September 25, 1989, he
received Special Master Ratliff's report outlining a proposed four-
phase trial plan.79 On October 26, Judge Parker issued an order
74. Memorandum and Order, Cimtno, Docket at 10 (Feb. 9, 1989). Judge Parker delin-
eated the following three phases:
(a) Phase One will determine the common issues relative to the tort liability
of defendants to all plaintiffs, actual damages of the class representatives,
and class punitive damage claims. (b) Phase Two will determine issues
of exposure, asbestos-related injury, and amounts of actual or compensatory
damages for the remaining individual plaintiff class members.
Phase Two also will determine affirmative defenses and percentages of
causation. (c) Phase Three will determine cross-actions and claims for indem-
nity and contribution among defendants.
IcL
75. I&
76. See Cimsno, Docket at 11-54 (Feb. 9, 1989-Sept. 22, 1989) (especially entries for Feb.
15, 16, 21; Mar. 9, 15, 17; Apr. 18, 21; June 8; July 3, 25; Aug. 24). By late spring 1989,
considerable confusion had arisen over which defendants were to be part of the class
action. In an attempt to clarify this confusion, Judge Parker issued an order designating
wich defendants would be part of the class action and severing from the class those
plaintiffs who had claims pending against nonclass defendants. See Order, Cimsno, Docket
at 46 (July 25, 1989). Sixteen defendants were named for inclusion in the class action:
AC & S, Inc., Asbestos Corp., Ltd., Carey Canada, Inc., Celotex Corp., Eagle-Picher
Indus., Inc.; Fibreboard Corp., The Flintkote Co., H.K. Porter Co., Jim Walter Corp.,
Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust; Owens-Illinois, Inc., Pittsburgh Corning Corp.,
Raymark Indus., Inc., Raytech Corp., Walter Indus., Inc., and W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. A
number of these defendants eventually settled with the plaintiffs.
77. Plaintiff's Second Amended Class Action Complaint, Cimwno, Docket at 28 (Mar. 17,
1989); Plaintiffs' Third Amelded Class Action Complaint, Cimzno, Docket at 39 (June 8,
1989).
78. Order, Cimno, Docket at 33 (Apr. 18, 1989).
79. Master's Report in Cimmo v. Raymark, Cimsnw, Docket at 54 (Sept. 20, 1989),
repmnted sn 5 Mealey's Litig. Rep. Asbestos G-1 (Oct. 6, 1989) [hereinafter Mealey's]. For
a discussion of the Report and the proposed trial plan, see 'nfra notes 352-57 and
accompanying text.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
certifying a class action of all asbestos cases pending in the
Beaumont Division as of February 1, 1989, and delineated a three-
phase trial plan for the approximately 3,031 pending cases.8° The
order called for a consolidated trial on the state-of-the-art defense
and punitive damages,81 as well as subsequent class action treat-
ment of the exposure and actual damages issues.82 The trial date
was set for February 5, 1990. Magistrate Judge Hines formulated
a discovery plan and scheduling order that required all plaintiffs
to be examined by physicians in Beaumont within thirty days
and to be deposed before the trial date, limiting depositions to
forty-five minutes. 3
In November 1989, defendants filed motions objecting to the
class certification and discovery limitations and requesting that
Judge Parker either vacate his ruling or certify it for interlocu-
tory appeal.M On December 29, 1989, Judge Parker overruled the
defendants' objections and denied the requests to modify the
order or grant certification for an interlocutory appeal. 85 In re-
sponse, defendants sought mandamus review of Judge Parker's
class certification, the trial plan, and the discovery order.86
80. Memorandum and Order, Ciminno, Docket at 58 (Oct. 26, 1989), reprnted in 5
Mealey's Litig. Rep. Asbestos A-1 (Nov. 3, 1989) [hereinafter Mealey's].
81. Id. at 5, reprnted tn Mealey's, supra note 80, at A-3. This portion of the trial plan
incorporated issues that the Fifth Circuit previously approved for class action treatment
in Jenkzns. See Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986).
82. Memorandum and Order, Cimino, Docket at 5-6, reprnted sn Mealey's, supra note
80, at A-3; see also Cimino Phased to Proceed as Consolidation, Class Action, 5 Mealey's,
supra note 80, at 8-10.
83. Discovery Plan and Scheduling for Deposition and Medical Examination of Plaintiffs,
Cimno, Docket at 63 (Nov. 9, 1989).
84. Cimsno, Docket at 63-75 (Nov.-Dec. 1989) (defendants' motions to decertify the class
or modify the court order relating to consolidation action and class certification); see also
Notes: Judge Parker's Class Action Ruling Challenged, Mealey's Litig. Rep. Asbestos 30-
31 (Nov. 17, 1989).
85. Order, Cimino, Docket at 78 (Dec. 29, 1989). Judge Parker refused to certify his
October 26th order because he thought the trial plan, coupled with a short trial date,
would impel certain "hold-out" defendants to settle. He feared that in granting interloc-
utory appeal, he would undermine his settlement goals. In retrospect, Judge Parker
thought interlocutory review was a means of letting all involved parties know whether
the appellate court ultimately would approve the trial structure, rather than wasting
time with a trial that the appellate court might subsequently invalidate.
86. Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Request to Consolidate, Adopt and Supplement,
In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1990) (No. 89-4945) (petition on behalf of
Pittsburgh Cormng Corp.); Petition for Writ of Mandamus, In re Fibreboard Corp., 893
F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1990) (No. 89-4937) (petition on behalf of Fibreboard Corp.). For the
plaintiffs' reply in opposition to the mandamus petition, see Plaintiffs-Respondents Reply
in Opposition to Petitions For Writ of Mandamus Filed by Fibreboard Corporation and
by Pittsburgh Cormng Corporation, In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1990)
(Nos. 89-4937, 89-4945).
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The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted the man-
damus, vacated Judge Parker's Phase II trial plan, and remanded
the case for further proceedings. The appellate court found "no
impediment to the trial of Phase I"8 and directed the district
court to proceed with that trial. The trial of Phase I began in
early February 1990.
On March 5, 1990, Judge Parker delineated the remaining trial
phases dealing with the issues of exposure, comparative causa-
tion, and damages.8 9 He consolidated Phases II and III under
Rule 42(a), trying the exposure issue by worksite group and the
damages issue by a representative sampling of disease category 90
He appointed Professor Francis McGovern as an expert witness
to evaluate the court's statistical sample for damages.91 Finally,
he certified the new trial plan for interlocutory appeal and invited
the parties to seek mandamus review,92 which they did.93 On
March 29, 1990, the Fifth Circuit denied the petitions for man-
damus and interlocutory appeal without written opinion.9 4 This
denial cleared the way for Judge Parker to proceed with Phases
II and III. 95
3. School Asbestos Litigation: The Natwnwde Class Actson
Throughout the 1980's, hundreds of public school districts and
private schools instituted asbestos removal lawsuits after federal
legislation required school asbestos hazard detection and abate-
87. In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1990). See snfra notes 145-49 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the reasons for the appellate court's invalidation
of Judge Parker's planned Phase H trial structure.
88. Fibreboard, 893 F.2d at 712.
89. Memorandum and Order, Cimno, Docket at 159 (Mar. 5, 1990).
90. Id.
91. I&, Docket at 161.
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Request to Consolidate, Adopt and
Supplement, In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1990) (No. 89-4945); Petition
for Writ of Mandamus, In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1990) (No. 90-4937).
94. Fibreboard Corp., No. 90-4199 (5th Cir. Mar. 29, 1990). The Fifth Circuit denied not
only the mandamus, but also Fibreboard's request that the mandamus petition be assigned
to the original three-judge panel that heard the first mandamus in January. The court
also denied the petitions for interlocutory appeal of Celotex, Carey Canada, and Pittsburgh
Corning. Id-, Nos. 90-9060 - 90-9062 (5th Cir. Mar. 29, 1990).
95. By coincidence, the jury returned its verdict in Phase I of Cimsno on March 29,
1990. The jury answered a series of liability-related interrogatories and found affirmatively
for nine of the ten plaintiffs whose individual cases they heard.
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ment.9 School asbestos abatement is a problem of enormous
dimensionsf7 In contrast to personal injury asbestos claims, school
asbestos cases seek to recover the costs of removing friable
asbestos from school buildings 8 School asbestos cases rely on
an array of legal theories to accomplish this goal: strict liability,
negligence, breach of warranty, nuisance, trespass, restitution,
indemnity, unfair trade practices, conspiracy, fraud, misrepresen-
tation, concert of action, and enterprise liability.9 Notwithstand-
ing these multiple theories, tort liability is the favorite ground
for recovery in school asbestos litigation because many jurisdic-
96. Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response, 15 U.S.C. SS 2641-2653 (1988); Asbestos
School Hazard Detection and Control Act of 1980, 20 U.S.C. SS 3601-3611 (1988); Asbestos
School Hazard Abatement Act of 1984, 20 U.S.C. SS 4011-4022 (1988); see also DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ASBESTOS LIABILrrY REPORT TO CONGRESS (Sept. 21,
1981). See generally Abelson, The Asbestos Removal Fiasco, 247 SCIENCE 1017 (1990)
(editorial criticizing the panic caused by EPA findings and federal law); Cross, Asbestos
in Schools: A Remonstianee Against Panw, 11 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 73 (1986) (proposing a
five-part program to standardize removal attempts as an alternative to litigation); Lang,
Danger sn the Classroom: Asbestos in the Public Schools, 10 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 111 (1985)
(arguing that the federal government should require inspection for asbestos and fund its
removal); Mossman, Bignon, Corn, Seaton, & Gee, Asbestos: Scientific Developments and
Implications for Public Policy, 247 SCIENCE 294 (1990) (discussing implications of low-level
exposure to asbestos in schools and buildings); Comment, Recovery for Risk Comes of Age:
Asbestos sn Schools and the Duty to Abate a Latent Envronmental Hazard, 83 Nw. U.L.
REV. 512 (1989) [hereinafter Comment, Recovery for Risk Comes of Age] (advocating tort
theory of liability for school asbestos removal cases); Comment, Issues in School Asbestos
Hazard Abatement Litigation, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 951 (1985) (outlining umque legal issues
in school asbestos removal cases); Comment, Asbestos in Schools and the Economw Loss
Doctrne, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 277 (1987) [hereinafter Comment, Economw Loss Doctrine]
(stating that costs of asbestos removal are economic losses and should be analyzed in
contract and not m tort); Comment, Asbestos zn Schools: The Asbestos Hazard Emergency
Response Act and School Asbestos Litigation, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1685 (1989) [hereinafter
Comment, Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act] (containing background on federal
legislation concerning school asbestos testing and removal, school board litigation, and
theories of liability); EPA-Sponsored Asbestos Dmlogue Concludes Without Major Agreement,
4 Alt. Dis. Res. Rep. (BNA) 235-36 (July 19, 1990) (discussing policy meeting on risks
involved in asbestos exposure in buildings).
97. See, e.g., Comment, Recovery for Risk Comes of Age, supra note 96, at 512 n.5
(discussing a 1985 United States General Accounting Office (GAO) investigation of 36
school districts' efforts at school asbestos cleanup, which reported $51 million spent
through 1984 and $289 million in planned expenditures).
98. Friable asbestos is asbestos that crumbles with age and emits asbestos fibers into
the air. Approximately 30,000 school districts nationwide have friable asbestos, and the
estimated cost of removal or abatement is as much as three billion dollars. See id. Another
figure reported to Congress was that cleanup would cost almost $200 million for the 295
districts nationwide with the worst asbestos problems. Id. (GAO Report and congressional
testimony on school asbestos and abatement removal estimate that cleanup would cost
almost $200 million).
99. See Comment, Recovery for Risk Comes of Age, supra note 96, at 513 n.6 (survey of
legal theories serving as basis for recovery for costs of abatement or removal of asbestos).
See generally Comment, Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act, supra note 96 (theories
of recovery); Comment, Economw Loss Doctrne, supra note 96 (theories of economic loss).
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tions have liberal "discovery rules" relating to statutes of limi-
tations in tort actions.100
Perhaps the most crucial distinction between asbestos personal
injury lawsuits and school asbestos abatement cases centers on
proving and evaluating recoverable damages. Whereas commen-
tators characterize personal injury recovery as highly individu-
alized and subjective, they view school asbestos recovery as more
objectively quantifiable:
Abatement recovery also reduces the concern with disparity
in the award of damages. Most personal injury toxic tort
actions include subjective, plaintiff-specific awards for intan-
gible damages such as pain and suffering, future medical costs,
and future injury that is likely to occur as a result of present
injury In contrast, asbestos abatement costs are fixed and
objectively measurable; they represent specific monetary dam-
ages. In addition, unlike personal injury damages, abatement
losses are status neutral. In other words, they will not signif-
icantly change according to the relative wealth or needs of the
party suffering the loss.10 1
This distinction helps to make the school asbestos cases more
amenable to consolidated proceedings than the personal injury
asbestos cases.
When Judge Kelly came on the bench, the plaintiffs had already
filed the complaint that would form the nucleus of the school
asbestos class action. In comparison to Cimsno, School Asbestos
Litsgatwn proceeded, and continues to proceed, at a more delib-
erate pace. Judge Kelly's overarching philosophy has been to
treat School Asbestos Littgattwn the same as any other class action,
and he has eschewed the active managerial judging that moved
100. Comment, Recovery for Risk Comes of Age, supra note 96, at 516-17. "Discovery
rules" refer to a clainant's ability to bring an action for recovery dating from the time
of discovery of an injury and are particularly pertinent in latent injury cases. In contrast,
strict notice and limitations requirements typically frustrate litigation based on contract
principles. Id In addition, the flux of so-called "economic loss" or "property damage"
doctrines often limits recovery to contract remedies. Id. at 518-26; see also Comment,
Economw Loss Doctine, supra note 96 (arguing in support of contract analysis of school
asbestos litigation and claiming that tort analysis causes economic distortion).
101. Comment, Recovery for Risk Comes of Age, supra note 96, at 544. Judge Kelly
believed that the problems that plague personal injury actions should not hamper
classwide calculation of damages in the nationwide school asbestos litigation because the
court and lawyers probably would be able to calculate damages based on the square
footage* of facilities affected by asbestos products. He did not mean to suggest that this
would be the ultimate measure of damages at trial, but merely that it differentiated
school asbestos cases from personal injury asbestos cases.
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Cimmno so quickly Although Judge Kelly admits that his nation-
wide class action is unique, he persistently conducts the litigation
as he would any other complex litigation or class action.10 2 From
Judge Kelly's perspective, school asbestos cases are distinguish-
able from personal injury asbestos cases because they are based
on property claims. School asbestos cases could not possibly be
tried on a one-by-one basis, and they are especially suited for
consolidated adjudication of common issues.
In reflecting on the genesis of the class action, Judge Kelly
stated that the possibility of a class action divided the plaintiffs'
and defendants' attorneys, with a number of plaintiffs' lawyers
wanting to proceed individually The defendants similarly split
along perceived interests. In contrast to Cimsno, however, the
parties initiated the class action certification rather than the
judge. In March 1984, some of the plaintiffs filed motions for
class certification. 03
In 1984, Judge Kelly certified a nationwide class action pur-
suant to Rules 23(b)(1)(B) and 23(b)(3).104 His order did three things.
First, the order created a mandatory class action for school
districts seeking punitive damages. 0 5 Second, it created an opt-
out class action for school districts seeking compensatory dam-
ages.10s Third, the order rejected plaintiffs' requests for certifi-
cations of a Rule 23(b)(2) class.'0 7 Judge Kelly also certified the
class action order for interlocutory appeal. While the appeal from
102. Prior to assuming responsibility for School Asbestos Litigation, Judge Kelly pre-
sided over employment discrimination class actions, some antitrust litigation, and a lawsuit
involving a multidefendant airplane crash; approximately half of his caseload consisted
of personal injury asbestos cases.
103. See, e.g., Plaintiffs' Motions for Class Action Certification, In re School Asbestos
Litig., No. 83-0268, Docket No. 50 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 1984); id., Docket No. 55 (Mar. 30,
1984); sd. Docket No. 56 (Apr. 13, 1984). In early October 1983, the court issued an order
requiring the plaintiffs to file a consolidated motion in support of class action maintenance.
Pretrial Order No. 4, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 30 (Oct. 6, 1983). The court
consolidated two separately filed school asbestos cases with the School Asbestos Litigation
docket. Board of Educ. v. U.S. Gypsum, No. 84-2312 (ED. Pa. filed May 11, 1984); Barnwell
School Dist. No. 45 v. U.S. Gypsum, No. 83-1395 (E.D. Pa. filed Apr. 1, 1983).
104. On April 13, 1984, Judge Kelly certified a mandatory class as against three
defendants and scheduled a hearing for May 11, 1984, at which time parties could appear
and apply for relief from the order. Throughout the summer, he heard oral argument on
the certification issue. As a result, he issued an order conditionally certifying a class
under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) and Rule 23(b)(3). See In re Asbestos School Litig., 104 F.R.D. 422
(E.D. Pa. 1984). The plaintiff classes were to consist of public and private elementary and
secondary schools.
105. Id at 438.
106. Id. at 433-34.
107. Id. at 438-39.
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the class certification was pending, the court constructed an
attorney committee,08 issued orders governing the award of
counsel fees and expenses,10 9 oversaw plaintiffs' drafting of the
class action notice,"0 and superintended a classwide settlement
with two defendants."'
In May 1986, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued
its decision on Judge Kelly's class certification order.112 The
appellate court decertified the mandatory punitive damages class,
but upheld the Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out class action for compensatory
damages."8
From 1987 through 1989, School Asbestos Littgatwn progressed
as a routine class action. Signal events included finalizing the
class action notice,"4 approving a class settlement with certain
defendants," 5 referring discovery matters to a magistrate judge,""
and conducting routine motion practice. 1 7 In January 1989, the
court ordered the completion of all discovery by December 31,
1989, scheduled a final pretrial conference for May 1990, and
indicated that it would place School Asbestos Litsgatwn in the
June 1, 1990, trial pool."8
Events, however, transpired more slowly. On January 23, 1990,
the plaintiffs submitted a proposed trial plan based largely on
108. Order No. 24, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 351 (Nov. 7, 1984).
109. Pretrial Order No. 23, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 315 (Oct. 19, 1984).
110. Pretrial Order No. 42, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 566 (Mar. 25, 1985).
111. Order No. 64, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 783 (June 17, 1986) (preliminary
approval of class settlement with Owens-Illinois, Inc. and Proko Industries, Inc. and
certification of temporary settlement class); Class Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary
Approval of Partial Settlement with Owens-Illinois, Inc. and Proko Indus., Inc., School
Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 750 (Apr. 2, 1986).
112. In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986); see also Comment, Asbestos
Hazard Emergency Response Act, supra note 96, at 1708-09 (describing School Asbestos
Litigation certification).
113. The court ruled that the punitive damages class was not valid due to insufficient
factual findings and the underinclusiveness of the proposed class. School Asbestos Litig.,
789 F.2d at 1005-06.
114. Pretrial Order No. 84, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 958 (Mar. 30, 1987) (order
relating to class notice).
115. Pretrial Order No. 198, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 1741 (Nov. 28, 1989)
(tentatively approving settlement Lac D'Amiante du Quebec); Pretrial Order No. 78,
School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 1015 (July 21, 1987) (approving settlement with Owens-
Illinois and Proko Industries).
116. Pretrial Order No. 94, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 1051 (Sept. 15, 1987)
(referring jurisdictional discovery requests to Magistrate Judge Edwin E. Naythons).
117. See generally docket sheet for School Asbestos Litig. (recording various Rule 12
motions to dismiss relating to jurisdiction and venue).
118. Order No. 169, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 1646 (Jan. 27, 1989). This order
also addressed expert witness discovery and the joint pretrial statement.
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Judge Parker's original trial plan in Cimsno. 119 When the Fifth
Circuit invalidated phases of the Cimno plan, the defendants
submitted alternative trial plans to the court.120 On May 17, 1990,
Judge Kelly ordered a bifurcated trial and delineated the issues
to be tried in Phase 1.121 In late July, he issued an order governing
expert witness discovery and required the parties to submit a
joint pretrial order before March 4, 1991.'2
Judge Kelly's goals for pretrial management have been to
move the case along with maximum efficiency and minimum cost
and to set up a litigation system that might lead to settlement
as a byproduct. He has maintained a posture of reacting to
counsel-initiated actions, spent little time meeting with counsel,
dealt with most issues on motion without oral argument, and,
whenever possible, conducted hearings by telephone conference.
I. BACKGROUND: JOINDER AND CONSOLIDATION ISSUES AS A
PREDICATE TO POSTAGGREGATIVE PROCEDURE
Both Cimtno v. Raymark Industres, Inc.123 and In re School
Asbestos Lstsgaton' resolved threshold issues of joinder and
consolidation. These mass tort cases differ, however, in that
Judge Parker adjudicated Cimbno under both class action pro-
cedure and Rule 42 consolidation principles, whereas Judge Kelly
has conducted School Asbestos Litigaton solely as a Rule 23 class
action.
A. Rule 23 Class Actwns and Rule 42 Consolsdatsons
The reluctance of federal courts to certify mass tort litigation
under Rule 23 class action procedure is well known and well
documented.125 Even after appellate courts upheld class certifi-
119. Plaintiffs' Motion for Order Governing Conduct of Trial, School Asbestos Litig.,
Docket No. 2032 (Jan. 22, 1990).
120. See, e.g., Response of Defendant GAF Corporation to Plaintiffs' Motion for Order
Govermng Conduct of Trial, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 2107 (Mar. 19, 1990).
121. Order No. 235, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 2225 (May 17, 1990) (describing
Phase I issues and bifurcated trial). For a discussion of the trial plan, see znfra notes
414-21 and accompanying text.
122. Pretrial Order No. 249, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 2294 (July 16, 1990); see
also Stipulation and Pretrial Order No. 239, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 2243 (May
29, 1990) (ordering 3oint pretrial order by June 29, 1990). The parties' failure to comply
with this order led Judge Kelly to extend the deadline in his July 16, 1990, order.
123. No. B-86-0456-CA (ED. Tex. Nov. 12, 1990).
124. No. 83-0268 (El). Pa. filed Jan. 17, 1983).
125. See, e.g., In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1984) (grant of
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cations in Cimzno and School Asbestos Littgatwn, federal court
resistance to class certification continued.126 Courts frequently
view class action procedure as inappropriate in toxic tort litiga-
tion for several reasons: the class action undermines both the
perceived need for individualized proof of claims and causation
requirements by relying on aggregate rather than individual
proof; the calculation of compensatory, punitive, and future-claim-
ant damages is highly problematic; the potential for applicable
law complications is present in every diversity-based mass tort
action; and class action procedure subverts individualized plaintiff
control over the litigation by transferring autonomy from the
individual claimant to the class attorney.127 Federal courts there-
mandamus to reverse erroneous class certification in bendectin products liability class
action); In re Tetracycline Cases, 107 F.R.D. 719 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (denial of class certifi-
cation for tooth discoloration caused by mothers' ingestion of tetracycline); Caruso v.
Celsius Insulation Resources, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 530 (MW.D. Pa. 1984) (denial of class certifi-
cation for claimants exposed to tome formaldehyde gas in insulation); Mertens v. Abbott
Labs., 99 F.R.D. 38 (D.N.H. 1983) (denial of class certification for DES claimants); In re
Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415 (W.D. Mo.) (denial of certification to Hyatt Skywalk
collapse claimants), vacated, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. dented, 459 U.S. 988, recertified,
95 F.R.D. 483 (W.D. Mo. 1982); In re Northern Dist. Cal. Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab.
Litig., 521 F Supp. 1188 (ND. Cal.) (denial of class certification relating to intrauterine
devices), 7odified, 526 F Supp. 887 (NJ). Cal. 1981), vacated sub nom Abed v. A.H. Robins
Co., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. dened, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983); Ryan v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 84 F.R.D. 230 (D.S.C. 1979) (denial of class certification for DES claimants); Payton
v. Abbott Labs., 83 F.R.D. 382 (D. Mass. 1979) (denial of class certification for exposure
to DES m utero), vacated, 100 F.R.D. 336 (D. Mass. 1983); Yandle v. PPG Indus., 65 F.R.D.
566 (E.D. Tex. 1974) (denial of class certification for claimants exposed to asbestos).
But see In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir.) (approving a Rule 23 settlement
class for Dalkon Slneld claimants and reviewing history of federal court resistance to use
of class action rule for mass accident and mass tort litigation), cert. dented, 110 S. Ct.
377 (1989); Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988) (upholding Rule
23(b)(3) class action certification for personal injury and property damage resulting from
chemical waste disposal); In re "Agent Orange" Prods. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir.
1987), cert. dented, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988) (settlement class certification for Agent Orange
claims).
126. See, e.g., In re Temple, 851 F.2d 1269 (11th Cir. 1988) (appellate court issued
mandamus to vacate district court order certifying mandatory class action under Rule
23(b)(1) in asbestos litigation).
127. Federal courts' resistance to use of the class action rule to adjudicate mass tort
claims is well rehearsed and argued in academic literature. See, e.g., Mullenix, Class
Resolution of the Mass-Tort Case: A Proposed Federal Procedure Act, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1039,
1039-43, 1049-60 (1986) (discussing the requirements of Rule 23(b)); Rosenberg, Class Actions
for Mass Torts, supra note 38, at 565-68 (identifying the "individual justice tradition" and
its rejection of bureaucratic justice as a source of the contempt for class treatment of
mass tort claims); Transgrud, Mass Trials sn Mass Tort Cases: A Dzssent, 1989 U. ILL. L.
REv. 69 (arguing against class action procedure); Note, Was the 1966 Advisory Committee
Right?: Suggested Remswns of Rule 23 to Allow More Frequent Use of Class Actions in
Mass Tort Litigation, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 461 (1988) (reviewing the techniques used by
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fore narrowly construe the Rule 23 prerequisites so that many
attempted mass tort class actions fail to meet commonality,
typicality, predominance, superiority, and other Rule 23 require-
ments.
1. Certificattwn Issues in Cimino and School Asbestos
Litigation
Cimino and School Asbestos Litigation offer two different meth-
ods of surmounting threshold joinder and consolidation issues.
Cimino represents a semisuccessful attempt at class action cer-
tification and procedure. In his October 26, 1989, trial plan order,
Judge Parker created a three-phase format.1e The first phase
consolidated 3,031 cases under Rule 42(a) for a single trial on the
state-of-the-art defense and punitive damages, a phase that did
"not involve class representatives or a class action."'1  Although
Judge Parker tried the state-of-the-art defense and punitive dam-
ages as a class action in Jenkins v. Raymark Industries, Inc.,3°
he abandoned this use of the class action in Cimino because "a
jury award to class representatives would serve merely to prej-
federal judges in certifying Rule 23 class actions in mass tort cases); Comment, Alternatives
to Litigation: Touw Torts and Alternative Duspute Resolution-A Proposed Solution to the
Mass Tort Case, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 779, 781-97 (1989) (identifying "indeterminant plaintiffs"
and "indeterminant defendants" as primary difficulties in bringing a mass toxic tort
action); Comment, The Use of Federal Class Actions in Mass Toic Pollution Torts, 56
TENN. L. REv. 243 (1988) [hereinafter Comment, The Use of Federal Class Actions] (survey
of problems of certifying mass tort cases under Rule 23). But see Rosenberg, Of End
Games and Openings, supra note 38, at 696-98 (arguing that collective processing of mass
tort cases more closely approximates individual justice than does case-by-case adjudica-
tion).
128. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
129. Memorandum and Order at 5, Cimino v. Raymark Indus., No. B-86-0456-CA, Docket
at 58 (EDl. Tex. Oct. 26, 1989), reprnted in Mealey's, supra note 80, at A-3; see also FED.
R. Civ. P 42(a).
130. 782 F.2d 468, 470-71 (5th Cir. 1986). Judge Parker found that one class trial on
defense-related questions-including product identification, product defectiveness, gross
negligence, and punitive damages-could save considerable time and expense. He isolated
the following issues, which later became standard Jenkins class issues:
(a) which products, if any, were asbestos-containing insulation products ca-
pable of producing dust that contained asbestos fibers sufficient to cause
harm in its application, use, or removal; (b) which of the Defendants' products,
if any, were defective as marketed and unreasonably dangerous; (c) what
date each Defendant knew of or should have known that insulators and their
household members were at risk of contracting an asbestos-related injury or
disease from the application, use, or removal of asbestos-contaimng insulation
products; and (d) what amount of punitive damages, if any, should be awarded
to the class as punishment for the Defendants' conduct.
Id. at 471 n.3.
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udice the [d]efendants in Phase Two of the trial."''1 Such a class
action would not achieve a fair resolution, and he could resolve
the issues without trying the cases of individual class represen-
tatives.132
Judge Parker intended to maintain Phases II and Ill as class
actions under Rule 23(b)(3). Phase II was to consider plaintiffs'
exposure, statutes of limitations and other defenses, and lump
sum actual and punitive damages. 1" Judge Parker initially antic-
ipated fully adjudicating eleven representative cases, but subse-
quently expanded this procedure to permit presentation of thirty
purely illustrative cases, with the plaintiffs and defendants each
selecting fifteen cases. These cases would not go to the jury for
resolution of the actual damages issue; rather, the distribution
of actual and punitive damages was to occur in Phase III, a
nonjury proceeding.14
Judge Parker found that proposed Phases II and III met the
requirements for certification under Rule 23(b)(3)"38 and that Rule
42(b) provided adequate legal authority to separate the consoli-
dation issues from the class action issues.'18 In concluding that
his Cimsno class action order was fully consistent with Jenkins,
he indicated that the Fifth Circuit had not foreclosed "the pos-
sibility that all issues in an asbestos case could be decided in a
mass tort action."'13 7
Denied the opportunity to appeal the class certification order,'3
the defendants sought mandamus review of Judge Parker's pro-
posed trial plan.1 Although they conceded that the Jenk&ns and
School Asbestos Littgatwn certifications suggested new inroads
on the use of class actions in mass tort cases, they argued that
those decisions did not permit wholesale class treatment of in-
131. Memorandum and Order at 8, Cimino, Docket at 58 (Oct. 26, 1989), reipmnted -in
Mealey's, supra note 80, at A-4.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 5-6, reprtnted sn Mealey's, supra note 80, at A-3.
134. Id. at 5-7, 10-11, reprinted 'n Mealey's, supra note 80, at A-3 - A-6.
135. Id. at 12-21, repmnted tn Mealey's, supra note 80, at A-6 - A-li (delineating indi-
vidual requirements for Rule 23(b)(3) certification and discussing how Phases II and III
of Cimino met the requirements).
136. Id. at 11, reprinted in Mealey's, supra note 80, at A-6; see also FED. R. Civ. P
42(b) (permitting district court to conduct separate trial when doing so promotes conven-
ience, avoids prejudice, or proves conducive to expedition and economy).
137. Order at 7, Cimino, Docket at 78 (Dec. 29, 1990).
138. Id. at 30.
139. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Mandamus, In r-e Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706 (5th
Cir. 1990) (No. 89-4937).
1991]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
dividual issues in personal injury tort cases.140 The defendants
welcomed reexamination of "the wisdom of class certification in
mass tort cases"' 4' and attacked the proposed trial plan as abridg-
ing constitutional guarantees to a jury trial and due process.'4
The Fifth Circuit issued a mandamus invalidating proposed
Phase II as a violation of Erw Railroad v. Tompkins'4 principles
relating to the application of substantive Texas law on products
liability.44 The court indicated that the remaining 2,990 class
members could not be certified for trial under Rule 23(b)(3)
because "[t]here are too many disparities among the various
plaintiffs for their common concerns to predominate."' 145 The court
tied the invalidity of the class action to Texas substantive tort
law: "To create the requisite commonality for trial, the discrete
components of the class members' claims and the asbestos man-
ufacturers' defenses must be submerged. The procedures for
Phase II do precisely that, but, as we have explained, do so only
by reworking the substantive duty owed by the manufactur-
ers.' ' 46 In response to the mandamus, Judge Parker reworked
Phases II and III as Rule 42 consolidations,'147 with a Phase II
trial of exposure issues by worksite groupings and a Phase IlI
trial of damages by disease categories. The Fifth Circuit denied
without opinion the parties' petitions to review this plan.1'8
After the second appeal to the Fifth Circuit, Judge Parker
was indifferent as to whether to conduct Cimsno as a Rule 42
consolidation or as a Rule 23 class action. He believed that a
Rule 23(b)(3) class action was the most suitable procedure because
it gave claimants the opportunity to opt out and it gave him
increased control over the trial, settlement, and attorneys' fees.
Nonetheless, he did not envision that a Rule 42 consolidation
would greatly circumscribe his ability to control the trial in a
similar fashion.
140. Id. at 18-21.
141. Id. at 16.
142. Id. at 29-42.
143. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
144. In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1990). For a discussion of the
applicable law problem, see snfra notes 219-55 and accompanying text.
145. Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d at 712.
146. Id.
147. Memorandum and Order, Cimino v. Raymark Indus., No. B-86-0456-CA, Docket at
159 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 1990) (consolidating 2,336 cases for Phase H trial of exposure issue
by worksite groupings; consolidating 2,336 cases for Phase III trial of damages issues by
disease categories).
148. In re Fibreboard Corp., No. 90-4199 (5th Cir. Mar. 29, 1990); see s-upra notes 94-95
and accompanying text.
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School Asbestos Litigation provides a clearer example of Rule
23 certification. In this case, the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit rejected Judge Kelly's certification of a Rule 23(b)(1)(B)
mandatory class for punitive damages, but upheld his certification
of a Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out class for compensatory damages. 149 The
court also upheld Judge Kelly's refusal to certify a Rule 23(b)(2)
class for incidental equitable relief on the basis that the appro-
priate final relief related exclusively or predominantly to money
damages.160
The Third Circuit rejected certification of a mandatory punitive
damages class for two reasons. First, it believed that such a
mandatory class implicated "serious questions of personal juris-
diction and intrusion into the autonomous operation of state
judicial systems.."' 5 1 Second, the court faulted the punitive dam-
ages class as undermclusive. 62 An opt-out compensatory damages
class alleviated these difficulties because "use of a voluntary
class assures that only willing plaintiffs are before the court."' 3
In reviewing Judge Kelly's certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) com-
pensatory damages class, the Third Circuit agreed that the class
action satisfied the rule's requirements of numerosity, typicality,
and adequacy of representation.1es The court upheld Judge Kelly's
finding of common factual issues in the plaintiffs' claims relating
to the health hazards of asbestos, the defendants' knowledge of
149. In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986); see also Note, supra note
127, at 465 (noting Third Circuit approval of Rule 23(b)(3) class action in School Asbestos
Litigation).
150. School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d at 1008.
151. Id. at 1002; see also Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. S 2283 (1988) (prohibiting federal
courts from enjoining proceedings in state courts except in a few specific circumstances).
152. School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d at 1005-06 (discussing problem of the "limited
generosity class" analogous to the limited fund class). The court stated that "all persons
with claims upon the 'limited fund' should be included in the 23(b)(1)(B) class:' Id. at 1006.
Because the class did not include all potential plaintiffs, the class was underinclusive. As
a result, "separate actions by those who should properly be included in the class will go
forward:' Id. The Third Circuit indicated, however, that it did
not hold that under-mclusiveness is necessarily fatal to a class created under
23(b)(1)(B); rather, each case requires a careful assessment of the factors
mentioned in Rule 19. Courts should give particular attention to the possi-
bility of prejudice either to those omitted from the class or to those within
it.
Id. at 1007; see also Comment, The "'Lmited Generosity" Class Action and a Uniform
Chowe of Law Rule: An Approach to Fair and Effective Mass-Tort Punitive Damage
Adjudication sn the Federal Courts, 38 EmORY L.J. 457 (1989) (arguing in favor of mandatory
punitive damages classes with neutral, uniform standards for punitive damages).
153. School Asbestos Litig, 789 F.2d at 1002.
154. Id. at 1009.
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those dangers, the defendants' failure to warn or test, and the
defendants' concert of action or conspiracy relating to industry
practices. 55 Furthermore, the court concluded that the School
Asbestos Lstsgatwn claims presented common issues that predom-
inated over individual ones and that the class action was superior
to existing alternative methods of disposition.1'
The Third Circuit had two reservations concerning the School
Asbestos Littgatwn compensatory damages class action. First, the
court expressed concern about the applicable law problem in a
nationwide class action because variations in state products lia-
bility law might create problems for adjudication of the different
districts' claims. Although the Third Circuit had "some doubts
on this score," the plaintiffs satisfied the district court that class
certification would not present insuperable obstacles to resolution
of the applicable law problem. 5 7 Second, the appellate court
opined that "at the present stage, manageability is a serious
concern."' Nevertheless, the court indicated a willingness to
permit Judge Kelly to adjudicate the litigation under class action
procedures. Noting that the class certification was conditional,
the Third Circuit concluded that "[w]hen, and if, the district court
is convinced that the litigation cannot be managed, decertification
is proper."''6 9
Jenkins was a good precedent for School Asbestos Litsgatwn,
particularly with respect to class resolution of common liability
155. Id. at 1009-10. The complaint alleged claims based on theories of negligence, strict
liability, breach of warranty, intentional tort, concert of action, and civil conspiracy. Id-
at 1009. With regard to the commonality issue, the Third Circuit agreed with the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Jenkins that the "threshold of commonality is not high." Id. at 1010
(quoting Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468, 472 (5th Cir. 1986)).
156. Id. at 1010. The Third Circuit believed that Jenkzns presented more complex
issues than School Asbestos Litigation "because of the complexity of the causation questions
in personal injury suits; that phase of a property damage claim is more straightforward."
I&
157. Id. For a discussion of the applicable law problem, see znfra notes 219-55 and
accompanying text.
158. School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d at 1011.
159. Id. The Third Circuit recognized that, in approving the Rule 23(b)(3) class action,
it was departing from general federal court reluctance to utilize the class action rule for
mass tort litigation. Nevertheless, the Third Circuit seemed more than willing to permit
Judge Kelly to try this option to deal with the asbestos litigation crisis:
We acknowledge that our reluctance to vacate the (b)(3) certification is
influenced by the highly unusual nature of asbestos litigation. The district
court has demonstrated a willingness to attempt to cope with an unprece-
dented situation in a somewhat novel fashion, and we do not wish to foreclose
an approach that might offer some possibility of improvement over the
methods employed to date.
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issues. Judge Kelly believed that the School Asbestos Litigatson
cases were a better vehicle for class resolution of compensatory
damages because the range of -damages would be more predict-
able than in personal injury cases. For him, certifying the class
for punitive damages in an aggregate sum was the real innova-
tion-an effort that the Third Circuit repudiated.
2. Class Compositson: Opt-Out and Opt-In Litigants
The problem of opt-out litigants is present in every Rule 23(b)(3)
class action. The opt-out option permits prospective class claim-
ants to exclude themselves from the class and to avoid the
preclusive effect of judgment.160 Opt-out claimants who pursue
individual relief in separate lawsuits undermine the utility of
class adjudication.161
Problems stemmng from opt-out plaintiffs were minimal during
the various reformulations of the trial plan in Cim?no. When
Judge Parker provisionally certified Cimsno as a Rule 23(b)(3)
class action, at most only five or six plaintiffs opted out of the
proposed class action. 62 In addition, with the help of information
supplied by plaintiffs' and defendants' counsel, Judge Parker
separated several cases that were not compatible with the class
action because of the type of employment, the type of exposure,
or the lack of uniformity among the defendants being sued.
Because a small group of plaintiffs' lawyers represented almost
160. FED. R. CIrv. P 23(b)(3), (c)(2), (c)(3); see Furman, Offensive Assertion of Collateral
Estoppel by Persons Opting Out of a Class Action, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1189 (1980) (problems
of preclusion in relation to opt-out claimants).
161. See generally Abraham, Indiwdual Action and Collective Responsibility: The Di-
lemma of Mass Tort Reform, 73 VA. L. REV. 845, 878 (1987) (noting that opt-out class may
break apart, "causing excess expense and-the inequitable resolution of similar cases");
Mullemx, supra note 127, at 1066-67, 1072-73 (commenting on problems relating to opt-
out litigants and proposing restrictions on ability to opt out); Put & Astiz, Punitive
Damage Claims of Class Members Who Opt Out: Should They Surive?, 16 U.S.F L. REV.
1 (1981) (arguing that opt-out plaintiffs should be precluded from asserting punitive
damage claims where classwide claims for punitive damages have already been settled
or adjudicated); Rosenberg, Of End Games and Openings, supra note 38, at 705-06, 714-15
(commenting on problems of opt-out litigants and proposing imposition of conditions on
opt-out litigants to eliminate abuse and enhance use of class action device); Rubin, supra
note 17, at 449 ("The right to opt out should be eliminated or restricted perhaps to those
who can show grave hardship or who are willing to pay the full costs of litigation in
another forum.").
162. See, e.g., Motion of Plaintiff Mattie Gobel to Opt-Out and be Excluded from Class
Action, Cimmo v. Raymark Indus., No. B-86-0456-CA, Docket at 51 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 21,
1989); Motion of Plaintiffs Represented by Lawrence Madeksho to Opt-out of Provisional
Class Action, Cimino, Docket at 15 (Feb. 21, 1989).
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all claimants, Judge Parker was able to anticipate few opt-out
claimants. Had he anticipated massive defection from a proposed
class action, Judge Parker would not have certified the action
for class action treatment.
Similarly, opt-out plaintiffs proved not to be a problem in
School Asbestos Litsgatwn. This class ultimately included over
35,000 school districts nationwide, with notices relating to settle-
ment with one of the defendants sent to 35,711 school districts
in 1989.163 Two or three rounds of opt-out procedure required
claimants to send an affidavit excluding themselves from the
action. On March 1, 1988, the plaintiffs supplied the court with
a list of timely opt-outs submitted by individual schools and
school districts, a list of timely opt-outs submitted by certain
states, and a list of untimely opt-outs.164 This list served as the
basis for defining the class membership.
Once the court defined the class membership, Judge Kelly
issued an order restraining certain school districts from individ-
ually litigating claims against certain defendants. 165 As late as
January 1990, a few school districts petitioned Judge Kelly for
reconsideration of class membership status, arguing that they
opted out in a timely fashion but were required to remain in the
class. Judge Kelly held firm to the exclusion notification date,
however, and barred certain school districts from individual liti-
gation against the defendants.166 This satellite litigation relating
to class membership led to some unorthodox party alignments,
as certain defendants supported individual school districts in their
attempts to opt out of the class after the final exclusion date.167
163. Pretrial Order No. 198, In re School Asbestos Litig., No. 83-0268, Docket No. 1741
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 28, 1989) (ordering dissemination of class settlement notice with defendant
Lac D'Amiante du Quebec).
164. Plaintiffs' List of Requests for Exclusion from Litigation Class, School Asbestos
Litig., Docket No. 1179 (Mar. 1, 1988).
165. Order No. 183, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 1709 (Mar. 29, 1989) (restraining
School District of Lancaster, Pennsylvania, from litigating individual clais against
National Gypsum Co.).
166. Memorandum and Order No. 205, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 2037 (Jan. 22,
1990) (restraining four school districts from litigating individually against National Gypsum
Co.). The School District of the City of Flint and the Akron City School District Board
of Education appealed Judge Kelly's ruling in Order No. 205 to the Third Circuit. Notice
of Appeal of the Akron City School District Board of Education, School Asbestos Litig.,
Docket No. 2077 (Feb. 22, 1990); Notice of Appeal of the School District of the City of
Flint, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 2064 (Feb. 16, 1990).
167. See, e.g., Kaiser Cement Corp.'s Response to Akron City School District's Motion
to Reconsider and/or Alter or Amend Order 205, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 2085
(Feb. 28, 1990).
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Judge Kelly also experienced the reverse phenomenon when
plaintiffs who previously excluded themselves from the class
petitioned to opt in to the litigaton.168 The plaintiff class sup-
ported these excluded parties, whereas the defendants opposed
their efforts.169 Judge Kelly did not permit school districts that
previously opted out to rejoin the litigation class because the
plaintiffs received ample time and notice in which to decide
whether to participate in the class action.170 With regard to opt-
in and opt-out litigants, Judge Kelly held firm on the class
composition because, with 35,000 claimants, to do otherwise would
lead to chaos.
S. Subclasses
Rule 23(c)(4) enables a court to adjudicate certain issues and
create subclasses to assist in litigation of a class action.17' Sub-
classes are one method of facilitating complicated mass tort class
litigation.172 Courts use them to sever common issues such as
causation and damages in order to ensure class certification.73
Indeed, in approving the Rule 23(b)(3) compensatory damages
class in School Asbestos Litsgatton, the Third Circuit specifically
168. See, e.g., Berne-Knox-Westerlo Central School District's Motion to Opt Into the
Plaintiff Litigation Class, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 2222 (May 15, 1990); County
of Knox, Tennessee's Motion/Petition to Opt Into the Plaintiff Class, School Asbestos Litig.,
Docket No. 2138 (Mar. 26, 1990).
169. See, e.g., Kaiser Cement Corp.'s Joinder in Opposition to Motion of Berne-Knox-
Westerlo Central School District to Opt Into the Plaintiff Litigation Class, School Asbestos
Litig., Docket No. 2262 (June 18, 1990); W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn.s Opposition to Motion
of Berne-Knox-Westerlo School District to Rescind its Opt-Out and Rejoin the Class,
School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 2252 (June 7, 1990); Class Plaintiffs' Reply Brief in
Support of Knox County's Motion to Opt-Into the Class, School Asbestos Litig., Docket
No. 2214 (May 8, 1990); Owens Corning Fiberglass Corp.'s Response to Motion of Berne-
Knox-Westerlo Central School District "To Opt Into the Plaintiff Litigation Class," School
Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 2249 (May 5, 1990) (opposing permission to opt-m).
170. See, e.g., Pretrial Order No. 243, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 2276 (June 25,
1990) (denying motion of Berne-Knox-Westerlo Central School District to opt into the
plaintiff class); Order No. 232, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 2217 (May 9, 1990)
(denying motion of County of Knox, Tennessee, to opt into the plaintiff class).
171. "When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a class action
with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided into subclasses and each
subclass treated as a class, and. the provisions of this rule shall then be construed and
applied accordingly." FED. R. Civ. P 23(c)(4).
172. See Mullemx, supra note 127, at 1074-75; see also Note, supra note 127, at 466-69
(subclasses may help to overcome barriers to class certification); Comment, The Use of
Federal Class Actions, supra note 127, at 284 (utility of subclasses).
173. See, e.g., In -re Northern Dist. of Cal. Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 521
F Supp. 1188 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (certifying common liability issue under Rule 23(c)(4));
Payton v. Abbott Labs., 83 F.R.D. 382, 891 (D. Mass. 1979) (using Rule 23(c)(4)(A) class).
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cited Rule 23(c)(4)(A) as authority for the proposition that the
class action was a feasible vehicle for adjudicating aggregate
claims: "Reassessment of the utility of the class action in the
mass tort area has come about, no doubt, because courts have
realized that such an action need not resolve all issues in the
litigation."174
Subclasses have not played a part in the ongoing management
of these two actions. Although Judge Parker invited motions for
subclasses,'175 he did not certify subclasses as part of Phases II
and III of the trial plan.17 6 Rather than create subclasses, Judge
Parker severed the individual cases of certain nonconforming
plaintiffs, such as seamen.177 After the Fifth Circuit invalidated
the trial plan and Judge Parker restructured the trial, the plain-
tiffs again moved for certification of subclasses, which Judge
Parker denied. 178
By organizing plaintiff groups into five disease categories,
however, Judge Parker designed Phases II and III of the trial
plan to have the effect of subclasses. Because the method by
which parties submitted evidence to the jury in Phase II equated
to subclasses, Judge Parker saw no need for formal certifica-
tion.179 Judge Parker neither attributed the Fifth Circuit's inval-
idation of Phase II to the lack of subclasses nor believed that
the certification of subclasses would have enhanced the validity
174. In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1008 (3d Cir. 1986).
175. Class Action Certification Hearing, Cimino v. Raymark Indus., No. B-86-0456-CA,
Docket at 8 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 1, 1989) (provisionally certifying the class action and inviting
motions regarding subclasses).
176. Order, Cimino, Docket at 78 (Dec. 29, 1989) (denying defendants' objections to the
Oct. 26 trial plan); Memorandum and Order, Cimsno, Docket at 58 (Oct. 26, 1989) (certifying
a class action and scheduling a three-phase trial for Feb. 5, 1990), repmnted Sn Mealey's,
supra note 80, at A-1.
177. See, e.g., Order, Cimsno, Docket at 9 (Feb. 8, 1989) (ordering plaintiffs to file
motions for proposed subclasses no later than Feb. 15, 1989); Response of Plaintiffs
Opposing the Celotex Corp. and Carey Canada Inc. Motion for Subclass Consisting of
Plaintiffs with Nonoccupational Exposure to Asbestos, Cimsno, Docket at 29 (Mar. 23,
1989); Motion of Owens-Illinois, Inc. for Division of the Provisionally Certified Class into
Subclasses, Cimsno, Docket at 19 (Feb. 28, 1989); Motion of Plaintiffs for Subclass and/or
Special Consideration of Merchant Seamen Plaintiffs, Cimsno, Docket at 13 (Feb. 15, 1989).
178. See Motion of Plaintiffs for Certification of Subclasses, Cimmo, Docket at 151 (Feb.
12, 1990).
179. Judge Parker anticipated that the jury would hear testimony on the exposure
issue that disease category A contained x number of people. This testimony would be
location or worksite specific, with the parties asking the jury to project percentages of
claimants exposed to certain products. Judge Parker believed this presentation of evidence
was equivalent to a subclass presentation.
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of Phase II.180 Iromcally, when Judge Parker reorganized Cimbno
as a Rule 42 consolidation, he structured Phase II exposure proof
according to worksite groups and organized Phase III damages
by disease categories.' 8 '
The creation of subclasses in School Asbestos Litgatwn proved
to be a point of some contention. After the provisional class
action certification, Judge Kelly notified all potential school dis-
trict class members of the opportunity to elect exclusion from
three subclasses. 82 After the Third Circuit validated only the
compensatory damages class, Judge Kelly scheduled oral argu-
ment on the content of the new class action notice. Several
defendants opposed the inclusion of subclasses in the new class
action, but the plaintiffs rallied in support of them.183 Judge Kelly
resolved the subclass issue by denying the plaintiffs' request to
give claimants the ability to opt out of the class by subclasses,
thereby removing subclasses from the action.'8 '
Although plaintiffs have not made any subsequent motions for
subclasses, Judge Kelly has not foreclosed the possibility of
certifying subclasses in the future. He suggested that there might
be an opportunity for subclasses after the liability phase of the
trial, with possible damage subclasses for different types of
asbestos providers. With regard to pretrial class management,
however, Judge Kelly did not see the need for organization by
subclasses or the potential utility of subclasses related to specific
state law issues, even though the plaintiffs proposed subclasses
by groups of plaintiffs and applicable law.
180. In hindsight, Judge Parker said that creating subclasses would have been easy,
but he did not think subclasses would have affected the trial of issues.
181. Memorandum and Order, Cimsno, Docket at 159-60 (Mar. 5, 1990) (trial of Phase
11 exposure issue by 13 identified worksites and presentation of Phase I damages by
five disease categories).
182. Pretrial Order No. 42, In re School Asbestos Litig., No. 83-0268, Docket No. 566
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 1985) (class action notice order, specifying three opt-out subclasses: (1)
compensatory damages subclass concerning asbestos containing ceiling and fireproofing
materials, (2) compensatory damages subclass concerning asbestos contaimng pipe and
boiler insulation, and (3) compensatory damages subclass concerning asbestos property
that was not specified in two other categories); Memorandum and Order No. 20, School
Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 307 (Sept. 28, 1984) (order certifying class actions and defining
the class).
183. See, e.g., Class Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Subclasses, School Asbestos
Litig., Docket No. 904 (Jan. 20, 1987) (supporting subclasses as defined in Pretrial Order
No. 42); National Gypsum Co., United States Gypsum Co., and W.R. Grace & Co.'s
Memorandum Sur Approval of Class Notice, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 901 (Jan.
6, 1987) (opposing subclasses provided in Pretrial Order No. 42).
184. Memorandum and Order No. 90, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 1020 (July 31,
1987).
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B. Related Jurisdictwnal Issues
1. Federal Sub3ect Matter Jusdictson rn Dwversity-Based
Mass Tort Class Actwns
The class action portions of Cimsno and School Asbestos Lits-
gatwn are grounded in federal diversity subject matter jurisdic-
tion. Well-established class action jurisdictional rules require
complete diversity between the class representatives and the
defendants, as well as satisfaction of the federal amount-m-con-
troversy requirement for each class member "I5 Potential prob-
lems in satisfying these requirements are magnified in multistate
mass tort actions because whether each class member has a bona
fide claim in excess of the jurisdictional amount may be unclear.1e
In addition, the amount-in-controversy requirement "would ap-
pear to bar federal mass tort class actions that involve non-
catastrophic injuries or indeterminate damage claims."' s7
In Cimino, the defendants challenged the subject matter juris-
diction of Judge Parker's proposed class action trial plan, arguing
that the court's proposed procedure undermined the amount-m-
controversy requirement that each class plaintiff must individu-
ally satisfy.188 In overruling this objection, Judge Parker relied
on the plaintiffs' allegation that "the 'amount in controversy
exceeds $50,000 per case, exclusive of interest and costs.' ,89
According to Judge Parker, this procedure did not contravene
the amount-in-controversy requirement because Phase III re-
185. See 28 U.S.C. S 1332 (1988) (general diversity statute). The amount-m-controversy
requirement was $10,000 at the time the plaintiffs filed these lawsuits, but Congress
raised it to $50,000 in 1988. See also Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973)
(every claimant in the class must meet the amount-m-controversy requirement); Snyder
v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969) (the statute requires complete diversity only between the
named class representatives and defendants). Like most products liability and toxic tort
litigation, asbestos litigation is based on state common law theories and hence is not
susceptible of federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 5 1331. See Note, supra note
127, at 482-83 (discussing the amount-m-controversy requirement in noncatastrophic mass
tort actions); Comment, The Use of Federal Class Actions, supra note 127, at 249-50 n.20
(1988) (mass tort cases meeting diversity jurisdiction requirements).
186. See Note, supra note 127, at 482.
187. Id. The author concludes, "Under present law, such victims, rather than being
able to take advantage of the economies of a single nationwide class action in federal
court, would at best be relegated to their respective state courts for relief in state-wide
class actions or individual lawsuits." Id.
188. See Order, Cimino v. Raymark Indus., No. B-86-0456-CA, Docket at 78 (ED. Tex.
Dec. 29, 1989) (overruling defendants' objections to October 26th trial plan order). The
challenge was based on the requirement in Zahn, 414 U.S. at 301.
189. Order at 22, Cimsno, Docket at 78 (Dec. 29, 1989).
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quired each plaintiff to submit proof of individual damages. 190
Soon after the Third Circuit's approval of the School Asbestos
Litsgaton class certification, certain defendants contested subject
matter jurisdiction on similar grounds. They argued that the
plaintiffs failed to plead adequately the jurisdictional amount for
each class member and that complete diversity did not exist
between each and every plaintiff and defendant. 191 The court
received full briefing and held oral argument on the motions.192
In response to the extensive briefing and hearing on the
motions, Judge Kelly concluded that the complaints were defi-
cient in pleading the amount-m-controversy requirement. 193 Judge
Kelly cited Zahn v. Internatwnal Paper Co.194 for the rule that
each plaintiff must meet the amount-m-controversy requirement
and stated that "'one plaintiff may not ride in on another's
coattails.' "195 The court found insufficient the plaintiffs' assertions
that "the vast bulk of class members have claims in excess of
the $10,000 jurisdictional amount requirement and that only a
few class members exist that may not allege the requisite
amount."'196 The court further faulted the plaintiffs' lack of au-
thority in support of their allegation that the number of unnamed
plaintiff class members who did not meet the jurisdictional amount
was miniscule.1' As a result, the court dismissed the plaintiffs'
complaints with leave to amend in order to conform with the
requirements of 28 U.S.C. 5 1332(a).198
190. Id. at 22-23.
191. Transcript of Apr. 18, 1989, In re School Asbestos Litig., No. 83-0268, Docket No.
1760 (ED. Pa. May19, 1989).
192. See, e.g., Order No. 176, School Asbestos Litig, Docket No. 1700 (Mar. 23, 1989)
(scheduling oral argument on Kaiser Gypsum's and other defendants' motion to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction). The defendants filed the motions pursuant to
Rules 12(b)(1), 12(f), 12(h)(3), and 15(a). See also Transcript, supra note 191 (transcript of
oral argument on subject matter jurisdiction challenges).
193. Memorandum and Order No. 191, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 1739 (May 1,
1989).
194. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
195. Memorandum and Order No. 191 at 2, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 1739 (May
1, 1989) (quoting Zahn, 414 U.S. at 301).
196. Id. at 3.
197. Id. In contrast, the defendants cited to United States Environmental Protection
Agency reports concluding that approximately 60% of class member school districts did
not have claims in excess of the jurisdictional amount. Id.
198. Id. Judge Kelly rejected the defendants' contention, however, that Zahn required
a district court to dismiss an entire action if any of the class plaintiffs failed to meet the
amount-m-controversy requirement. Id. at 3; cf. Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d
1188, 1195 (6th Cir. 1988) (district court need not make amount-in-controversy determi-
nation immediately upon jurisdictional challenge); In re "Agent Orange" Prods. Liab.
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After the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint asking the
court to postpone a dismissal order,199 the defendants renewed
their objection that the complaint failed to specify the class
members whose claims satisfied the amount-in-controversy re-
quirement.200 The defendants also renewed a challenge based on
lack of complete diversity between all plaintiffs and all defen-
dants. 201
Judge Kelly resolved the second round of subject matter ju-
risdiction challenges by denying all motions to dismiss and de-
ferring ultimate resolution of the amount-in-controversy dispute
until trial.202 He concluded, "Any potential jurisdictional problems
raised in this case can be cured at trial by entering final judgment
at the damages stage of the trial only against those plaintiffs
that have sustained the burden of proving damages in excess of
$10,000. Caselaw supports postponement."203 The court rejected
definitively the defendants' challenge to complete diversity, hold-
ing that the Pennsylvania local action doctrine did not apply to
monetary damage claims based on transitory tort actions. 2 4 Judge
Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 163 (2d Cir. 1987) (when plaintiff makes good faith claim as to amount-
in-controversy, the court need not inquire as to sufficiency absent apparent justification);
Memorandum and Order No. 191 at 3, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 1739 (May 1,
1989).
199. Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 1768 (May
30, 1989); Class Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of the Amended Jurisdictional Alle-
gations in Each Complaint in These Consolidated Actions, School Asbestos Litig., Docket
No. 1769 (May 30, 1989).
200. Kaiser Gypsum Co., Inc.'s Response, With Statement of Joinder by Other Defen-
dants, to Class Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Amended Jurisdictional Allegations
and Request for Implementation of Pretrial Order No. 191 by Dismissal of Class Allega-
tions in each Amended Complaint, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 1779 (June 13, 1989);
Certain Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Claims of Unnamed Class Members, and to
Strike the Allegations of Class Representation from the Amended Complaints for Failure
to Plead Subject Matter Jurisdiction, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 1778 (June 13,
1989).
201. Certain Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Claims of Unnamed Class Members,
and to Strike the Allegations of Class Representation from the Amended Complaints for
Failure to Plead Subject Matter Jurisdiction at 3, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 1778
(June 13, 1989).
202. Memorandum and Order No. 197, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 1977 (Nov. 15,
1989). For authority to defer resolution of the matter, Judge Kelly cited Sterling v.
Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1195 (6th Cir. 1988). Memorandum and Order No.
197 at 4.
203. Id. at 3-4. But see FED. R. Civ. P 12(h)(3).
204. Memorandum and Order No. 197 at 7, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 1977
(Nov. 15, 1989). The amended complaints alleged claims based on negligence, strict liability,
breach of warranties, concert of action, civil conspiracy, intentional tort, restitution, and
malicious, reckless misconduct. Id., see also sources cited supra note 199.
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Kelly left open the possibility that he could dismiss some school
districts later if the defendants showed that the local action
doctrine applied.2 5 He refused to certify his jurisdictional rulings
for interlocutory appeal.2 6
2. Personal Jursdictwn Challenges sn Dsversity-Based Mass
Tort Class Actwns
Personal jurisdiction in federal diversity actions derives from
state jurisdictional rules under the Erne doctrine.2°7 In Cimsno
and School Asbestos Litsgatwn, respectively, the Texas and Penn-
sylvania long-arm statutes determined personal jurisdiction.M
Despite the multiparty composition of the consolidated cases,
205. Memorandum and Order No. 197 at 7, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 1977
(Nov. 15, 1989):
It is possible that questions related to ownership of some particular buildings
may arise later in the litigation. It is premature for the Court to dismiss
the amended complaints for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the basis
of the "local action" doctrine as the amended complaints allege clais not
bound to any issues of title or possession of real property.
206. Numerous defendants filed motions for leave to appeal Pretrial Order No. 197.
See, e.g., W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn.'s Joinder in Motion to Amend Order No. 197 and to
Certify that Order for Interlocutory Appeal Pursuant To 28 U.S.C. S 1292(b), School
Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 2009 (Dec. 15, 1989); Fibreboard Corp:s Joinder in U.S.
Gypsums Motion to Amend Order No. 197 and to Certify that Order for Interlocutory
Appeal Under 28 U.S.C. 5 1292(b), School Asbestos Litig, Docket No. 2008 (Dec. 14, 1989);
Kaiser Gypsum Co., Inc.s Motion for Leave to Appeal Pretrial Order No. 197, School
Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 197 (Nov. 30, 1989); see also Joinder of Asbestospray Corp. in
Motion for Leave to Appeal Order No. 197 and to Certify that Order for Interlocutory
Appeal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291(b), School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 2038 (Jan. 24,
1990); Kaiser Gypsum Co., Inc.s Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to
Appeal Pretrial Order No. 197, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 2039 (Jan. 24, 1990);
U.S. Gymsum Co:s Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Motion to Amend Order No.
197 and to Certify that Order Under 28 U.S.C. 5 1292(b), School Asbestos Litig., Docket
No. 2040 (Jan. 24, 1990); Joinder of Flintkote Co. in Motion to Amend Order No. 197 and
to Certify that Order for Interlocutory Appeal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1292(b), School
Asbestos Litig., Consolidated Opposition to Certain Defendants' Motions for Certification
of Pretrial Order No. 197 for Interlocutory Appeal, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No.
2026 (Jan. 16, 1990); Basic Inc.'s Joinder in Motion (of U.S. Gypsum Co.) to Amend Order
No. 197 and to Certify that Order for Interlocutory Appeal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S
1292(b), School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 2020 (Dec. 22, 1989).
207. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see Omm Capital v. Wolff, 484 U.S. 97
(1987) (state long-arm jurisdictional principles apply in diversity-based federal case; na-
tionwide minimum contacts standards apply only if federal statute provides for nationwide
service of process; otherwise, state jurisdictional rules govern). See generally Noonan,
State Personal Jurisdictional Requirements and the Non-Aggregation Rule sn Class Actions,
1987 U. ILL. L. REv. 445 (FED. R. Civ. P 23 should control the determination of jurisdiction
in federal court even if the federal rule conflicts with a state rule).
208. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. S 5301 (Purdon 1990); TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. S 17 (Vernon 1990).
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neither Judge Parker nor Judge Kelly experienced a large num-
ber of personal jurisdiction challenges. Both judges handled these
challenges in a routine, similar fashion. They permitted full
briefing on the issue, allowed additional discovery relating to
jurisdiction, and ultimately rejected all personal jurisdiction mo-
tions to dismiss.
Of the sixteen defendants in Cimsno, three pursued Rule 12
motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction209 Judge
Parker summarily denied two of these motions, finding that in
personam jurisdiction was exercisable under Texas law, but per-
mitting an additional six months to conduct personal jurisdiction
discovery and to petition for reconsideration of the rulings. 210
Judge Parker referred the challenge of one defendant, Asbestos
Corporation Limited (ACL), to Magistrate Judge Hines for a
report and recommendation. ACL's presence in the lawsuit com-
plicated the action because ACL, a Canadian corporation with all
of its stock owned by the Quebec government, was engaged
solely in the business of mining raw materials21 ACL raised the
standard jurisdictional argument that its contacts with Texas
209. The three defendants were Walter Industries, Inc., Jim Walker Corp., and Asbestos
Corp. Ltd. Beginning in early 1989, these three defendants filed numerous papers in
support of their motions, with responses in opposition from the plaintiffs. See, e.g., Second
Brief of Defendant Asbestos Corp. Ltd. in Support of its Supplemental Motion to Quash
Service of Process and Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, Cimino v. Raymark Indus., No.
B-86-0456-CA, Docket at 53 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 6, 1989); Memorandum of Law of Defendant
Jim Walter Corp. in Support of its Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, Cimino,
Docket at 36 (May 15, 1989); First Amended Motion of Defendant Walter Indus., Inc. to
Dismiss, Cimmo, Docket at 32 (Apr. 10, 1989); Response of Plaintiff in Opposition To
Motion of Defendant Asbestos Corp. Ltd. to Quash Service of Process and to Dismiss
First Complaint for Lack of In Personam Jurisdiction, Cimsno, Docket at 20 (Mar. 2,
1989); Motion of Defendant Walter Indus., Inc. to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, Cimtno,
Docket at 8 (Feb. 7, 1989).
210. Judge Parker later denied the petition for reconsideration of the rulings. Order,
Cimino, Docket at 86 (Jan. 9, 1990) (denying motion of Jim Walter Corp. to dismiss on
grounds of lack of in personam jurisdiction); Order, Cimsno, Docket at 37 (May 26, 1989)
(denying Walter Industries' motion to reconsider April 19 order denying motion to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction, refusing to certify order for immediate interlocutory
appeal, and giving parties six months in which to complete discovery on personal
jurisdiction and to file for reconsideration); Order That Motion of Walter Industries to
Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction is Denied, Cimsno, Docket at 33 (Apr. 19, 1989).
211. These facts induced ACL to raise several defenses, including statute of limitations,
prohibition against double recovery, immunity from suit, international law principles, and
jury trial and punitive damages under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28
U.S.C. 5§ 1602-11 (1988). Judge Parker severed ACL for a nonjury trial, but determined
that Texas law applied to the plaintiffs' claims against the corporation. He also acceded
to ACL's sovereign immunity defense under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,
ruling that the statute barred punitive damages. Memorandum and Order, Cimno, Docket
at 336 (June 15, 1990) (section V relating to defendant ACL).
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were insufficient under minimum contacts jurisprudence to sup-
port an action against it in that state. Nonetheless, Magistrate
Judge Hines recommended the denial of ACL's motion to dis-
miss V2 12 and Judge Parker approved his recommendation.213
Only two of the more than fifty defendants named in School
Asbestos Litsgatson, Kaiser Gypsum Co. and Kaiser Cement Cor-
poration, assiduously pursued personal jurisdiction challenges to
the Pennsylvania court's authority to adjudicate claims against
it in the class action.214 After reviewing Pennsylvama's long-arm
statute, Judge Kelly construed it to permit exercise of jurisdic-
tion to the fullest extent that the Constitution allows and con-
cluded that Kaiser Gypsum's activities fell within the reach of
state jurisdiction. Nevertheless, because Kaiser Gypsum was no
longer doing business in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania at
the time of the complaint, Judge Kelly dismissed the claims
against Kaiser Gypsum for lack of venue.215
Kaiser Cement Corporation contested personal jurisdiction be-
cause it never shipped any of its products to Pennsylvania. 21 6
The class plaintiffs argued in response that Kaiser Cement's
representations were incomplete and based on evasive interrog-
atory answers and that the plaintiffs' independent investigations
revealed that the defendant's contacts with Pennsylvania were
pervasive.2 7 In July 1990, Judge Kelly ruled that Kaiser Cement
waived its personal jurisdiction defense through its extensive
involvement in the ongoing litigation.218
212. Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate on the Motion of Defen-
dant, Asbestos Corp. Ltd., to Quash Service of Process and to Dismiss for Lack of in
Personam Jurisdiction, Cimwzo, Docket at 75 (Dec. 14, 1989).
213. Order that the Court Adopts the Report and Recommendations of the U.S.
Magistrate, Cimrno, Docket at 123 (Jan. 11, 1990).
214. See supra note 200; Memorandum and Pretrial Order No. 245, In re School Asbestos
Litig., No. 83-0268, Docket No. 2283 (E.D. Pa. July 5, 1990) (identifying 52 defendants to
the action).
215. Memorandum and Order No. 218, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 2093 (Mar. 5,
1990); see also 28 U.S.C. S 1391 (1988) (venue requirements). On July 9, 1990, the court
ruled additionally that Kaiser Gypsum was dismissed without prejudice by virtue of the
plaintiffs' failure to file an amended complaint to join Kaiser Gypsum Co. as a defendant.
Pretrial Order No. 248, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 2287 (July 10, 1990).
216. Motion of Kaiser Cement Corporation to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction,
School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 2149 (Apr. 6, 1990) (memorandum in support of motion).
217. Plaintiffs' Response to Motion of Kaiser Cement Corporation to Dismiss for Lack
of Personal Jurisdiction, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 2244 (May 30, 1990); see also
Kaiser Cement Corporation's Reply to Plaintiffs Untimely Response to Motion to Dismiss
for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 2263 (June 18, 1990).
218. Memorandum and Pretrial Order 245, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 2283 (July
5, 1990).
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III. APPLICABLE LAW CONSIDERATIONS
Mass tort actions, whether litigated as class actions or consol-
idated proceedings, present complex choice-of-law problems.219
Because federal diversity jurisdiction is the basis for most mul-
tistate, multiparty mass tort actions, the Ere doctrine and Klaxon
Co. v. Stentor Elect'r Manufactunng Co.20 require a federal court
to apply the substantive law and choice-of-law rules of the state
in which the federal court sits.221 Variations in state substantive
219. See generally Atwood, The Chowe-of-Law Dilemma n Mass Tort Litigation: Kicking
Around Erie, Klaxon and Van Dusen, 19 CONN. L. REV. 9 (1986) (arguing that mass tort
actions in federal court present an appropriate context for the formulation of a federal
common law of choice-of-law); Conflict of Laws and Complex Litigation Issues sn Mass Tort
Litigation, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 35 (symposium on conflict of laws in mass tort litigation);
How-Downing, The Agent Orange Litigation: Should Federal Common Law Have Been
Applied?, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 611 (1983) (suggesting that federal common law should have
been applied in the Agent Orange litigation); Lowenfeld, Mass Torts and the Conflict of
Laws: The Atrline Dsaster, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 157 (arguing that national substantive
law is necessary in airline disaster litigation); Miller & Crump, Jusdiction and Choice
of Law 'n Multistate Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE L.J.
1 (1986) (calling for limits on choice-of-law to prevent forum shopping, unfairness to
defendants, and interference with state sovereignty); Rosenberg, Of End Games and
Opensngs, supra note 38, at 721-22 (proposing an applicable law solution for nationwide
class action); Torchiana, Chowe of Law and the Multistate Class: Forum Interests sn Matters
Distant, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 913 (1986) (arguing that constitutional concerns can be met
without destroying the class action device); Vairo, Multi-Tort Cases: Cause for More
Darkness on the Sub3ect, or a New Role for Federal Common Law?, 54 FORDHAM L. REV.
167 (1985) (discussing the application of federal common law in mass tort cases); Note,
Federal Mass Tort Class Actions: A Step Toward Equity and Effliwncy, 47 ALB. L. REV.
1180 (1983) (arguing that differences in state laws should not preclude a finding of
commonality of claims); Note, Choice of Law and the Supreme Court: Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Shutts, 19 CONN. L. REV. 171 (1986) (choice-of-law problems in state class actions);
Note, supra note 127, at 485-86 (discussing proposed choice-of-law principle for Rule 23
class action); Note, Mass Tort Litigation: A Statutory Solution to the Choice of Law
Impasse, 96 YALE L.J. 1077 (1987) (proposing that Congress enact a choice-of-law statute
enabling federal courts to make choice-of-law decisions promoting equity and efficiency);
Comment, supra note 152, at 479-86 (arguing that Klaxon should not apply in mass tort
cases); Comment, The Use of Federal Class Actions, supra note 127, at 253 (choice-of-law
problems relating to class certification).
Various institutional reform efforts have addressed the choice-of-law issues involved in
multistate mass tort litigation. See, e.g., Complex Litigation Pro3ect (Prelim. Report on
Chap. 5, Choice of Law, Jan. 1990); Report to the House of Delegates, supra note 16; see
also H.R. 3406, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. 23,116 (daily ed. June 5, 1990).
220. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
221. Erie and Kaxon require federal courts to apply state choice-of-law rules when
determining applicable substantive law in diversity cases. Because Cim'no and School
Asbestos Litigation did not involve consolidation under federal transfer provisions, these
cases did not implicate either Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964), or Ferens v.
John Deere Co., 110 S. Ct. 1274 (1990). According to Van Dusen, the transferee court
applies the law of the transferor court in defendant-initiated transfers under 28 U.S.C. S
1404(a); according to Ferens, the court applies the same Van Dusen rule in plaintiff-
initiated transfers under 28 U.S.C. S 1404(a).
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law are a potential impediment to class certification because they
undercut the requirements of factual commonality and similarity
of legal claims.222 At least two federal courts attempted unsuc-
cessfully to solve the applicable law problem in mass tort cases
by applying a federal common law of torts.223 Because most
appellate courts resist the notion of a uniform federal common
law, however, federal district judges in mass tort cases face
difficult choice-of-law decisions.
A. Erie Problems sn a D7stritwde Consoldated Mass Tort
Case
When Special Master Jack Ratliff recommended certifying the
Rule 23(b)(3) class action in Cimino, he commented that if this
aggregation of asbestos cases could not be certified for class
action treatment, then no class action ever could.2 4 He based
this assessment on the fact that the certification was limited to
the district, the number of plaintiffs' attorneys and defendants
was small, and only one law applied. Thus, complications that
existed in other multistate, multiparty mass tort cases were not
endemic to Cimsno. Ironically, applicable law under the Ene
doctrine eventually played a decisive role in the case.
The Erwe doctrine affected Cimsno in three ways. First, the
application of Texas law defeated Judge Parker's proposed class
action treatment for Phase II of the trial plan. Second, a revision
in Texas tort law during the pendency of the action forced Judge
Parker to group cases by date and to instruct the jury as to two
different applicable Texas statutes. Third, Klaxon principles re-
quired Judge Parker to determine separately the appropriate
rules of liability for the foreign defendant, ACL.225
222. See Comment, The Use of Federal Class Actions, supra note 127, at 253.
223. See In re "Agent Orange" Prods. Liab. Litig., 580 F Supp. 690 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)
(judge to discover and apply "national consensus law" of products liability, government
contract defense, and punitive damages); see also Lowenfeld, supra note 219, at 170-71
(disapproving of federal common law proposals and attempted applications by Judge
Weinstein in Agent Orange litigation); Mullemx, supra note 127, at 1077, 1095 (proposing
application of federal common law to mass tort class actions); Vairo, supra note 219, at
189-200 (favoring creation and application of federal common law); cf. Jackson v. Johns-
Manville Co., 750 F.2d 1314, 1323-27 (5th Cir. 1985) (rejecting district court's determination
to apply federal common law in asbestos action); In re "Agent Orange" Prods. Liab.
Litig., 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980) (rejecting application of federal common law), rev'g 506
F Supp. 737 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), cert. denzed, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981).
224. Master's Report in Cinino v. Raymark at 2, Cimino v. Raymark Indus., No. B-86-
0456-CA, Docket at 54 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 20, 1989), reprtnted in Mealey's, supra note 79,
at G-i.
225. Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468, 474 (5th Cir. 1986).
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Ere's most significant impact on Cim&no occurred in the Fifth
Circuit's invalidation of Judge Parker's class action trial plan.226
The appellate court rejected Judge Parker's proposed class action
treatment of liability in Phase II because the plan violated Texas
law by effectuating a change in substantive duty through pro-
cedural innovation.m Texas precedent required plaintiffs in prod-
ucts liability actions to prove individually both causation and
damage.m Judge Parker's plan-to supply proof for 2,990 class
members through expert testimony regarding their similarity to
forty-one plaintiffs-did not comport with the requirements of
Texas law: "That procedure cannot focus upon such issues as
individual causation, but ultimately must accept general causation
as sufficient, contrary to Texas law."'
Texas law also affected the structure of Judge Parker's class
action and consolidated proceedings with regard to damages.
Judge Parker intended for the jury to apportion responsibility
for any award of actual damages among the defendants. In 1987,
however, the Texas legislature changed the law regarding ap-
portionment of damages.aso Judge Parker therefore divided the
class into pre- and post-1987 claimants so that the jury could
consider the two groups of cases according to the different
requirements of Texas law231 This separation of pre- and post-
1987 claims, originally recommended in the special master's re-
port,22 remained throughout all subsequent modifications of the
Cimno trial plan. As for punitive damages, Judge Parker sum-
marily dismissed the defendants' objection that trying punitive
damages before compensatory damages violated Texas law, sug-
gesting that the court in Jenksns v. Raymark Industrnes, Inc.m
226. In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1990).
227.The core problem is that Phase II, while offering an innovative answer to
an admitted crisis in the judicial system, is unfortunately beyond the scope
of federal judicial authority. It infringes upon the dictates of Ere that we
remain faithful to the law of Texas, and upon the separation of powers
between the judicial and legislative branches.
Id. at 711.
228. Id. at 711 n.4, 711-12 (relying on Gaulding v. Celotex Corp., 772 S.W.2d 66, 77
(Tex. 1989)).
229. Id. at 711-12.
230. See TEx. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. S 33.001-.017 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1991).
231. Order at 6-7, Cimino v. Raymark Indus., No. B-86-0456-CA, Docket at 58 (E.D. Tex.
Oct. 26, 1989), repnnted in Mealey's, supra note 80, at A-1.
232. Master's Report in Cimino v. Raymark at 5-6, Cimsno, Docket at 54 (Sept. 20,
1989), reprnted in Mealey's, supra note 79, at G-3.
233. 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986).
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definitely resolved the permissibility of trying punitive damages
first.2
The third choice-of-law problem, albeit a relatively minor one,
involved the liability rules applicable to the foreign defendant,
ACL. Judge Parker severed the claims against ACL because it
was an instrumentality of a foreign sovereign and conducted a
bench trial of the plaintiffs' claims against it. ACL contended
that, as a corporation owned in part by Quebec and doing its
mining business in Quebec, it was subject to Quebec law. Judge
Parker first determined that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act governed sovereigns and their instrumentalities.235 Because
the Act does not contain an express choice-of-law rule, he held
that a federal court was bound by the choice-of-law rules in the
forum state in which it sits and that Texas had adopted the
"most significant relationship" approach for choice-of-law in tort
actions.m Applying these principles, Judge Parker determined
that Texas law applied to the plaintiffs' claims against ACL.2
B. Klaxon Problems sn a Natwnunde Class Actwn
As a nationwide class action involving more than 35,000 plain-
tiffs and nearly fifty defendants, School Asbestos Litsgatwn pre-
sented potential problems of chaos and unmanageability. Initially,
the defendants opposed the class action in part because of the
multiple variations in state substantive tort law To ameliorate
this potential problem, the plaintiffs proposed creating subclasses
by groups of claimants and applicable law. They abandoned this
approach, however, and agreed to meet the strictest state re-
quirements on liability issues that arose during the litigation.
The Third Circuit recognized the potential problems, but none-
theless agreed to approve the class and allow Judge Kelly to
work out choice-of-law questions as they developed in the case.23
234. Order at 26-28, Cimsno, Docket at 78 (Dec. 29, 1989) (relying on Jenkins, 782 F.2d
at 474).
235. Memorandum and Order, Cimrno, Docket at 336 (June 15, 1990); see also Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. SS 1602-1611 (1988).
236. Memorandum and Order at 18, Cimsno, Docket at 336 (June 15, 1990). The court
also agreed with the Ninth Circuit's construction that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act contained no implicit choice-of-law rule with regard to claims for actual damages
based on negligence. See Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1425-26 (9th Cir. 1989).
237. Judge Parker determined that Texas adopted the most significant relationship
approach in accordance with SS 6 and 145 of the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS (1971). Memorandum and Order at 18-19, Cimsno, Docket at 336 (June 15, 1990)
(relying on Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979)).
238. In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1011 (3d Cir. 1986).
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The plaintiffs represented that applicable law would not present
insuperable obstacles to class action litigation,23O and, true to this
representation, the plaintiffs have not opposed Judge Kelly's
choice-of-law decisions by individual motions.2 41
Judge Kelly used Pennsylvania choice-of-law rules to decide
choice-of-law questions on a motion-by-motion basis. His applica-
tion of Pennsylvania choice-of-law principles combines an "inter-
est analysis" with the "significant contacts" approach of the
Restatement (Second) of Conflct of Laws.241 This approach led
Judge Kelly to apply the laws of Virginia, South Carolina, Ten-
nessee, Georgia, and other states to grant partial or complete
summary judgment for defendants on liability or limitations is-
sues.m When the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of a
state's statute of repose, Judge Kelly certified the question to
the state's Attorney General with a request that the Attorney
General file a memorandum with the court concerning the con-
stitutionality of the challenged repose statute.243
239.To meet the problem of diversity in applicable state law, class plaintiffs
have undertaken an extensive analysis of the variances in products liability
among the jurisdictions. That review separates the law into four categories.
Even assuming additional permutations and combinations, plaintiffs have
made a creditable showing, which apparently satisfied the district court, that
class certification does not present insuperable obstacles. Although we have
some doubt on this score, the effort may nonetheless prove successful.
Id. at 1010.
240. See znfra note 241. But of. Pretrial Order No. 247, In re School Asbestos Litig.,
No. 83-0268, Docket No. 2285 (E.D. Pa. July 6, 1990) (certifying question of constitutionality
of Hawaii statute of repose to Hawaii Attorney General, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2403(b)).
241. See, e.g., Memorandum and Order No. 224, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 2128
(Mar. 20, 1990) (applying South Carolina law and granting partial summary judgment).
This interpretation of Pennsylvania choice-of-law principles is derived from Melville v.
American Home Assurance Co., 584 F.2d 1306 (3d Cir. 1978); Klein v. Council of Chemical
Associations, 587 F "Supp. 213 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d
854 (1970); Griffith v. United Airlines, 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964); Memorandum and
Order No. 167, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 1644 (Jan. 27, 1989) (applying Virginia
statute of repose and granting defendants' motion for summary judgment).
242. See, e.g., Memorandum and Pretrial Order No. 238, School Asbestos Litig., Docket
No. 2242 (May 25, 1990) (applying Georgia statute of limitations to grant summary
judgment to 31 defendants against all Georgia plaintiffs); Memorandum and Order No.
224, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 2128 (Mar. 20, 1990); Memorandum and Order No.
220, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 2124 (Mar. 20, 1990) (applying Tennessee law and
granting partial summary judgment to defendant against plaintiffs' restitution claims);
Memorandum and Order No. 167, School Asbestos Litig., Docket at 1644 (Jan. 27, 1989).
243. Pretrial Order No. 247, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 2285 (July 6, 1990)
(certifying question of constitutionality of Hawaii statute of repose to Hawaii Attorney
General, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2403(b)); see also Plaintiffs' Response to Certain Defen-
dants Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to the Claims of Hawaii Schools, School
Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 2254 (June 8, 1990); Certain Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs'
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On first reflection, Judge Kelly's solution to the applicable law
problem seems to illustrate the difficulty of multiple applicable
laws in a nationwide, diversity-based mass tort action. In practice,
however, the difficulty has not proved unduly burdensome to
Judge Kelly. He simply has determined applicable law on a
motion-by-motion basis. This method has enabled defendants to
defeat liability to certain plaintiffs in certain states. It remains
to be seen whether this motion-by-motion resolution under dif-
ferent states' substantive law will yield inconsistent results for
class claimants. Judge Kelly still faces major choice-of-law ques-
tions concerning applicable law at trial.
C. Statute of Lsmitatwns Problems
Mass tort cases involving latent injuries frequently entail com-
plicated technical and legal questions relating to proof of causa-
tion and statutes of limitations.2" In latent injury cases, the long
period of time between the initial exposure to a toxic substance
and the manifestation of injury creates an obstacle to recovery.2"
In addition, exposure to other toxic substances during the latency
period raises intervening cause defenses. Furthermore, nation-
wide class actions such as School Asbestos Litsgatwn raise the
spectre of disparate statutes of limitations under conflicts rules.
These interrelated problems have generated debate concerning
Response to Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Hawaii School Building Claims,
School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 2277 (June 26, 1990); Certain Defendants' Notice that
Plaintiffs Have Triggered the Court's Duty Under 28 U.S.C. 2403(b) to Certify to the
Attorney General of Hawaii that the Constitutionality of a Hawaii Statute has been
Drawn in Question, School Asbestos Litig, Docket No. 2278 (June 26, 1990).
244. See M. PETERSON & M. SELVIN, supra note 19, at 10-il (latent tort injury cases
raise statute of limitations problems). See generally Glimcher, Statute of Limitations and
the Discovery Rule in Latent Inury Claims: An Exception or the Law, 43 U. PITT. L. REv.
501 (1982) (advocating adoption of equitable discovery rules for statutes of limitations);
Green, The Paradox of Statutes of Limitations in Toxc Substances Litigation, 76 CALIF.
L. REV. 965 (1988) (advocating that statutes of limitations should be abolished in toxic
tort cases); McGovern, The Status of Statutes of L-mitations and Statutes of Repose in
Products Lzability Actions: Present and Future, 16 FoRum 416 (1981) (discussing the status
of statutes of limitations for products liability cases in various states); Note, Wilson v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp. and Statutes of Limitations in Latent Inury Litigation: An
Equitable Expanswn of the Discovery Rule, 32.CATH. U.L. REV. 471 (1983) (examimng the
unique analysis of statute of limitations in Wilson); Note, The Fairness and Constitution-
ality of Statutes of Limitations for Tox Tort Suits, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1683 (1983) (discovery
rule relating to damages vindicates liberty and property rights of plaintiffs).
245. See Innovative Techniues, supra note 17, at 386 (discussing New York's stringent
limitations as a barrier to mass toxic tort claims); Feinberg, The Toxc Tort Litigation
Criss: Conceptual Problems and Proposed Solutions, 24 Hous. L. REv. 155, 157 (1987)
(discussing statute of limitations problems and impact on plaintiffs' claims).
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the ability of aggregative procedure to preserve individualized
statute of limitations defenses.24 6
Believing that the class action frustrated their ability to raise
individual statute of limitations defenses, the defendants in Cim-
ino opposed Judge Parker's proposed class action trial plan.247
Judge Parker denied all objections to the trial plan and devised
a dual approach to solve problems relating to the statute of
limitations defense.m First, the jury would address statute of
limitations issues on a classwide basis during Phase II of the
trial.z49 Then, during proposed Phase III, the court would examine
the filing date of each plaintiff's case and the evidence concerning
each plaintiffs exposure to asbestos for purposes of the damages
determination.25  "In this manner," stated Judge Parker, "the
Court will be able to eliminate from sharing in the Jury's award
of damages those Plaintiffs whose cases are barred by the statute
of limitations. '251 Although the Fifth Circuit invalidated Phase II
of Judge Parker's proposed class action trial, the court made no
mention of the proposed class damages and individualized treat-
ment of the statute of limitations defense in Phase III.252 When
Cimsno finally went to trial in July 1990, Judge Parker deferred
all statute of limitations defenses to postverdict motions.2
In a May 1990 pretrial order setting forth issues to be tried
during Phase I of School Asbestos Litigaton, Judge Kelly indi-
cated that Phase I would include the trial of "common de-
246. See Rosenberg, Of End Games and Openzngs, supra note 38, at 718 (advocating the
averaging of statute of limitations defenses by sampling the class to determine the
frequency that the defense denies or reduces recovery). Professor Rosenberg writes,
"Then, based on the probability of each successful defense, recovery would be discounted
in all cases where the defense might plausibly be raised." Id.
247. See, e.g., Motion of Defendant Fibreboard Corp. to Vacate or Amend the October
26, 1989 Order or to Certify the Order of October 26, 1989, for Interlocutory Appeal,
Cimino v. Raymark Indus., No. B-86-0456-CA, Docket at 64 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 1989);
Objections of Defendant Asbestos Corp. to Court's Memorandum and Order of Consoli-
dation and Certification of Class, Cimsno, Docket at 67 (Nov. 13, 1989); Objections of
Defendant Pittsburgh Corning to Court Certification of Class Action and Motion for
Reconsideration, Cimno, Docket at 67 (Nov. 14, 1989).
248. Order, Cimzno, Docket at 78 (Dec. 29, 1989).
249. Id. at 2-3.
250. Id. at 3-4.
251. Id at 22 (court to examine medical records, medical examination results, and
depositions to determine availability of statute of limitations defense).
252. See In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1990).
253. The defendants continued to raise limitations defenses prior to trial. See, e.g.,
Order, Cimno, Docket at 146 (Feb. 5, 1990) (court to make determination on defendant's
motion concerning applicability of Texas statute of repose based on evidence presented
at trial); Order, Cimsno, Docket at 143 (Feb. 2, 1990) (same).
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fenses." ' Whether this will include statute of limitations defenses
and, if so, how this will be staged as a matter of common proof
remains unanswered. During pretrial proceedings, however, Judge
Kelly considered statute of limitations defenses on a motion-by-
motion basis, similar to his disposition of choice-of-law issues.255
IV. PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS
Complex civil litigation involving multiple parties and multiple
claims gives rise to massive, complicated discovery.25s Various
judicial management techniques, many recommended in the Man-
254. Pretrial Order No. 235, In re School Asbestos Litig., No. 83-0268, Docket No. 2225
(E.D. Pa. May 17, 1990).
255. For example, in ruling on a summary judgment motion challenging a claim barred
by Virgina's statute of repose, Judge Kelly distingished statutes of repose from statutes
of limitations and held Pennsylvana's forum rule for statutes of limitations inapplicable.
Memorandum and Order No. 167, Shool Asbestos Litig, Docket No. 1644 (Jan. 27, 1989).
He concluded that, under choice-of-law principles, Pennsylvama courts would apply the
Pennsylvama 6tatute of limitations to disputes involving the timely filing of complaints,
with the Pennsylvama borrowing statute providing the only exception. Id. at 3 (relying
on Ross v. Johns-Manville Corp., 766 F.2d 823 (3d Cir. 1985), and Freeman v. Lawton,
353 Pa. 613, 46 A.2d 205 (1946)).
In May 1990, however, Judge Kelly applied a Georgia four-year statute of limitations
and granted summary judgment in favor of 32 defendants against all Georgia plaintiffs
in the class. Memorandum and Pretrial Order No. 238A, School Asbestos Litig., Docket
No. 2251 (June 6, 1990); Memorandum and Pretrial Order No. 238, School Asbestos Litig.,
Docket No. 2242 (May 25, 1990). The court explained that the parties did not contest the
application of the four-year limitations statute and that the plaintiffs failed to produce
evidence in support of their tolling argument. Id. at 3.
256. See generally Brazil, Refernng Discovery Tasks to Spectal Masters: Is Rule 53 a
Source of Authority and Restrictions?, 1983 Ai. B. FOUND. REs. J. 143, 183-84 (arguing
that the judiciary's inherent power, not Rule 53, allows appointment of a special master
to aid civil discovery); Hare & Gilbert, Dzscovery in Products Liability Cases: The Plaintiffs
Plea for Judicial Understanding, 12 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 413, 415-17 (1989) (defining the
"cause and effect of a plaintiffs abuse of discovery"); Kaminsky, Proposed Federal
Discovery Rules For Complex Civil Litigation, 48 FORDHAM L. REv. 907, 909-11 (1980)
(describing the flagrant abuse of discovery in complex civil litigation); Peckham, A Judical
Response to the Cost of Litigation: Case Management, Two-Stage Discovery Planning and
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 253, 256-57 (1985) (tracing the devel-
opment of modern discovery provisions); Peckham, The Federal Judge As Case Manager:
The New Rule in Guiding a Case From Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 770 (1981)
(assessing the effectiveness of judicial pretrial management techmques in producing fair
settlements and efficient trials); Pointer, Complex Litigation: Demonstration of Pretrial
Conference, 6 REv. LITIG. 285 (1987) (discussing modern practice in handling complex
litigation); Richey, Document Control and Management sn Complex Litigation, 18 MEM. ST.
U.L. REV. 443 (1988) (discussing various aspects of organizing and managing documents
in complex litigation); Note, Mass Products Lzability Litigation: A Proposal For Dissem-
ination of Discovered Maternal Covered by a Protective Order, 60 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1137 (1985)
(arguing that protective orders restricting the dissemination of discovered material to
similarly situated plaintiffs violate plaintiffs' first amendment rights and lander justice).
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ual for Complex Litgatwn,-2 57 assist in the judicial regulation of
extensive pretrial proceedings. Numerous federal courts handle
asbestos litigation through such techniques as districtwide stand-
ing pretrial orders, standard interrogatories, detailed scheduling
orders, and cooperative lawyer actions limiting filings and paper-
work. Judges Parker and Kelly used pretrial conferences and
hearings to organize counsel, set scheduling orders, formulate
discovery plans, and issue rulings on pretrial motions. In addition,
both judges extensively used magistrate judges to handle routine
motions and to resolve discovery disputes.259
A. Pretmal Conferences, Organzatwn of Counsel, and
Attorneys' Fees
Rule 16 has five stated goals: (1) to expedite the disposition of
an action; (2) to establish early and continuing control so that a
case will not be protracted because of a lack of management; (3)
to discourage wasteful pretrial activities; (4) to improve the
quality of the trial through more thorough preparation; and (5)
to facilitate case settlement.26° To achieve these goals, the rule
requires the court to issue a scheduling order limiting the time
to join other parties, to file and hear motions, and to complete
discovery no more than 120 days after the filing of a complaint. 26 1
In general, Judges Parker and Kelly used pretrial conferences
sparingly They preferred to hold telephone conferences or to
rule on paper motions. Both judges organized the class actions
early and regulated the proceedings through scheduling orders.
257. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, SECOND S 21.41-.48 (1985) (discovery recommen-
dations).
258. T. WILLGING, supra note 7, at 15-24 (standardized pretrial procedures, including
motions, discovery, and rulings); T. WILLGING, supra note 1, at 47-50 (paperwork manage-
ment techniques).
259. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (1988) permits the referral of nondispositive pretrial matters
and factual disputes to a magistrate judge for rulings, including supervision of discovery
or discovery disputes. See also 28 U.S.C. S 636(b)(1)(B) (permitting magistrate judges to
submit to judges findings of fact and recommendations for disposition); MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION, SECOND S 21.53. Judges Kelly and Parker referred motions relating
to personal jurisdiction and venue to Magistrate Judges Naythons and Hines, respectively.
260. FED. R. Civ. P 16(a).
261. Id. The court also may order dates for other pretrial conferences, a final pretrial
conference, and "any other matters appropriate in the circumstances of the case." Id.,
see also FED. R. CIV. P 16(c), (d), (e), (f) (delineating the subjects to be discussed at pretrial
conference, governing final pretrial conference, discussing the pretrial order, and imposing
sanctions for failure to obey court's pretrial orders).
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Because of Judge Parker's long-standing relationship with as-
bestos personal injury litigation and his familiarity with most of
the lawyers in Cimino, he had less need to meet with the
attorneys. By the time Cimino was certified, the conduct of
asbestos litigation in the Eastern District of Texas followed
standardized pretrial procedures. A standing order with detailed
provisions concerning the filing of papers and the regulation of
discovery governed asbestos cases.262 A master set of interroga-
tories and requests for admissions supplemented this standing
order. 2" All pretrial motions filed in the Beaumont Division were
referred to Magistrate Judge Hines. 26 4
Through a series of rapidfire scheduling orders, Judge Parker
held the parties to tight, rigid deadlines. 265 In order to focus the
attorneys' efforts exclusively on Cimino, Judge Parker issued an
order protecting the class counsel and the defendants' liaison
counsel from having to conduct discovery or appear in any other
case pending in state or federal court during the Cimino trial.266
Judge Parker also issued a series of scheduling orders detailing
short deadlines for such matters as the conduct of discovery, the
exchange of tentative and final exhibit lists, the designation of
fact and expert witnesses, and the filing of dispositive motions.
267
The issue of attorneys' fees and the problems of financing
complex class actions generated a great deal of controversy
because of the high fees that plaintiffs' attorneys have received
from asbestos awards and settlements. 2
6 8
262. Standing Order for Asbestos Cases in the Eastern District of Texas (E.D. Tex.
July 7, 1982).
263. See Defendants' Master Set of Interrogatories (E.D. Tex. filed Sept. 1, 1982);
Plaintiff(s) Master Set of Interrogatories and Request for Admissions (E.D. Tex. filed
Dec. 8, 1982).
264. Order, Cimino v. Raymark Indus. (filed Dec. 8) No. B-86-0456-CA, Docket at 4 (E.D.
Tex. Oct. 10, 1986).
265. See, e.g., Order, Cimino, Docket at 45 (July 19, 1989) (ordering plaintiffs' and
defendants' liaison counsel to meet to attempt to agree on uniform discovery requests);
Order, Cimino, Docket at 44 (July 14, 1989) (overruling objections to plaintiffs' discovery
requests and ordering defendants to comply within 30 days); Order, Cimino, Docket at
37 (June 26, 1989) (giving parties six months to complete discovery on jurisdictional issue).
266. Order, Cimino, Docket at 59 (Nov. 2, 1989).
267. Order, Cimino, Docket at 77 (Dec. 20, 1989); Order, Cimino, Docket at 75 (Dec. 14,
1989); Scheduling Order Phase I, Cimino, Docket at 74 (Dec. 8, 1989).
268. See generally J. KAKALIK, P. EBENER, W. FELSTINER, G. HAGGSTROM, & M. SHANLEY,
VARIATION IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION COMPENSATION AND EXPENSES 628-43 (1984) (summariz-
ing the average characteristics of asbestos claims from 1980 to 1982 and analyzing the
ratio between litigation expense and compensation); Coffee, Rethinking the Class Action:
A Policy Primer on Reform, 62 IND. L.J. 625 (1987) (discussing the incentives to plaintiffs'
attorneys in various reform proposals); Coffee, The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Liti-
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Three points characterized Judge Parker's handling of attor-
neys' fees. First, Judge Parker typically made fee determinations
as settlements were achieved with individual defendants.2 9 Sec-
ond, rather than overriding them, Judge Parker permitted con-
tractual arrangements with the plaintiffs to govern attorneys'
fees. For example, in the instance of a twenty-one million dollar
settlement, Judge Parker specifically indicated that "[t]he Court
does not impose a limitation of the attorney fees which are
recoverable as a result of this settlement," but held the plaintiffs
"bound to the terms of their contingent fee agreements" with
the plaintiffs' attorneys.270 Third, Judge Parker permitted settle-
gation: Balancing Fairness and EJffcency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. Cm. L. REV.
877 (1987) (examining an approach for achieving greater client control in class action
litigation); Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of Economic
Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM.
L. REV. 669 (1986) (arguing in favor of reforms that would restrict collusive settlements);
Hamilton, Rabinowitz, & Szanton, Cutting the Overhead Costs of Resolinng Asbestos Claims:
A Time for Action, 6 J. PROD. LiAB. 17 (1983) (proposing implementation of measures
whereby selected cost-reducing measures could be installed, maintained, and adapted to
changing circumstances); Johnson, Ethical Limitations on Creative Financing of Mass Tort
Class Actions, 54 BROOKLYN L. REV. 539 (1988) (discussing the ethical implications of
representing multiple clients in the context of mass tort litigation); Kane, Of Carrots and
Sticks: Evaluating the Role of the Class Action Lawyer, 66 TEx. L. REv. 385 (1987)
(suggesting that analyzing class actions through the lawyer's role informs courts of
efficient means of handling complex cases); Leubsdorf, Recovering Attorney Fees As
Damages, 38 RUTGERS L. REV. 439 (1986) (advocating the recovery of attorneys' fees and
reasonable litigation expenses by prevailing plaintiffs); Levin & Colliers, Containing the
Cost of Litigation, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 219 (1985) (studying and suggesting solutions to
the problem of high litigation costs); Rosenberg, The Dusting of America: A Story of
Asbestos-Carnage, Coverup, and Litigation (Book Review), 99 HARV. L. REV. 1693 (1986)
(describing attorneys' tactics as self-serving); Rosenberg, Toxic Tort Litigation: Crisis or
Chrysalis? A Comment on Feinberg's Conceptual Problems and Proposed Solutions, 24 Hous.
L. REV. 183 (1987) [hereinafter Rosenberg, Toxic Tort Litigation] (discussing political
reasons, including attorneys' fees, for frustration of class action reform proposals); Walsh,
Asbestos Cases at Another Crossroads, Wash. Post, July 15, 1990, S H, at 1 (commenting
on high attorneys' fees in asbestos cases); Labaton, The Bitter Fight Over the Manville
Trust, N.Y. Times, July 8, 1990, S 3, at 1, col. 2 (discussing lawyer fees from Manville
trust for asbestos victims).
The Federal Judicial Center published a series of studies relating to recovery of
attorneys' fees in federal court. See R. ARONSON, ATTORNEY-CLIENT FEE ARRANGEMENTS:
REGULATION AND REVIEW (1980); A. MILLER, ATTORNEYS' FEES IN CLASS ACTIONS (1980); J.
SHAPARD, THE INFLUENCE OF RULES RESPECTING RECOVERY OF ATTORNEYS' FEES ON SET-
TLEMENT OF CIVIL CASES (1984); T. WILLGING & N. WEEKS, ATTORNEY FEE PETITIONS:
SUGGESTIONS FOR ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT (1985); T. WILLGING, JUDICIAL REGU-
LATION OF ATTORNEYS' FEES: BEGINNING THE PROCESS AT PRETRIAL (1984).
269. See, e.g., Partial Judgment, Cimino, Docket at 315 (June 2, 1990) (approving
settlement and allowing recovery of attorney fees); Order, Cimino, Docket at 146 (Feb.
5, 1990) (approving settlement with H.K. Porter, including provision for attorneys' fees);
Order, Cimino, Docket at 33 (Apr. 18, 1989) (approving settlement with Center for Claims
Resolution, including provision for attorneys' fees).
270. Partial Judgment, Cimino, Docket at 315 (May 2, 1990).
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ment awards to finance the ongoing class litigation and ordered
the creation of an interest-bearing account to offset litigation
expenses.271
Like Judge Parker, Judge Kelly organized the class action in
School Asbestos Litsgatswn very early in the case. During the past
seven years of ongoing litigation, he conducted only a few, widely
spaced pretrial conferences.2 2 Although Judge Kelly preferred
to rule on motions by written submission, when he held oral
hearings he consolidated argument on several motions.2 s He
refrained from the detailed scheduling orders and short deadlines
that Judge Parker used in Cimsno.
Due to the large number of litigants, this nationwide class
action required a formal organization of counsel.2 4 At the outset
of the case, Judge Kelly designated two lead counsel for the
plaintiffs and a liaison counsel for the defendants. 5 Sixteen
months later, he set up five litigation committees: an executive
committee; an administrative committee; a liability and trial
committee; a legal committee; and a settlement committee.26
271. Order, Cimsno, Docket at 153 (Feb. 14, 1990) (granting plaintiffs' motion to withhold
sums from settlements with three defendants to pay litigation expenses incurred in the
case); Disbursement Order, Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., No. M-84-193-CA (ED. Tex. June
30, 1986) (limiting attorneys' fees to 20% for attorneys representing individual plaintiffs
and 1% for class action counsel); see also Court Awarded Attorney Fees: Report of the
Third Circuit Task Force, 108 F.R.D. 237 (1985) (discussing use of percentage fee awards
in class actions with common funds).
272. See, e.g., Rule 16 Scheduling Hearing, In re School Asbestos Litig., No. 83-0268,
Docket No. 2053 (ED. Pa. Feb. 2, 1990); Order No. 204, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No.
2025 (Dec. 11, 1989) (scheduling Rule 16 conference for Jan. 25, 1990); Order No. 169,
School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 1646 (Jan. 27, 1989) (setting final pretrial conference
during May 1990); Pretrial Order No. 141, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 1388 (Sept.
13, 1988) (scheduling final pretrial conference for Apr. 7, 1989); Order No. 140, School
Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 1370 (Sept. 1, 1988) (scheduling discovery conference for Sept.
8, 1988); Pretrial Order No. 40, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 518 (Mar. 6, 1985)
(scheduling Rule 16 pretrial conference for Mar. 19, 1985); Status Conference, School
Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 28 (Sept. 20, 1983).
273. See, e.g., Pretrial Order No. 158, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 1571 (Dec. 16,
1988} (scheduling oral argument on six different motions); Pretrial Order No. 152, School
Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 1537 (Nov. 22, 1988) (scheduling oral argument on combined
motions); Order No. 101, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 1143 (Jan. 19, 1988) (scheduling
hearing on various plaintiffs' motions).
274. See generally E. SHEMAN & R. MARCUS, COiPLEX LITIGATION, CASES AND MATE-
RIALS IN ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE 643-54 (1985) (discussing lead and liaison organization
of counsel in complex cases).
275. Pretrial Order No. 1, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 23 (Aug. 1, 1983) (desig-
nating plaintiffs' lead counsel and liaison counsel for defendants).
276. Pretrial Order No. 24, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 351 (Nov. 7, 1984). Judge
Kelly directed lead counsel to cooperate with one another, to consult with the executive
committee, and to receive a majority vote of the executive committee before proceeding
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With few changes in personnel, this committee structure func-
tioned throughout seven years of litigation and continues to
operate as the litigation proceeds to trial.
The original executive committee was composed of ten law
firms and individual lawyers. The order assigned five duties and
responsibilities to this committee:
1. To coordinate briefing and arguments of motions and the
filing of briefs
2. To initiate and conduct class discovery and present the
[class] position during trial P
3. To discuss settlement or negotiate with defense counsel
4. To call meetings of counsel, providing due notice, when it
is deemed appropriate; and
5. To perform such other duties as deemed necessary 2
The original administrative committee consisted of six plain-
tiffs' attorneys who were responsible for all administrative func-
tions, such as receiving and distributing notices, orders, and
communications that the court generally did not distribute to all
lawyers.28 The liability and trial committee consisted of nine
lawyers who prepared the plaintiffs' case on liability and dam-
ages.27 The legal committee's five members were responsible for
briefing legal argument of all motions.20 Finally, the settlement
committee, which consisted of seven members, was responsible
for conducting all settlement negotiations.281 The court's directive
to "make all work assignments in such a manner as to lead to
the orderly and efficient prosecution of this litigation and avoid
duplicative or unproductive efforts" required that the committee
chairs consider "the qualifications and experience" of counsel
when making assignments. 22
with any major decision in the class action. The order defined "major decisions" to include
decisions to enter into settlement negotiations with defendants, decisions to recommend
acceptance of a settlement offer, and decisions to add lawyers to the executive committee.
Judge Kelly did not create a parallel committee structure for defendants' counsel.
277. Id. at 2-3. The liability and trial committee was to coordinate discovery; the
settlement committee was to coordinate settlement negotiations. The order did "not
preclude any defendant from initiating individual settlement discussions with any repre-
sentative of any public or private school district unless otherwise ordered by this court."
Id.
278. Id. at 3.
279. Id. at 3-4.
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At the outset of School Asbestos Litsgatwn, Judge Kelly issued
a pretrial order governing the award of counsel fees and ex-
penses.2 This order required each attorney or law firm expecting
an award of fees to file a statement under seal each month
concerning the prior month's activities relating to the litigation
and detailed specific information to be included in the attorneys'
affidavits.2 Attorneys in the case have been satisfying this
requirement. When the first major settlement was achieved, the
class plaintiffs requested an order authorizing reimbursement of
past expenses and the creation of a litigation fund to pay for
contemplated future expenses.2s Judge Kelly granted this motion
and created a litigation escrow account to finance the class
action.286
B. Discovery Plans and Regulatwn of Dscovery
Both Cimsno and School Asbestos Litsgaton entailed massive
discovery efforts with hundreds of discovery events.2 Judges
283. Pretrial Order No. 23, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 315 (Oct. 19, 1984)
(concerning award of counsel fees and expenses).
284. Id. The information required by the court included:
(a) A narrative summary of the specific contributions made by the attorney
for the benefit of the class as well as a summary of the work [of] each
attorney and legal assistant in the firm for whom compensation is requested.
(b) The number of hours or fraction thereof and an explanation specifically
describing the tasks performed by each attorney and legal assistant.
(c) The hourly billable rate which the attorney/firm normally charges for
each attorney and legal assistant for similar types of work/service.
(d) The hours billed to other clients by the attorney and legal assistant
on non-class action matters during the time period.
(e) If the time or rate of any attorney who is not a partner or employee
of the firm submitting the statement is included , the submitting
attorney must include [information relating to fee allocation] together
with a statement of the reasons why it was necessary to enter into such
arrangements.
f) The initial statement for each attorney or legal assistant shall include
a resume of the background and qualifications of such person.
Id. at 1-2.
The court's order also indicated that it was not applicable "to the award of counsel
fees as a sanction for the filing of frivolous motions or for the failing to properly respond
to discovery requests." Id. at 2. Judge Kelly also ordered that attorneys itemize expenses
and support them with original documentation. Id. at 2-3.
285. Class Plaintiffs' Motion for an Order Authorizing Reimbursement of Past Expenses
and the Creation of a Litigation Fund to Pay for Contemplated Future Expenses, School
Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 1244 (Apr. 28, 1988) (motion to withdraw funds from settlement
fund created by settlement with defendants Owens-Illinois, Inc. and Proko Industries,
Inc.).
286. Memorandum and Pretrial Order No. 137, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 1344
(Aug. 5, 1988).
287. For commentary relating to complex litigation discovery, see supra notes 256-58.
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Parker and Kelly regulated discovery through similar procedures:
scheduling orders mandating discovery deadlines, referral of dis-
covery matters to magistrate judges, and rulings on contested
discovery decisions. Typical of their different case management
styles, Judge Parker controlled discovery more aggressively
whereas Judge Kelly permitted attorneys to proceed with dis-
covery at their own pace with virtually no interference from the
court.m
As suggested above, standing orders relating to pleading and
discovery generally governed Cimno.2 Even before Judge Parker
provisionally certified the class action, opposing counsel made
many discovery requests. ° To deal with developing discovery
contention, Judge Parker ordered plaintiffs' counsel and defen-
dants' liaison counsel to agree upon a uniform set of discovery
requests and indicated that the court would not entertain objec-
tions to such agreed-upon discovery requests.2 1 The court re-
ferred discovery matters to Magistrate Judge Hines, who met
with the parties to resolve discovery problems. 2
After provisional certification, Judge Parker streamlined dis-
covery by eliminating notice filings for depositions,29 by referring
as many discovery matters as possible to Magistrate Judges
Hines and McKee, and by issuing successive scheduling orders.24
He assigned Magistrate Judge Hines the task of formulating a
plan for pretrial discovery Magistrate Judge Hines' plan ordered
that all depositions occur between November 17, 1989, and Feb-
288. Only in July 1990 did Judge Kelly express impatience with the pace of discovery
in School Asbestos Litigation and order attorneys to meet short discovery and pretrial
deadlines. See Pretrial Order No. 249, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 2294 (July 16,
1990) (expressing judge's frustration at parties' failure to meet expert witness discovery
and pretrial memoranda deadlines despite knowing of deadline for 17 months).
289. See srupra note 262.
290. See, e.g., Memorandum and Order, Cimino v. Raymark Indus., No. B-86-0456-CA,
Docket at 44 (E.D. Tex. July 14, 1989) (responding to plaintiffs' motion to compel answers
and overruling defendant Asbestos Corp. Ltd.'s objections to plaintiffs' discovery request);
Motion of Plaintiffs for Protection from Multiple, Redundant Discovery Requests, Cimzno,
Docket at 35 (May 10, 1989); Memorandum of Plaintiff in Support of Motion to Compel
Discovery and Sanctions, Cim&no, Docket at 35 (May 9, 1989).
291. Order, Cimzno, Docket at 45 (July 19, 1989).
292. See, e.g., Hearing on the Defendant's Motion to Quash a Deposition, Cimno, Docket
at 58 (Oct. 13, 1989); Request of Plaintiffs for Hearing on An Discovery Pending, Cim-mo,
Docket at 55 (Oct. 12, 1989); Hearing to Resolve Objections, Cimino, Docket at 53 (Aug.
24, 1989).
293. Order, Cimsno, Docket at 328 (June 8, 1990) (sua sponte order eliminating filing
requirement for notice of deposition except when opposing party objected to the taking
of the deposition).
294. See supra notes 265-67 and accompanying text.
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ruary 3, 1990, the scheduled trial date.295 The depositions were
to occur at plaintiffs' offices or any other mutually agreed-upon
location and were limited to forty-five minutes.296 The plan also
permitted individual medical examinations of class claimants, but
required that the examinations occur in Beaumont, Texas, and
that all phases of the medical examination be completed within
eight hours of the individual's scheduled appointment time.2
Over the defendants' objectionss28 Judge Parker adopted Mag-
istrate Judge Hines' discovery plan9 and held the defendants to
the discovery limitations throughout the ensuing months of pre-
trial discovery.O He expedited matters further by permitting
the attorneys to proceed with discovery on later trial phases
while Phase I proceeded.301
295. Discovery Plan and Schedule For Deposition and Medical Examination of Plaintiffs,
Cimio, Docket at 63 (Nov. 9, 1989). This plan proved ighly controversial. The magistrate
judge proposed limiting discovery to a statistically significant sample of plaintiffs, but
the defendants insisted on individualized discovery for each claimant, including individual
depositions and medical examinations. Magistrate Judge Hines compromised by permitting
discovery of all 3,031 claimants in the class, but imposing time and place limitations on
those depositions and medical examinations. Id. at 1-2.
296. Id-. at 3-4. The plan anticipated completion of 704 depositions in November, 1,160
depositions in December, and 1,360 depositions in January. See %d. Attachment C (45-
minute plan).
297. Id. at 4-5.
298. The defendants objected that this discovery plan unconstitutionally restricted trial
preparation. As a practical matter, they argued that the time limitations were infeasible
and that Beaumont's medical facilities were insufficient to handle the volume of medical
examinations within the designated timetable. In sustaining the discovery plan, Judge
Parker noted that
[tihe court's decision to allow depositions and medical examinations of all
the Plaintiffs in this action was made solely for the benefit of the Defendants.
These procedural safeguards are not available in the typical class action. In
the usual class action, a group of class members are allowed to represent
the interests of the entire class of plaintiffs.
Id-
The defendants further challenged the discovery plan in their mandamus appeals to
the Fifth Circuit, but the Fifth Circuit specifically declined to address the validity of this
plan. See In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 709 (5th Cir. 1990) ("Petitioners attack
the limits of discovery from the class members, but we will not reach this issue."). The
court noted, however, that the attorneys did not propose to use the depositions of the
individual class members directly at trial, but rather planned to use the depositions to
"provide information for experts engaged to measure the damages suffered by the class."
Id.
299. Order at 2, Cim no, Docket at 79 (Jan. 5, 1990) (adopting Magistrate Judge Hines'
Discovery Plan and Schedule); Order, Cimino, Docket at 78 (Dec. 29, 1989) (upholding
Magistrate Judge Hines' Discovery Plan and Schedule).
300. See, e.g., Order Relating to the Resolution of Certain Discovery Matters, Cimino,
Docket at 251 (May 11, 1990) (ordering that the 45-minute time limit for plaintiffs'
depositions would remain in effect).
301. See, e.g., Order, Cimio, Docket at 77 (Dec. 20, 1989) (discovery deadlines); Order,
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Notwithstanding all these efforts, Judge Parker was disturbed
by the amount and expense of discovery, which he viewed as
unnecessary In retrospect, he regretted not limiting discovery
to the 160 claimants comprising the sample for Phase III. Rela-
tively few discovery challenges, however, accompamed the high
volume of discovery conducted in the case-defendants conducted
over 2,000 plaintiff depositions and 1,500 independent medical
examinations.
Discovery in School Asbestos Lsttgatwn proceeded in a some-
what different fashion. From the initial filing of the complaint
through class certification, very little discovery activity oc-
curred,302 primarily because the parties were engaged in various
jurisdictional motions or matters relating to class certification.
Once the class was certified, however, the parties submitted a
suggested comprehensive discovery plan, and the court agreed
to hear oral argument on that plan.303 Judge Kelly issued a
comprehensive discovery order setting a deadline for completion
of all discovery in the action and detailing specifics relating to
the conduct of discovery 304 The order also stated that he would
schedule a final pretrial conference forty-five days after the
discovery deadline. Failure to meet these deadlines prompted
Judge Kelly's expression of frustration in July 1990.305
The three central components of the School Asbestos L'stzgatwn
discovery order related to written discovery, production of doc-
uments, and depositions.306 For written discovery, the court or-
dered attorneys for each side to develop standard sets of
interrogatories, requests for documents, and requests for admis-
Cimsno, Docket at 75 (Dec. 14, 1989); Scheduling Order Phase I, Cimzno, Docket at 74
(Dec. 12, 1989).
302. See, e.g., Stipulation and Order, In re School Asbestos Litig., No. 83-0268, Docket
No. 1006 (E.D. Pa. June 13, 1987) (extending time in which to respond to plaintiffs'
requests for admissions); Stipulation and Order, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 1004B
(June 7, 1987) (same); Memorandum and Order No. 49, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No.
643 (June 12, 1985) (dismissing as moot defendants' request for an extension of time in
which to answer plaintiffs' request); Pretrial Order No. 41, School Asbestos Litig., Docket
No. 561 (Mar. 21, 1985) (denying defendants' motion for extension of time to respond to
discovery requests).
303. Order That Oral Argument will be Held on a Suggested Comprehensive Discovery
Order Heretofore Submitted by the Parties, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 1026 (Aug.
6, 1987); see also Transcript, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 1040 (Aug. 25, 1987)
(transcript of oral argument concerning discovery and defendants' motion for entry of
discovery order).
304. Pretrial Order No. 93, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 1049 (Aug. 10, 1987)
(discovery order).
305. See supra note 288.
306. Pretrial Order No. 93, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 1049 (Aug. 10, 1987).
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sions, and the court required the parties to answer or object to
written discovery within sixty days of service.30 7 For document
production, the court required that all requests seeking an ad-
mission as to the genuineness of any document include a copy of
the document.308 The most extensive direction concerned deposi-
tions: the order required notice to all parties in the action,
including notice of changes in time or place of the deposition; for
parties not present, not represented, or subsequently joining the
case, the order provided for supplemental deposition testimony s0 9
The order also required that counsel agree on who would
conduct the examination and cross-examination of deponents.3 10
Judge Kelly ordered that "[n]o counsel shall be excluded from
participating in the examination or prevented from exploring
more fully lines of questions previously pursued, provided that
counsel shall not engage in unnecessary repetition."3 11 The order
required the parties to furnish deposition transcripts to counsel
on all sides, but did not require them to file deposition transcripts
with the court. If disputes arose during the course of the depo-
sition, the parties could present them to the court by telephone.3 1 2
The court also granted leave to depose expert witnesses through
interrogatories in addition to or i lieu of oral depositions. Finally,
the court indicated that it would not permit any motion to compel
discovery prior to a conference among the plaintiffs' co-lead
counsel, the chairman of the trial and liability committee, the
involved defendants' counsel, and, if requested by the involved
defendants, the defendants' liaison counsel.313
Judge Kelly referred contested discovery matters to Magis-
trate Judge Naythons and, after Magistrate Judge Naythons'




310. Id. at 3.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 4. The dispute had to be one that could not be resolved by agreement and
that would "significantly disrupt the discovery schedule or require a rescheduling of the
deposition." Id.
313. Id. The order further specified requirements for contesting the sufficiency of
discovery responses. Id. at 5.
314. See, e.g., Pretrial Order No. 138, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 1356 (Aug. 16,
1988) (referring motion for sanctions for failure to comply with prior order to compel
answers to plaintiffs' discovery requests to Magistrate Judge Naythons); Pretrial Order
No. 125, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 1285 (June 15, 1988) (referring motion for
protective order staying deposition and document production to Magistrate Judge Nay-
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Judge Kelly held telephone conferences on contested discovery
motions, 15 holding oral argument or a discovery conference only
in rare instances.3 16 Unlike Judge Parker, Judge Kelly did not
issue multiple successive scheduling orders, but he did revise
discovery and trial deadlines two times after the initial discovery
order. 17
The single distinguishing feature of discovery in School Asbestos
Littgatwn is the parties' heavy reliance on expert witness testi-
mony. Because the school asbestos claims are not based in per-
sonal injury tort theory, the attorneys for the plaintiff class have
not been involved in deposing thousands of claimants or con-
ducting individualized medical examinations. Rather, the focus of
pretrial discovery has been on designating expert witness lists
and deposing expert witnesses. Judge Kelly ordered the plaintiffs
and defendants to provide the opposing side with lists of expert
witnesses for common issues they intended to present at trial. 1
Further, he issued a highly detailed order regulating expert
witness discovery which ordered all such discovery to occur
during a four-month period.319 In order to satisfy this deadline,
Judge Kelly imposed time and place limitations that required
thons); Order No. 94, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 1051 (Aug. 15, 1987) (referring
plaintiffs' motion to compel answers to jurisdictional discovery requests to Magistrate
Judge Naythons). For a discussion of Magistrate Judge Naythons' recusal, see snfra notes
335-37 and accompanying text.
315. See, e.g., Order No. 123, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 1281 (June 14, 1988)
(granting plaintiffs' motion for protective order requiring that depositions be held in the
federal district where the deponent is located, granted after telephone conference).
316. See, e.g., Order No. 140, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 1370 (Sept. 1, 1988)
(scheduling discovery conference regarding class plaintiffs' motion for sanctions for failure
to comply with a prior order); Pretrial Order No. 124, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No.
1282 (June 14, 1988) (scheduling oral argument on defendant's motion for protective order).
317. See Pretrial Order No. 249, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 2294 (July 16, 1990)
(extending expert witness discovery deadlines through January 1991 and ordering joint
pretrial order before March 4, 1991); Stipulation and Pretrial Order No. 239, School
Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 2243 (May 29, 1990) (ordering parties to submit a joint pretrial
order on or before June 8, 1990); Order No. 169, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 1646
(Jan. 27, 1989) (requiring parties to complete all discovery before December 31, 1989,
scheduling expert witness depositions between January and March 1990, and setting trial
pool date of June 1, 1990).
318. Order No. 207, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 2042 (Jan. 26, 1990) (order for
reciprocal production of expert witness lists). The parties exchanged and supplemented
these expert witness lists during spring 1990. The plaintiffs filed their list on February
13, 1990, and the defendants filed their lists on April 2, 1990.
319. Pretrial Order No. 249, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 2294 (July 16, 1990)
(extensive provisions regulating expert witness discovery and testimony); see also Judge
Kelly Okays Plans For Expert Discovery, Pretrial Order, 5 Mealey's Litig. Rep. Asbestos
42 (Aug. 3, 1990) (discussing Pretrial Order No. 249).
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parties to make their experts available for three consecutive days
and required coordinating counsel to circulate the schedules of
expert witness depositions. 320
Just as Magistrate Judge Hines scheduled over 3,000 deposi-
tions during the three months before the trial in Cimino, Judge
Kelly offered a mathematical measure to govern the expeditious
taking of expert witness depositions. His order stated:
Up to thirty percent (30/o) of the experts listed by plaintiffs
or defendants may be proffered for deposition during the same
four week period, provided that on no day does the number of
experts proffered exceed the proportion of days available di-
vided by number of experts increased by fifty percent (50/0)
unless agreed to by coordinating counsel.3 21
Finally, Judge Kelly's order contained provisions for proffering
expert opinion testimony in reliance on unpublished studies or
subsequent studies and investigations&22
In July 1990, some defendants filed a memorandum raising a
potential problem with this discovery in response to Judge Kelly's
expert witness order. 23 These defendants contended that al-
though Judge Kelly's order was an "attempt to complete expert
discovery in an orderly fashion,"324 it did not address "what will
inevitably be certain defendants' need for building-specific dis-
covery to the extent that the named plaintiffs' claims survive
pending or soon-to-be-filed summary judgment motions. ' ' s25 They
suggested that defendants "will need an opportunity to take
building-specific discovery regarding buildings in which its prod-
ucts have been specifically identified. ''326 No defendants have yet
filed such motions, but if this problem materializes, it effectively
could transform the discovery in School Asbestos Littgatwn into
the extensive discovery that characterized Cimsno.
320. Pretrial Order No. 249 at 6, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 2294 (July 16, 1990).
"The proffering parties shall produce each expert for deposition during the four month
discovery period in an order that will accommodate their experts' schedules, provided
that by the end of the four month period all experts will have been deposed." Id.
321. Id at 7 (noting "Experts/days x 1.5. Fractions shall be rounded to the nearest
whole number:').
322. Id at 3-5. The order directed the parties to produce unpublished papers, studies,
data, and other items on which the expert intended to rely in proffering the expert's
opinmon.
323. Certain Defendants' Memorandum Regarding Pretrial Order No. 249, School As-
bestos Litig., Docket No. 2313 (July 25, 1990).
324. I& at 1.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 4.
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C. Use of Magistrate Judges
Under the statute governing magistrate judges, judges may
refer nondispositive pretrial matters such as discovery motions
and certain types of factual disputes to magistrate judges.32 The
Manual for Complex Lsttgaftwn suggests that this authority in-
cludes the referral of disputes concerning personal jurisdiction
and venue, evidentiary hearings, and proposed findings and re-
commendatons.32a
Judges Parker and Kelly used magistrate judges extensively
to supervise discovery, resolve discovery disputes, and issue
recommendations on selected jurisdictional motions.3 2 In addition,
Judge Parker designated Magistrate Judges McKee and Hines
as monitors of the Jenkins II ADR process,ss requested that
Magistrate Judge Hines formulate the class action discovery plan
and schedule for Cimsno,331 and used Magistrate Judge McKee to
make pretrial rulings regarding exhibits, evidence, and order of
proof. In both cases, the judges routinely referred nondispositive
discovery matters to the magistrate judges for rulings, subject
to reconsideration when "the magistrate's order [was] clearly
erroneous or contrary to law ,,32 Both judges, however, developed
a pattern of validating the magistrate judges' rulings on discovery
and other matters.
327. 28 U.S.C. 5 636(b)(1) (1988). See generally C. SERON, THE ROLES OF MAGISTRATES:
NINE CASE STUDIES (1985) (describing the use of magistrate judges in nne districts); C.
SERON, THE ROLES OF MAGISTRATES IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1983) (summarizing
magistrate judges' involvement in preparing civil and criminal cases).
328. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, SECOND S 21.53 (1985).
329. See Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate on the Motion of
Defendant, Asbestos Corp. Ltd., to Quash Service of Process and to Dismiss for Lack of
In Personam Jurisdiction, Cimino v. Raymark Indus., No. B-86-0456-CA, Docket at 75
(E.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 1989); Pretrial Order No. 145, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 1438
(Oct. 13, 1988); Pretrial Order No. 144, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 1497 (Oct. 7,
1988); Pretrial Order No. 100, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 1140 (Jan. 13, 1988);
Pretrial Order No. 94, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 1051 (Sept. 15, 1987).
330. See supra notes 63-71 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 295-301 and accompanying text.
332. 28 U.S.C. S 636(b)(1)(A) (1988).
333. See, e.g., Order That the Court Adopts the Report and Recommendation of the
U.S. Magistrate, Cimsno, Docket at 123 (Jan. 11, 1990) (regarding Magistrate Judge Hines'
report and recommendations on defendant's jurisdictional motion); Hearing on Motions,
Cimmo, Docket at 153 (Feb. 5, 1990) (sustaimng Magistrate Judge McKee's ruling on
exhibits and denying all other motions of appeal from Magistrate Judge McKee's rulings);
Order, Cimmno, Docket at 79 (Jan. 5, 1990) (adopting Magistrate Judge Hines' discovery
plan and schedule); Order No. 175, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 1692 (Mar. 20, 1989)
(upholding Magistrate Judge Naythons' rulings regarding defendant's objections to dis-
covery requests); Order No. 114, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 1185 (Mar. 10, 1988)
(upholding Magistrate Judge Naythons' rulings regarding defendant's objections to juris-
dictional discovery).
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Based on his experience as a magistrate judge handling refer-
rals from seven of the eight judges in the Eastern District of
Texas, Magistrate Judge Hines did not view his asbestos-related
assignments as particularly onerous, estimating that these mat-
ters took approximately fifteen percent of his time.3 He was
involved initially as a Jenkins II ADR monitor. Later, Judge
Parker assigned him various aspects of Cimino, including drafting
the provisional certification order, ruling on motions to amend
the complaint, conferring with Special Master Jack Ratliff con-
cerning the draft trial plan, formulating the discovery plan,
reporting on a jurisdictional motion, resolving discovery motions,
and serving as a settlement monitor with a defendant.
Magistrate Judge Hines attributes the efficient disposal of the
numerous motions in Cimino to the high caliber of lawyers
involved in the litigation. Whenever Magistrate Judge Hines set
a hearing on a discovery motion, his order included a boilerplate
warning that the court would determine whether it should impose
sanctions at the conclusion of the hearing. According to Magis-
trate Judge Hines, the parties made very few sanction motions
and the court did not impose any sanctions because the lawyers
knew what they were doing and generally tried to work things
out. For a litigation of the complexity and duration of Cimino,
Magistrate Judge Hines believed his interaction with Judge Parker
was infrequent. He understood Judge Parker's management style
and litigation goals and knew he had to determine motions by
certain dates so as not to impede the trial.
Magistrate Judge Naythons functioned similarly in School As-
bestos Litigation. Viewing his general role as helping to expedite
cases to trial, he performed the full range of a magistrate judge's
statutory duties yet utilized a small percentage of his time as a
magistrate judge on matters relating to School Asbestos Litsga-
twn. He handled all discovery motions and wrote reports and
recommendations on Rule 12 motions, partial summary judgment
motions, and one personal jurisdiction motion. Judge Kelly, how-
ever, ruled on the motions.
Magistrate Judge Naythons' involvement in School Asbestos
Litigattwn became problematic when his law clerk, who had
worked as a summer associate in the plaintiffs' class counsers
law firm, was offered a permanent position with that firm. Per-
334. Magistrate Judge Hines did consider Magistrate Judge McKee's assignment-
handling pretrial rulings and exhibits-onerous in that it demanded one or two days of
work for several weeks before trial.
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ceiving a potential breach of the Code of Judicial Conduct,M
Magistrate Judge Naythons invited objections from counsel,is
consulted with Judge Kelly, and recused himself from the case.i 7
Although Magistrate Judge Naythons believed his recusal re-
moved an experienced court officer from an ongoing complex
litigation, he characterized the situation as a very unique instance
not likely to occur often, even in complex cases. Although this
assessment is plausible in light of the small percentage of time
he worked on School Asbestos Lstsgatwn, his recusal raises the
spectre of disqualification complications in multiparty litigation
with a highly mobile lawyer population. The potential for disrup-
tion and delay engendered by conflicts problems is a real problem
that courts must stay alert to avoid.
V. THE ROLE OF ADJUNCTS: SPECIAL MASTERS AND EXPERT
WITNESSES
Another method of facilitating adjudication of complex civil
litigation is the special referral of complicated factual disputes
to special masters or court-appointed expert witnesses. Although
these referrals involve unique procedures and consequences, the
Manual for Complex Lstsgatwn suggests that "they are designed
to enhance or facilitate the fact-finding process by having some
complicated issue studied before trial by someone selected by
335. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon C3(C}(1) ("A judge
shall disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned"), re-pnted sn 69 F.R.D. 273, 277 (1975); see also 28 U.S.C. § 455 ("[A]ny justice,
judge, or magistrate shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impar-
tiality might reasonably be questioned.").
336. Counsel for defendants could not reach a consensus on the magistrate judge's
recusal, but counsel for plaintiffs agreed that the magistrate judge's continued partici-
pation in the litigation was not objectionable and wanted him to remain on the case.
Order No. 174 at 2, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 1678 (Mar. 1, 1989).
337. He believed that, regardless of whether any of his decisions actually affected the
law clerk, "her continuing participation with this Court in a case in which her future
employer is counsel for plaintiffs gives rise to an appearance of partiality." Id. at 3.
Further explaimng the perceived problem, Magistrate Judge Naythons stated:
Law clerks are not merely the judge's errand runners. They are sounding
boards for tentative opimons and legal researchers who seek authorities that
affect decisions. Clerks are privy to the judge's thoughts in a way that
neither parties to the law suit or his most intimate family members may be.
I agree that the clerk is forbidden to do all that is prohibited to the
judge.
Id. at 3-4 (citing Price Bros. v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 629 F.2d 444, 447 (6th Cir. 1980),
cert. dented, 454 U.S. 1099 (1981); Kennedy v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 551 F.2d 593,
596 (5th Cir. 1977)).
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the court because of his or her objectivity, expertise, or other
special qualifications."m Although Judge Kelly has neither used
a special master nor designated a court-appointed expert wit-
ness,D Judge Parker appointed both a special master and an
expert witness to assist in Cimino.
A. The Special Master as Trial Planner
Rule 53 governs the appointment, duties, and responsibilities
of court-appointed special masters. The rule is vague concerning
what matters a court may refer to a master, indicating that in
jury trials "a reference shall be made only when the issues are
complicated"' 0 and that a court's reference order "may specify
or limit [the master's] powers and may direct [the master] to
report only upon particular issues or to do or perform particular
acts or to receive and report evidence only."' i Until recently,
courts used special masters for limited ministerial functions, such
as accountings, calculations of damages, or administration of class
action settlement funds.s With the advent of complicated mass
tort litigation, federal judges increased their use of special mas-
ters. Their responsibilities have been expanded greatly to include
such diverse functions as ruling on assertions of privilege, nar-
rowing issues for trial, creating and supervising ADR processes,
mediating or negotiating settlements, implementing court-ordered
institutional reforms, and conducting statistical studies, data col-
lection, and computer modelling.3 Many of these innovative uses
338. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, SECOND S 21.5 (1985).
339. He has not, however, ruled out the possibility of a court-appointed expert as the
litigation moves closer to trial.
340. FED. R. Crv. P 53(b).
341. FED. R. Civ. P 53(c). See generally W BRAZIL, G. HAZARD, JR., & P RICE, MANAGING
ComPLEX LITIGATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE USE OF SPECIAL MASTERS (1983) (arguing
that a neutral manager is needed in complex litigation and assessing the use of special
masters in various capacities during discovery); Brazil, supra note 256 (arguing that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide authority for assigning pretrial discovery
tasks to special masters and calling for a rule guiding their pretrial use); Hazard & Rice,
Judicial Management of the Pretrial Process in Massive Litigation: Special Masters as Case
Managers, 1982 Am. B. FouND. RES. J. 375 (reporting on the experience of special masters
appointed to regulate pretrial phases of complex antitrust litigation).
342. See Brazil, Special Masters in Complex Cases: Eztending the Judiciary or Reshaping
Adjudication?, 53 U. CH. L. REV. 394, 395-96 (1986).
343. See generally Nathan, The Use of Masters in Institutional Reform Litigation, 10 U.
TOL. L. REV. 419 (1979) (use of masters in implementing court-ordered reform of correc-
tional and mental health institutions); Brazil, supra note 342, at 395-417 (discussing use
of masters in Ohio asbestos litigation, Alabama DDT litigation, early neutral evaluation
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of special masters are lauded for assisting in the resolution of
complex cases344 Some, however, criticize this expansion of duties
as an encroachment upon proper judicial functions.ess
Judge Parker created an innovative role for a special master
in Cimsno. At the same time he declared that Cimsno would
proceed as a class action, Judge Parker appointed Professor Jack
Ratliff4 6 as special master.347 His order detailed dates for interim
and final reports and required the parties to deposit funds with
the court to pay for the master's expenses3ss Instead of specifying
certain duties, Judge Parker directed Special Master Ratliff to
formulate a class action trial plan and to issue a report with
programs, Michigan fishing rights cases, Agent Orange litigation, and formulation of
equitable decree in Boston sewage case); Brazil, Specual Masters n the Pretrial Development
of Big Cases: Potential and Problems, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 287; Little, Court-
Appoanted Special Masters -n Complex Enmronmental Litigation: City of Quincy v. Met-
ropolitan District Commission, 8 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 435 (1984) (case study of the
judicial use of special masters in complex litigation); McGovern, Mature Mass Tort, supra
note 40 (case studies of Professor McGovern's role as special master in Jenkins and the
A.H. Robins Dalkon Shield litigations); McGovern, Functional Approach, supra note 40
(case studies of McGovern's role as special master in Michigan fishing rights case, Alabama
utility ratemaking case, and Ohio asbestos litigation); New Developments, Mass Torts:
Court-Appointed Master sn Baltimore Expands Asbestos ADR Plans to State, 4 Alt. Dis.
Res. Rep. (BNA) 19 (Jan. 18, 1990) (appointment of Special Master Feinberg to devise
ADR plan for handling 3,500 Maryland state asbestos claims).
344. See, e.g., McGovern, Mature Mass Tort, supra note 40, at 693.
345. See, e.g., Brazil, supra note 342, at 396-97 ("With broader duties, masters might
contribute more, but they also may invade the proper preserve of the judiciary, change
the character of adjudication, or interject themselves into sensitive aspects of attorney-
client relations."). Magistrate Judge Brazil also believes that some special masters'
exercise of expanded duties raises ethical concerns. Id. at 397; see also Brazil, supra note
343, at 352-62 (criticizing Special Master McGovern's techniques in the Ohio asbestos
litigation as overkill and raising ethical issues surrounding McGovern's mediation in the
Alabama DDT cases).
346. Professor of Law at The Umversity of Texas (Austin). Prior to joimng the Texas
faculty, he was in private practice in Texas. Professor Ratliff teaches civil procedure and
related subjects.
347. Amendment to Order Appointing Special Master, Cimino v. Raymark Indus., No.
B-86-0456-CA, Docket at 15 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 1989); Memorandum and Order, Cimzno,
Docket at 10 (Feb. 9, 1989) (concerning contemplated class action and ordering hearing
on class certification); Memorandum and Order Appointing Special Master, Cimino, Docket
at 10 (Feb. 9, 1989).
348. See Memorandum and Order Appointing Special Master, Cimsno, Docket at 10
(Feb. 9, 1989). The order specified $50,000 for the master's expenses, with each side to
contribute its proportionate share of $25,000. The order also indicated that the special
master would be paid compensation in addition to reasonable expenses, at rates fixed by
the court and paid at periodic intervals. The order finally specified that the costs of
reimbursement and compensation "may be awarded to the prevailing party as costs of
court." Id. at 3. Professor Ratliff was reimbursed from this fund as per the court's order.
Order, Cimino, Docket at 40 (June 20, 1989) (ordering clerk to disburse funds to special
master).
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recommendations concerning the conduct of the asbestos cases
pursuant to class action procedure.3s9 His chief interest was
learning whether a mass trial was possible and whether a lump
sum damages award was permissible.
Judge Parker and Special Master Ratliff agreed that the special
master would proceed with complete independence. From the
time of Special Master Ratliff's appointment until the issuance
of his report, Judge Parker adhered to this understanding. Al-
though Judge Parker outlined general problems with the litiga-
tion, Special Master Ratliff commented that he carefully refrained
from suggesting any solutions throughout the process. If the
special master had returned a report indicating that consolidation
and adjudication of the cases under class action procedure was
not feasible, Judge Parker would have given that conclusion great
weight and abandoned the class action format.
Some defendants objected strenuously to the appointment of
a special master and argued that no authority existed for a
special master to formulate a trial plan. Judge Parker overruled
these objections and refused to revoke the reference to a special
master. 5 1 This set the stage for the initial resistance to Special
Master Ratliff's efforts; early joint consultations failed to produce
cooperation or candor. Special Master Ratliff therefore consulted
with counsel in separate ex parte meetings and telephone con-
versations. The defendants continually resisted his role and pro-
tested the evolving trial plan. After the eventual elimination of
349. At the time he gave these directions to the special master, Judge Parker had no
predetermined ideas concerning how to stage the trial. He wanted the special master to
make detailed recommendations concermng the feasibility of adjudicating the asbestos
cases under the class action rule and to address the seventh amendment implications of
attempting to use the class action rule to adjudicate aggregated personal injury cases.
350. See, e.g., Objections of Defendant Celotex Corp. to the Appointment of Special
Master and Motion for Revocation of the Reference to a Special Master, Cimzo, Docket
at 25 (Mar. 9, 1989); Objection of Defendant Fibreboard Corp. and Pittsburgh Corning
Corp. to the Appointment of a Special Master and Motion for Revocation of the Reference
to a Special Master, Cimsno, Docket at 18 (Feb. 27, 1989); Objections of Defendant Owens-
Illinois, Inc. to the Appointment of a Special Master and Motion for Revocation of the
Reference to a Special Master, Cimzno, Docket at 16 (Feb. 21, 1989). Other defendants
requested that the judge at least clarify the order of reference. See Motion of Defendants
H.K. Porter Co., Eagle Picher Indus. Inc., Fibreboard Corp., and Pittsburgh Corning
Corp. for Clarification of Order Appointing Special Master and Amendment Thereto,
Cimino, Docket at 18 (Feb. 24, 1989). Special Master Ratliff suggested that Owens-Illinois
objected because the judge asked the special master to determine the application of rules
and law, which was outside the scope of a special master's authority.
351. See, e.g., Order That Defendant Owens-Illinois, Inc.'s Objection to Appointment of
a Special Master is Overruled and Motion to Revoke Reference is Denied, Cimzo, Docket
at 19 (Mar. 1, 1989).
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the group meetings, however, liaison counsel began to assist
constructively in formulating a class action trial plan. In addition
to talking with the parties, Special Master Ratliff discussed trial
plan issues with other academics and special masters.
After receiving written comments regarding a preliminary
report, Special Master Ratliff reformulated his recommendations.
The final master's report recommended a four-phase Rule 23(b)(3)
opt-out class action.352 The first phase isolated the issue of class-
wide liability based on the class representatives' cases and was
to include "individualized proofs of exposure, causation, damages,
and affirmative defenses. 53 The second phase proposed a class-
wide trial of damages through the presentation of expert and
statistical proof.su The third phase apportioned the plaintiffs'
damages, allowing each defendant to develop its own theory of
apportionment. 55 The fourth phase, a nonjury phase, consisted
of an administrative distribution of proceeds among the plaintiffs,
through either a special master or the creation of a claims-
handling facility.3 1 The master's report also contained myriad
pretrial procedural details, including recommendations for non-
conforming settlers, plaintiffs with different disease and worksite
exposure, standing issues, conspiracy claims, punitive damages,
the contents of the opt-out notice, expert testimony on classwide
damages, limitations problems, selection of class representatives,
interim argument to the jury, and distribution of proceeds to
claimants. 57
Special Master Ratiff's research revealed that few litigations
had made any attempt to use the class action rule for adjudication
of mass tort claims, and none were good models for Cim&no.m
His model for Cimsno derived from class action precedent, par-
ticularly employment discrimination, civil rights, and antitrust
class actions. In his opinion, these cases provided analogs for
determination of classwide damages, although their application
352. Master's Report in Cimino v. Raymark at 2, Cimsno, Docket at 54 (Sept. 20, 1989),
repnnted in Mealey's, supra note 79, at G-1; see also Master Outlines Four-Phase Tral
for Cimno Class, 5 Mealey's Litig. Rep. Asbestos 30 (Oct. 6, 1989).
353. Master's Report in Cimino v. Raymark at 4, Cimmno, Docket at 54 (Sept. 20, 1989),
repnnted in Mealey's, supra note 79, at G-2.
354. I& at 5, reprinted sn Mealey's, supra note 79, at G-3.
355. Id. at 15-16, reprnted in Mealey's, supra note 79, at G-8.
356. Id. at 16-17, repnnted in Mealey's, supra note 79, at G-8 - G-9.
357. Id. at 7-10, reprnted in Mealey's, supra note 79, at G4 - G-5.
358. He identified the Califorma IUD Dalkon Shield cases (failed Rule 23 certification),
Agent Orange (largely a settlement class action), and the Bendectin cases (failed class
action).
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to a personal injury class was a new proposal. Selecting class
representatives to truly represent the range of claims in the
class was crucial to Special Master Ratliff. He indicated that the
expert witnesses recommended for the damages phase were to
permit statistical presentation of damages on a representative
basis, with extrapolation to the entire class. Upon submission of
his report, Special Master Ratliff's role ended, and Judge Parker
did not consult him again as special master for the remainder of
the Cimino proceedings.
Judge Parker's innovative use of a special master raises ques-
tions concerning the appropriate limitations of such court-ap-
pointed adjuncts. The special master in Cimino performed a
function different from the narrow functions traditionally as-
signed to special masters: he formulated the trial plan, a judicial
function that the parties argued could not be delegated. Fur-
thermore, by conducting ex parte discussions with the parties,
the special master eliminated the adversarial presentation of
arguments on issues relating to his structuring of the trial.
Nevertheless, Judge Parker exercised final authority over set-
ting the trial plan. One month after receipt of the master's report,
he certified a class action of all asbestos cases pending in the
Beaumont Division and consolidated the cases under Rule 42 for
trial of the state-of-the-art defense and punitive damages. 59 His
order of a three-phase trial modified the master's report in a
number of details. The special master's report remained a set of
recommendations, not binding on the judge or the parties. In one
sense, Judge Parker expanded the role of the special master by
creating a new task for a master in Cimino. On the other hand,
the purely advisory nature of the master's work product limited
this expansive role.
B. The Court-Appointed Expert Witness
Another method to assist the court in cases involving complex
scientific and technical evidence is the use of court-appointed
expert witnesses.31 Federal Rule of Evidence 706 gives federal
judges the authority to appoint expert witnesses.3 61 A recent
359. For a discussion of the various trifurcated trial plans in Cimsno, see 'nfra notes
394-413 and accompanying text.
360. Dealing with complex scientific and techmcal evidence has been problematic for
thb courts. See generaUy REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note
16, at 97 (recommending "a comprehensive examination of how courts handle scientific
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study of court-appointed expert witnesses suggests that federal
courts use such witnesses infrequently and that such appoint-
ments are for varied, idiosyncratic purposes.36 2
Mass tort litigation repeatedly demonstrates that the parties
need assistance in presenting technical testimony because their
own experts are not always sufficient. In particular, toxic tort
litigation raises complex issues relating to causation, epidemio-
logical proof, and statistical evidence.3 13 Many issues involved in
and technological complexity in litigation"); M. SAKS & R. VAN DUIZEND, THE USE OF
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN LITIGATION (1983) (arguing that courts should resolve issues of
scientific uncertainty by employing traditional judicial methods); Abraham & Merrill,
ScWntific Uncertainty -in the Courts, ISSUES SCI. & TECH. 93 (1986) (describing various
methods used by courts for dealing with issues of scientific uncertainty, and opposing
the use of judges to decide matters of scientific truth); Black, Evolwng Legal Standards
for the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 239 SCIENCE 1508 (1988) (arguing for a more
thorough judicial review of scientific claims); Botter, The Court-Appointed Impartial
Expert, in USING EXPERTS IN CIVIL CASES 53-55 (M. Kraft 2d ed. 1982) (listing proponents
of the use of court-appointed experts); Vidmar, Assessing the Impact of Statistical Evidence,
A Social Science Perspective, in THE EVOLVING ROLE OF STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS AS
EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS 279 app. H (S. Feinberg ed. 1989) (reviewing social science
literature on the impact of statistical evidence used in litigation on the court process);
Weinstein, Improving Expert Testimony, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 473 (1986) (suggesting changes
to the rules of evidence and the role of the trial judge); Weinstein, Litigation and
Statistics, 3 STAT. SCI. 286 (1988) (same). But see Huber, A Comment on Toward Incentive-
Based Procedure: Three Approaches for Regulating Scientific Evndence by E. Donald Elliott.
69 B.U.L. REV. 513, 514 (criticizang advocacy of court-appointed expert witnesses); Lempert,
Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Let's Not Rush to Judgment, 80 MICH. L. REV. 68, 124
(1981) (value of court-appointed experts overstated).
361. (a) Appointment. The court may on its own motion or on the motion of any
party enter an order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be
appointed, and may request the parties to submit nominations. The court
may appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by the parties, and may
appoint expert witnesses of its own selection. An expert witness shall not
be appointed by the court unless the witness consents to act. A witness so
appointed shall be informed of the witness' duties by the court in writing,
a copy of which shall be filed with the clerk, or at a conference in which
the parties shall have opportunity to participate. A witness so appointed
shall advise the parties of the witness' findings, if any; the witness' deposition
may be taken by any party; and the witness may be called to testify by the
court or any party. The witness shall be subject to cross-examination by
each party, including a party calling the witness.
FED. R. EvD. 706. See generally J. CECIL & T. WILLGING, USE AND NON-USE OF COURT-
APPOINTED EXPERT WITNESSES (forthcoming); T. WILLGING, COURT-APPOINTED EXPERTS
(1986) (describing procedures governing court-appointed expert witnesses under FED. R.
EVID. 706).
362. See J. CECIL & T. WILLGING, supra note 361.
363. See generally Black & Lilienfeld, Epdemswlogw Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52
FORDHAM L. REV. 732 (1984) (suggesting that courts should apply recognized epidemiologic
principles in conjunction with traditional standards of proof); Brennan, Causal Chains and
Statistical Links: The Role of Scientific Uncertainty in Hazardous Substance Litigation, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 469 (1988) (arguing that the differences between legal and scientific
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mass tort litigation are so complicated that some commentators
have urged the use of special science panels or special juries of
scientific and medical experts to adjudicate these cases.364
Judge Parker decided to use a court-appointed expert to testify
during Phase III after the Fifth Circuit invalidated his original
proposal for Phase 11.365 Under the revised trifurcated trial plan,
with a new Phase III for damages,3B 150 (subsequently 160)
representative cases were to present damages in five disease
categories.36 7 At the conclusion of their presentation, the court
concepts of causation prevent just resolution of toxic tort cases through tort litigation);
Brennan, Helping Courts with Toic Torts: Some Proposals Regarding Alternative Methods
for Presenting and Assessing Sczentific Evidence in Common Law Courts, 51 U. PITT. L.
REv. 1 (1989) [hereinafter Brennan, Helping Courts with Toxic Torts] (outlining alternatives
to litigation in order to resolve scientific questions); Dore, A Proposed Standard for
Evaluating the Use of EpWdnologwal Evidence in Toxic Tort and Other Personal Inury
Cases, 28 How. L.J. 677 (1985); Epstein, Agent Orange Diseases: Problems of Causality,
Burdens of Proof and Restitution, 19 TRIAL No. 11, at 91 (1983) (discussing problems in
proving scientific causation in Agent Orange cases); Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 MINN.
L. REv. 1219 (1987) (proposing a system of awarding damages to "most likely victims" of
a toxic substance); Gold, Causation in Toxc Torts: Burdens of Proof, Standards of
Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE L.J. 376 (1986) (discussing statistical proof
in toxic tort litigation); Harris, Toxic Tort Litigation and the Causation Element: Is There
Any Hope of Reconciliation?, 40 Sw. L.J. 909 (1986) (arguing that traditional rules and
causes of action do not provide a remedy for victims of toxic waste); Rheingold, New
Frontiers in Causation and Damages: Compensating Clients Injured by Toxc Torts, 22
TRIAL No. 10, at 42 (1986) (asserting that courts have expanded the rights of toxic tort
victims by easing proof of causation requirements); Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and
Compensation for Tortious Risk, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 779 (1985) (suggesting that tort law
should base toxic tort liability on risk of injury rather than actual harm); Special
Committee on Science and Law, An Analysis of Proposed Changes in Substantive and
Procedural Law in Response to Perceived Difficulties in Establishing Whether or Not
Causation Exists in Mass Toxic Tort Litigation, 41 REC. A.B. CITY OF N.Y. 905 (1986)
(studying the goals and problems in tort law, especially in the area of mass tort causation,
and exploring alternative approaches to litigation); Wright, Actual Causation vs. Proba-
bilistic Linkage: The Bane ofEconomw Analysis, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 435 (1985) (challenging
the attempts of economic analysts to reconcile actual causation requirements with wealth-
maximizing theories); Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics
and Proof. Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, 73 IowA L. REV. 1001
(1988) (challenging modern concepts of causation that have confused issues in tort litiga-
tion).
364. See, e.g., Brennan, Helping Courts with Toxic Torts, supra note 363 (recommending
use of science panels for scientific evidence issues in mass tort cases and increased use
of court-appointed experts, with limited use of special masters); Drazan, The Case for
Special Juries in Toxic Tort Litigation, 72 JUDICATURE 292 (1989) (advocating use of special
juries of scientific and medical experts and arguing that the seventh amendment does
not bar such use).
365. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
366. See Memorandum and Order, Cimino v. Raymark Indus., No. B-86-0456-CA, Docket
at 159 (ED). Tex. Mar. 5, 1990) (detailing procedure for Phases H and Ill as a consolidation
under Rule 42(a)).
367. The five disease categories were pulmonary asbestosis cases, pleural asbestosis
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would "conduct a hearing to determine whether the [160] cases
are truly representative of the 2336 consolidated cases. Specifi-
cally, a court appointed expert witness will testify as to whether
the Court's samples for each disease category accurately comprise
statistically significant samples of each one of the disease cate-
gories."su
The court appointed Professor Francis McGovern "to evaluate
the Court's procedure and to compare the experience of the [160]
damage case trials with the class as a whole."' ' 9 In appointing
an expert witness to perform this function, Judge Parker rec-
ognized the innovative nature of a sampling technique to prove
consolidated damages.s 0
The sample sizes selected by the Court reflect a measure of
subjectivity That subjectivity is influenced by ten years ex-
perience with these type cases. . The Court's subjectivity
built into the sample sizes will be tested by the scientific
method after the jury verdicts are received in these [160]
cases. These [160] sample cases will be chosen at random by
the Court. The Court will try the damage issues in the sample
cases and will obtain jury verdicts for all [160] cases. The Court
will, then, determine an average jury award for each disease
category and will apply this award to all the cases in that
particular disease category The Plaintiffs in the [160] cases,
however, will receive judgments for the specific amount of the
jury verdicts in those cases.3' 1
cases, asbestos-related lung cancer cases, asbestos-related "other, cancer" cases, and
mesothelioma cases. Id. at 8. The court increased the sample size to 160 representative
cases in May 1990.
368. Id. at 9.
369. Id. at 10. Judge Parker chose Professor McGovern as his expert witness because
he was well known, had served as a special master in Jenkins v. Raymark Industries,
Inc., and had experience with the Dalkon Shield and Cleveland asbestos litigations. Id.
at 11. Judge Parker subsequently issued a series of orders concerning compensation of
the court-appointed expert witness that directed the plaintiffs and defendants to deposit
funds with the court for payment of the expert's services and expenses. See Order,
Cimsno, Docket at 443 (July 30, 1990); Order, Cimzno, Docket at 327 (June 7, 1990); Order,
Cimtno, Docket at 306 (May 30, 1990).
370. See, e.g., Rosenberg, Class Actions For Mass Torts, supra note 38, at 570 (discussing
the use of damage schedules created by averaging); Rosenberg, Tozic Tort Litigation,
supra note 268, at 190-98 (discussing and approving proportional liability, causal proba-
bility, and statistical proof in mass toxic tort litigation); see also Bush, Between Two
Worlds: The Shift from Individual to Group Responsibility sn the Law of Causation of
Injury, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1473 (1986).
371. Memorandum and Order at 8-9, Cimno, Docket at 159, (Mar. 5, 1990). In describing
his experience determining the appropriate sample size, Judge Parker stated:
Experience has taught that the mesothelioma cases are all terminal and
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This approach raised some fundamental problems. Alterna-
tively, Judge Parker might have appointed the expert to create
the sample, rather than appointing the expert to test the validity
of a judicially selected sample. In addition, Judge Parker's ap-
proach linked the anticipated size of damage awards to represent-
ativeness in the class-not necessarily a logical relationship.
Judge Parker also recognized the need for independent expert
testimony to support and verify the methodological soundness of
adjudicating aggregate claims in this fashion:
Whether the Court's expert witness will deem it advisable to
extend the evaluation beyond the pure statistical approach and
to perform a class analysis to determine actual variance be-
tween the sample and the class remains to be seen. After the
experience generated with these [160] cases, the Court will
examine the evidence and either discard the approach, approve
the procedure, or modify some or all of the sample groups-
all with a view of satisfying the Court that the approach has,
in fact, achieved a fair result and satisfied due process require-
ments3s 2
After issuing the appointment order and discussing the as-
signed task, Judge Parker did not confer with Professor Mc-
Govern. As a witness in the case, the court-appointed expert was
subject to deposition and cross-examination. As a part of the
Phase III damages determination, McGovern was scheduled to
many times result in high damage awards; therefore, the sample percentage
for these cases should be larger. The lung cancer cases are almost always
fatal; they many times also produce large damage awards and should have
a higher percentage sample. The "other cancer" cases usually have a high
percentage of contested diagnosis which justifies a higher percentage sample.
Lower size samples are more appropriate for pulmonary asbestosis and
pleural disease cases. The level of disability for these categories is lower,
the diagnosis are not as often controverted and the damage awards are
usually lower than the cancer cases.
Id.
372. Id at 10. Judge Parker indicated that the expert would testify after the presen-
tation of the 160 cases because
the Court recogmzes that a purely statistical approach would lead the Court
to hear evidence concermng proper sample sizes for each disease category
then litigate damages for that sample size. The Court is persuaded that a
higher level of reliability can be achieved by delaying the hearing until the
[160] cases are decided. This approach will permit the Court to examine the
process with the benefit of experience of not only the jury results, but also
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give his expert testimony to the bench after the presentation of
damages evidence in the 160 individual cases. He was to give his
testimony to the bench rather than the jury because Judge
Parker believed that the expert's testimony concerned issues of
law for the judge rather than issues of fact for the jury
At the completion of the 160 sample cases, however, Judge
Parker abandoned the idea of using a court-appointed expert to
validate the statistical methodology Instead, he permitted plain-
tiffs and defendants to use their own experts to testify to the
validity of the sample cases. After the defendants declined to
present evidence on the point, the court ruled that the samples
were representative at a ninety-nine percent confidence level and
that the court should award the plaintiffs in each disease category
the average verdict for the category 3 73
VI. SETTLEMENT
In his 1987 study on asbestos litigation, Tom Willging reported
that from 1977 through 1986, seventy-three percent of all ter-
minated asbestos cases concluded by settlement.3 74 At that time,
settlement was the single most important feature of asbestos
litigation, with a handful of case verdicts supporting hundreds of
settlements. Willging concluded that "'[t]he primary asbestos case
management decisions facing federal courts concern the settle-
ment of cases," with wide variation in the interventionist role of
federal judges in the settlement process. 375 Settlement continues
to be the prevalent mode of disposition in asbestos cases, with
seventy-nine percent of all terminated cases through 1989 con-
cluded by settlement.3 76
Willging's study surveyed modes of judicial intervention and
focused on the types of judicial assistance, the effects of judicial
intervention in achieving settlement, and the quality of settle-
ments. Among many findings, the study reported that the setting
of a firm trial date generally controlled the settlement process.3 77
373. Opinion and Order at 36-38, Cimzno (Nov. 12, 1990).
374. T. WILLGING, supra note 1, at 55; see also td. at 26, Table 4 (Procedural Progress
at Termination of Federal Asbestos Cases).
375. Id. at 55-56. As a result, "[djiagnosis of the need for settlement intervention,
selection of the most efficient mechanism to achieve the court's goals, and reevaluation
of these interventions are continuing issues for courts with substantial asbestos case-
loads." Id.
376. See snfra Table 3 (method of disposition of terminated federal asbestos personal
injury/product liability cases).
377. T. WILLGING, supra note 1, at 59.
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Judges also encourage settlement through other techniques. For
example, a federal court in Ohio, working with a special master,
created an elaborate computer-assisted early settlement program
which still functions as the settlement vehicle for Ohio asbestos
cases.3rs A few districts encourage early settlements through the
imposition of sanctions on late-settling cases.3 79 Settlement prac-
tices vary widely among judges,38° and a range of judicial actions
have produced settlements in asbestos cases.
A. Judical Role sn Settlements =n the Asbestos Class Actwns
In Cimno and School Asbestos Lstsgatwn, the judges remained
relatively detached from settlement negotiations. They were not
actively involved in settlement discussions, did not monitor the
progress of negotiations, and were not involved in evaluation of
the cases. Neither judge invited parties into chambers to assess
the level of agreement or to analyze case strengths, weaknesses,
378. Id. at 60-69. Although other districts have not adopted the computer model m its
entirety, they have adopted features of the plan. Id. at 63; see also McGovern, Functional
Approach, supra note 40, at 479-91 (case study of Ohio asbestos litigation and development
of computer-assisted settlement model). But see Brazil, supra note 343, at 400-01 (criticizing
McGovern's computer-assisted techniques in Ohio asbestos litigation).
379. See T. WILLGING, supra note 1, at 69-70.
380. Id. at 71. For discussion of settlement techmques m complex litigation, see
generally W BRAZIL, SETTLING CivIL SUITS (1985) (discussing litigators' views about
appropriate roles and effective techmques for federal judges); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION, SECOND S 3327 (1985) ("Settlement") (outlining the levels of settlement that
might be achieved in mass tort cases, and discussing the use of structured settlements
to pay future benefits to plaintiffs); A. TALBOT, SETTLING TmNGS: SIX CASE STUDIES IN
ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION (1983) (describing the use of mediation to negotiate resolutions
of site-specific environmental disputes); Coleman & Silver, Justice in Settlements, 4 Soc.
PHIL. & POL'Y 102 (1988); Craft, Factors Influencng Settlement of Personal In3ury and
Death Claims in Aircraft Accident Litigation, 46 J. Am L. & Com. 895 (1981) (emphasizing
the need to curtail excessive fees, unnecessary delays, and unreliable advice to clients to
maximize settlement options); Green, Marks, & Olson, Settling Large Case Litigation: An
Alternative Approach, 11 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 493 (1978) (arguing m favor of the use of
nonbinding minitrials as a means to inform parties as to the relative strengths of their
cases and to expedite settlement); Innovative Techniques, supra note 17 (discussing Hyatt
Skywalk Collapse settlement); Peterson & Redick, Innovations and Considerations in
Settling Toxi Tort Litigation, 3 NAT. RESOURCES ENV'T. Spring 1988, at 9 (discussing the
complexities of drafting enforceable settlement agreements); Sand, How Much Is Enough?
Observations in Light of the Agent Orange Settlement, 9 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 283 (1985)
(discussing the weaknesses in plaintiffs' case and factors that led to defendants' decision
to settle); Schuck, supra note 40 (identifying the risks involved in an active judicial role
in settlement and assessing the ways in which judges' knowledge, power, and other
resources control the course of litigation); Tornqmst, The Active Judge in Pretrial Settle-
nent: Inherent Authority Gone Awry, 25 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 743 (1989) (suggesting
reforms in the current system of judicially managed settlement).
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and settlement values. In Cimsno, Judge Parker played no role
at all in early settlements, but was available to listen to settle-
ment offers as the litigation progressed towards tral.381 In School
Asbestos Ltzgatwn, Judge Kelly channelled settlement discus-
sions through the special settlement committee and became in-
volved only when the parties agreed upon a tentative settlement
to present to the court for approval. Likewise, the magistrate
judges and special master played no role in mediating settlement
agreements.
Settlement negotiations in Cimsno began before provisional
certification of the class in 1989 and continued through the trial
in 1990. By the time of trial, approximately a dozen defendants
had settled, but four defendants did not reach settlement. One
of Judge Parker's goals throughout the pretrial preparation was
to induce the parties to settle; he hoped to accomplish this
indirectly through the trial staging rather than directly through
mediation of settlement negotiations. Judge Kelly also referred
to settlement as a goal in School Asbestos Litsgaton. Of fifty-two
original defendants, three settled and a fourth presented a set-
tlement to the court in September 1990.s2 All School Asbestos
Lstsgatwn settlements involved notice to the class plaintiffs for
hearing and approval. Despite the massive number of class claim-
ants, over 35,000 class members received notice without mci-
dent.383
381. See, e.g., Teleconference, Cimino v. Raymark Indus., No. B-86-0456-CA, Docket at
149 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 1990) (regarding settlement of Johns-Manville with Judge Parker);
Telephone Hearing, Cimsno, Docket at 141 (Jan. 31, 1990) (regarding status of Johns-
Manville's settlement); Order Regarding Settlement and Proposed Dismissal with Preju-
dice of All Claims Against Defendant Grace, Cimsno, Docket at 79 (Jan. 5, 1990) (ordering
settlement hearing in court).
382. Order, In re School Asbestos Litig., No. 83-0268 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 1990) (scheduling
hearing for Sept. 24, 1990, on motion of plaintiff Barnwell School District No. 45 for
preliminary approval of proposed class settlement with defendant Certainteed Corpora-
tion).
383. See Transcript of Feb. 12, 1990: Oral Argument on Proposed Settlement Re: Lac
D'Amiante du Quebec, Ltee., School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 2063 (Feb. 13, 1990). At
the hearing for this class settlement, class counsel reported that the settlement notice
had been sent to 35,711 members of the class and that only 120 notices had been returned
as undeliverable. Id. at 11-12. According to counsel, additional effort would be made to
reach these 120 class members, who were chiefly private schools. Id. at 12. School districts
that had excluded themselves from the class were not sent notice. Id.
Only three class members objected to the settlement, and one of the three withdrew
its objection before the oral hearing. Id. The Akron school district objected on the ground
that it had wanted to opt out of the class, but was made part of the class and settlement
against its will because it had failed to opt out in a timely manner. Id. at 13. The Redmont
City schools entered a general objection that they thought the amount of the settlement
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In both litigations, the parties presented settlements to the
court for approval in oral hearings and the judges approved them
all.3
B. Motwoatwns For Settlement
Counsel for defendants who settled identified an interrelated
array of reasons for settlement in the two litigations.3 Because
almost all of the attorneys who discussed settlement have been
involved in asbestos litigation for many years, they viewed the
settlements in Cimsno and School Asbestos Litigatson in the con-
text of more than fifteen years of nationwide asbestos litigation
and disposition of asbestos claims. The three most common rea-
sons the lawyers offered for settlement in these two cases were
broad calculations of the risks of litigating versus the benefits
of settling, preexisting relationships with plaintiffs' counsel, and
the sense of being a peripheral defendant to the class action.
With regard to calculations of risk, the defendants' attorneys
expressed similar views regarding the desirability of avoiding
trial. Many attorneys thought it more cost effective to settle
claims than to incur the expense of litigating hundreds of cases
individually. Defense attorneys suggested that clients generally
should be increased. Id. at 13-14. The class settlement money had been available since
January 31, 1989, and had accrued interest for almost one year to the time of the
settlement hearing. Id. at 14.
384. See, e.g., Memorandum and Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P 54(b) and Pretrial
Order No. 212, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 2073 (Feb. 20, 1990) (finally approving
class settlement with defendant Lac D'Amante du Quebec, Ltee); Judgement Pursuant
to F.R. Civ. P 54(b) and Pretrial Order No. 88, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 1015
(July 21, 1987) (finally approving class settlement with defendants Owens-Illinois, Inc. and
Proko Industries); Order No. 64, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 783 (June 17, 1986)
(preliminarily approving settlement agreement with defendants Owens-Illinois, Inc. and
Proko Industries); see also Partial Judgment, Cimino, Docket at 315 (May 2, 1990) (terms
of class settlement); Order, Cimino, Docket at 306 (May 2, 1990) (court approval of class
settlement with Manville Settlement Trust); Final Judgment, Cimino, Docket at 157 (Feb.
26, 1990) (class settlement with Owens-Illinois, Inc.); Order, Cimino, Docket at 150 (Feb.
7, 1990) (court approval of settlement with AC & S); Order, Cimino, Docket at 146 (Feb.
5, 1990) (approval of settlement with H.K. Porter); Final Judgement, Cimino, Docket at
127 (Jan. 18, 1990) (class settlement with W.R. Grace & Co.); Orders, Cimino, Docket at
42 (July 3, 1989) (court approval of settlements with nine defendants); Order, Cimino,
Docket at 33 (Apr. 18, 1989) (approving settlements with defendant members of the Center
for Claims Resolution).
385. The author conducted telephone interviews with counsel for 10 settling defendants
during August 1990. The interviews were conducted with assurance of nonattribution to
the interviewed attorneys and nomdentification of the clients. Settlement information
relating to School Asbestos Litigation is a matter of public record and the author was
present at the February settlement with Lac D'Amiante du Quebec.
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knew the extent of their insurance coverage and were willing to
settle within those limits. Many attorneys involved in Cimsno
stated that the prospect of the class action encouraged settlement
negotiations because of their clients' desires to avoid potential
liability for a class judgment that included punitive damages
determined by a jury-set multiplier Settlement often permitted
defendants to resolve claims with plaintiffs based on individual-
ized proof of injury
Many defense attorneys in Cimnno suggested that an additional
reason for settlement was to avoid trial before Judge Parker
because of his management techniques. These attorneys viewed
Judge Parker as a managerial judge who held the parties to
tight deadlines and pushed pretrial and trial procedures expedi-
tiously. One lawyer stated that Judge Parker liked to keep his
docket cleared and would push the asbestos cases to accomplish
this. Another attorney said that Judge Parker's management
style encouraged settlement because defendants wished to avoid
Judge Parker's everchanging procedural innovations and their
potentially catastrophic results. More than one attorney stated
that defense counsel had little notice as to what instructions or
novel orders Judge Parker might impose as the litigation pro-
gressed, thus making settlement preferable to being caught up
in novel procedural innovations.
Other defense attorneys indicated that their clients settled
because of venue considerations. With fifteen years of experience
in asbestos litigation in the Eastern District of Texas, many
defendants perceived local juries as sophisticated, pro-plaintiff,
and hard on defendants. Many defendants believed that a fair
trial and verdict in the district was impossible and preferred to
settle in order to have more control over awards. Some believed
that the local pro-plaintiff bias would be exacerbated and the
jury deliberations skewed if a very small number of class rep-
resentatives consisting of very sick plaintiffs presented thousands
of claims in a consolidated action.
Another driving factor behind settlement in Cimino was the
familiarity with the plaintiffs' counsel and ongoing settlement
discussions. By the time Judge Parker began thinking about
certifying a new class action in the eastern district, the asbestos
lawyers knew each other well. Three plaintiffs' attorneys were
handling almost all the class claims, and most of the defendants'
lawyers had been involved in previous asbestos litigation with
the plaintiffs' counsel. A number of defendants had previously
negotiated block settlements with groups of plaintiffs and had
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negotiated settlement case values for types of injuries or dis-
eases. Many defendants were involved in the Jenksns H ADR
process, the Asbestos Claims Facility, or its successor, the Center
for Claims Resolution. 8
Thus, many defendants viewed settlement in Cimino not as a
discrete event, but rather as part of a continuum of asbestos
litigation in the district. For many lawyers, the key event prompt-
ing settlement was the collapse of the Jenkins HI ADR process
and the unravelling of the Asbestos Claims Facility, followed by
the defendants' withdrawal from the Center for Claims Resolu-
tion. As one attorney indicated, settlement negotiations assumed
new urgency when it became clear that the ADR process was
falling apart and when Judge Parker announced his intention to
certify a new class action for pending asbestos cases. Another
attorney said that Judge Parker leaked enough information about
his intentions with regard to the class action to persuade some
defendants to avoid this new consolidated action. Yet another
defense attorney believed that the collapse of the ADR process
impeded settlement at that point because the defendants had
negotiated hard for the Jenkns ADR process and its dismantle-
ment served to harden the parties in their positions. All agreed,
however, that it was obvious from the time of the breakdown of
the ADR that a class would be certified, -and those defendants
who ultimately settled indicated that they never stopped nego-
tiating from that point.
Moreover, a number of defense, attorneys in Cimino noted that
although settlement negotiations in the district were ongoing,
the plaintiffs' lawyers often initiated and pursued settlement
negotiations after the collapse of the ADR process. Some defense
counsel suggested that the plaintiffs' lawyers were just as anxious
to settle before class certification because the judge would be
able to adjust and monitor attorneys' fees once a class action
was certified. The preservation of plaintiffs' attorneys' contingent
386. See generally Comment, The Asbestos Claims Facility-An Alternative to Litigation,
24 DuQ. L. REv. 833 (1986) (analyzing reasons for creating the facility and describing the
expectations of and reactions to its establishment). The Asbestos Claims Facility, con-
sisting of a group of defendants who wished to settle asbestos claims, was organized in
1985, at about the same time that the Jenkins class action was certified, and was involved
in the Jenkins I ADR process. McGovern, Mature Mass Tort, supra note 40, at 665.
When the Jenkins ADR process began to fall apart, a number of defendants withdrew
from the Facility, which was then succeeded by the Center for Claims Resolution. Feder,
Asbestos: The Saga Drags On, N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1989, S 3, col. 4, at 1.
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fee contracts therefore became, sub rosa, a negotiating element.3
The third factor inducing some defendants in Cimsno and School
Asbestos Litsgatson to settle was the self-evaluation that they
were peripheral parties to the litigation and that settlement,
rather than inclusion in a large class or consolidated action, was
in their best interest. For example, one Cimsno defendant iden-
tified itself as a "modest, fringe defendant" that settled before
Cimsno was provisionally certified because not much money was
involved and the lawyers easily worked out an agreement. In
School Asbestos Littgatson, a settling defendant informed the court
in its settlement presentation that it considered itself a peripheral
defendant that made the policy judgment to settle because of
the expense of remaining a litigating defendant in the class
action.3m
In the settlements accomplished in Cimzno, counsel negotiated
using historical ntimbers known to each side from previous as-
bestos personal injury cases that had been settled or adjudicated
with that defendant. The parties reached agreements concerning
classifications of diseases, levels of exposure and medical proof
for a disease, and resulting claim values. One attorney suggested
that a defendant was most likely to settle if a plaintiff came
forward with proof of product exposure and medical proof of
disease; such cases were futile to litigate. For defendants involved
in large numbers of prior cases, claim settlement is now fairly
routine.
387. One defense attorney indicated that all of the plaintiffs' lawyers had 40% contin-
gent fee contracts with the plaintiffs and wanted to settle as many of these cases as
possible before the clms certification. This percentage fee seems very high and is only
one defense lawyer's surmise. The lawyer did, however, believe it gave defendants a
negotiating advantage because they believed the plaintiffs' lawyers wanted settlements
to assure high contingency fees. For a discussion of the problem of class settlement and
attorneys' fees, see generally Ricciuti, Equity and Accountability zn the Reform of Settle-
ment Procelures sn Mass Tort Cases: The Ethical Duty to Consult, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
817 (1988) (argiqmg that the class action should be reformed by increasing the ethical
requirements placed upon the class attorney and by giving class members an increased
role in terminating suits); Note, Abuse in Plaintiff Class Action Settlements: The Need for
a Guardian Durng Pretrial Settlement Negotiations, 84 MICH. L. REV. 308 (1985) (arguing
that courts 4hould appoint neutral third-party guardians to oversee pretrial negotiations).
388. See supra note 385. In urging approval of the settlement, the defendant conceded
neither liability nor that it would have lost at trial. Rather, the defendant stated that it
mined and milled fiber, but as an ingredient supplier it had not manufactured the products
allegedly used in the case. It argued that two-thirds of the schools involved in the action
were built before 1958, but the defendant did not ship its products before then. The
defendant further urged that as an ingredient supplier it would benefit from many state
laws that no longer make suppliers liable to class plaintiffs and that the defendant had
achieved many summary judgments on these grounds in other cases. Id.
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VII. TRIAL STAGING
With the failure of universal settlement, Judges Parker and
Kelly focused their attention on the staging of these complex
cases. Both judges resorted to trial management procedures
already used in other complex cases: reverse bifurcated trial
phases. In addition, Judge Parker used many trial techniques to
aid jury comprehension in Cimno.
A. Polyfurcated Tral Plans
Rule 42(b) permits a separate trial of any claims or issues "in
furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when sepa-
rate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy.s 9 The
Manual for Complex Litsgattwn notes that "[a] single trial of all
issues is rarely feasible in multiple tort litigation" and that the
court may sever issues of defendant culpability from causation
and damages and then consolidate them for joint trial under Rule
42(a).39 Federal courts have adjudicated mass tort claims using
bifurcated or polyfurcated trial procedure in hotel fire litigation,
the Agent Orange case, bendectin litigation, and asbestos cases.391
Defendants have challenged such multiphase trial procedures,
however, on the grounds that they violate the seventh amend-
ment right to a jury trial by separating general causation from
other trial issues. 92 Whereas defendants have voiced constitu-
tional objections to polyfurcated trials, some plaintiffs have ex-
pressed dissatisfaction with multiphase trial staging that first
focuses on the weakest aspects of their case.39 3
389. FED. R. Civ. P 42(b). The rule further requires that m ordering such separate
trials, the court must "always preserv[e] inviolate the right of trial by jury as declared
by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United
States." Id.
390. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, SECOND S 33.26 (1985); see also FED. R. Civ. P
42(a) (consolidation).
391. See T. WILLGING, supra note 1, at 102-04 (bifurcation and trifurcation in asbestos
litigation); Comment, Rule 42(b) Bifurcation at an Extreme: Polyfurcation of Liability Issues
in Enmnronmentat Tort Cases, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 123, 139-47 (1989) (prior uses
of bifurcated trials under Rule 42(b) and trial plans m Beverly Hills Hotel fire, Agent
Orange, bendectin, and Anderson v. W.R. Grace litigation).
392. See T. WILLGING, supra note 1, at 102-04; see also Comment, Bifurcation of Lwiability
and Damages -in Rule 28(b)(S) Class Actions: History, Policy, Problems and a Solution, 36
Sw. L.J. 743. 746-47, 758-59 (1982).
393. T. WILLGING, supra, note 1, at 103; see also Bordens & Horowitz, Mass Tort Civil
Litigation: The Impact of Procedural Changes on Jury Decuons, 73 JUDICATURE 22, 25-27
(1989).
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1. The Cimino Trtfurcated Tral Plans
Three major points characterized trial planning in Cimsno.
First, from the earliest formulation of the class action through
the actual consolidated proceedings, Judge Parker had a basic
concept of a trifurcated trial plan consisting of (1) presentations
of Jenkzns issues such as common defenses and liability for
punitive damages, (2) exposure, and (3) compensatory damages.
Second, trial planning was an ongoing process of reformulation,
modification, and amendment which continued throughout the
trial itself. Third, Judge Parker's chief challenge was to formulate
a method for presenting exposure and compensatory damages
issues in consolidated trial format.
From the time Judge Parker issued the initial class action
order and appointed a special master, he contemplated a three-
phase trial. The original concept was first to try common issues
of tort liability, class punitive damages, and actual damages of
class representatives; second, to try exposure issues, amounts of
actual or compensatory damages for remaining individual class
plaintiffs, affirmative damages, and percentages of causation; and
third, to try cross-actions, indemnity claims, and contribution
among defendants.3 94 All successive trial plans in Cimsno were
variations on these themes, moving the issues around and devel-
oping means for representative proof on common issues. Judge
Parker did not seek briefing from counsel, but rather appointed
Special Master Jack Ratliff for the explicit purpose of developing
a class action plan. The special master's four-phase trial plan was
an intricate elaboration of these same issues, with a core rec-
ommendation that proof of classwide damages be presented
through expert and statistical proof of aggregate damages.395
Of the many trial plans formulated in Cimno, two are most
significant: the October 1989 trial plan, which the Fifth Circuit
partially invalidated, and the March 1990 trial plan, which the
Fifth Circuit upheld and which became the basis for the actual
Cimino trial. The October plan suggests a trial staging that will
not withstand appellate scrutiny, whereas the March 1990 plan
suggests a consolidated trial staging that will.
394. See Memorandum and Order, Cimino v. Raymark Indus., No. B-86-0456-CA, Docket
at 10 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 1989) (order delineating three-phase class action); Memorandum
and Order Appointing Special Master, Cimsno, Docket at 10 (Feb. 9, 1989) (appointing
Professor Jack Ratliff as special master).
395. See Master's Report in Cimino v. Raymark at 13-16, Cimsno, Docket at 54 (Sept.
20, 1989), repmnted rn Mealey's, supra note 79, at G-7 - G-8. For a discussion of the special
master's role and report, see supra notes 340-59 and accompanying text.
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a. October 1989 Tmal Plan
The October 1989 trial plan outlined three phases. Phase I was
a consolidated trial of Jenksns issues under Rule 42(a), namely
the state-of-the-art defense and punitive damages. 96 The jury was
to award punitive damages on the basis of a multiplier. Findings
in this stage were binding on the parties. Phase II was to be
presented as a class action trial of the cases of the class repre-
sentatives. Using statistical and testimonial evidence, the jury
was to determine the makeup of the class, the percentage of the
plaintiffs exposed to the defendants' products, and the percentage
of claims barred by affirmative defenses.19
Then, the jury was to determine actual damages in a lump
sum for each disease category and to apportion responsibility
among the defendants. 98 After the award of actual damages, the
jury could award punitive damages against defendants found
liable for gross negligence in Phase I. Phase III was to be a
nonjury proceeding in which the court distributed actual and
punitive damages to the plaintiffs.399
In December 1989, Judge Parker modified this proposed trial
plan in three ways. First, during Phase II the court would allow
the plaintiffs and defendants to introduce the testimony of fifteen
claimants chosen by each side, in addition to the presentation of
396. Memorandum and Order, Cimno, Docket at 58 (Oct. 24, 1989), reprnted sn
Mealey's, supra note 80, at A-1. The so-called Jenkns issues included the following
questions:
(a) which products, if any, were asbestos-contaming insulation products ca-
pable of producing dust that contained asbestos fibers sufficient to cause
harm in its application, use, or removal; (b) which of the Defendants' products,
if any, were defective as marketed and unreasonably dangerous; (c) when
each Defendant knew or should have known that insulators or construction
workers and their household members were at risk of contracting an asbestos-
related injury or disease from the application, use, or removal of asbestos-
contaimng insulation products; and (d) whether each Defendant's marketing
of a defective and unreasonably dangerous product constituted gross negli-
gence.
Id. at 4, repmnted 'in Mealey's, supra note 80, at A-2.
397. Id. at 5, repnnted sn Mealey's, supra note 80, at A-3. Among the affirmative
defenses to be tried in this phase were statute of limitations defenses and adequate
warnings.
398. Id. at 6-7, reprnted sn Mealey's, supra note 80, at A-3 - A-4. This portion of the
trial plan also included directions for dealing with apportionment of responsibility under
Texas law. Id.
399. Id at 7, reprnted sn Mealey's, supra note 80, at A-4. The court indicated that the
defendants did not have standing with regard to the issues raised in this phase; this
determination was consistent with the special master's recommendation for Phase IV in
the master's trial plan. See supra note 356 and accompanying text.
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the individual cases of the class representatives. Second, the
court would allow the jury to award lump sum punitive damages
rather than use the Phase I multiplier Third, in awarding actual
and punitive damages, the court would determine the validity of
each plaintiffs claim based on individualized proof of damages.400
Through these procedures, Judge Parker afforded the litigants
opportunities to present both representative and individualized
claims.
The defendants objected to this plan and appealed to the Fifth
Circuit. They argued that the proposed trial plan violated the
seventh amendment right to a jury trial, procedural due process,
and controlling Texas substantive tort law.40 Although the Fifth
Circuit addressed the seventh amendment and due process con-
cerns at length,4 2 the court invalidated Phase II because of the
Ere doctrine, vacating the order for Phase II and remanding the
case to Judge Parker:
The core problem is that Phase II, while offering an innovative
answer to an admitted crisis in the judicial system, is unfor-
tunately beyond the scope of federal judicial authority It
infringes upon the dictates of Ene that we remain faithful to
the law of Texas, and upon the separation of powers between
the judicial and legislative branches.43
Texas products liability law required plaintiffs to prove that the
defendant supplied the product that caused the injury-a stan-
dard that focused on individuals, not on groups.4 4 The court
stated that the proposed collective presentation of proof in Cim-
mno was a procedural innovation that impermissibly effected a
change in substantive duty 40 5 The court further viewed the
proposed use of statistical proof as dealing only with general
causation, not with the individual causation that Texas law re-
quired.40 6
400. Order at 2-4, Cimsno, Docket at 78 (Dec. 29, 1989). With regard to individualized
proof in Phase III, Judge Parker indicated that "[in this manner, the Court will ensure
that, before receiving a share of the damages in this action, each individual Plaintiff has
been exposed to the defendants' asbestos products and has suffered actual damages." Id.
at 4.
401. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
402. See In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 709-11 (5th Cir. 1990).
403. Id. at 711.
404. Id.
405. Id. at 711-12.
406. Id.
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The Fifth Circuit's decision is significant not only for its in-
validation of the proposed Phase II in Cimsno, but also for what
it left unsaid with regard to consolidated mass tort procedure.
For example, although the court expressed great concern over
the proposed procedural innovations, it did not hold that the
proposed procedures violated the right to trial by jury or due
process. The appellate court never invalidated 'the elass action
per se, but rather suggested-that "[tihere were too many dispar-
ities among the various plaintiffs for their common concerns to
predominate.."407 Nor did the court repudiate the use of statistical
proof of damages, stating instead that it was "uncomfortable"
with the analogous use of statistical proof in title VII and secu-
rities cases.418 Finally, the Fifth Circuit gave no guidance to
Judge Parker on how to restructure Cimsno in light of the
mandamus opinion.
b. March 1990 Trial Plan
Judge Parker restructured a trial plan for Cimgino that with-
stood a second appeal. 4 9 Again, he ordered a three-phase trial.
Phase I consisted of a Jenksns-style class action of the state-of-
the-art defense, gross negligence, and punitive daitages. Phase
II consolidated the remaining 2,336 cases under Rule 42(a) for a
single trial on the exposure issue and required findings specific
to job site, craft, and time. Phase II organized evidence of
exposure by ten-year intervals for submission to the juty. The
court was to make a nonjury determination concerning which
claimants worked for a sufficient period at each wolksite so as
to be a proper member of that site's group and craft, and the
jury was to apportion responsibility among settling and nonset-
tling defendants.410
Phase III, also a Rule 42(a) consolidation, dealt with compen-
satory damages. As before, Judge Parker proposed to present
damages through representative sampling and statistical extrap-
olation to the group of consolidated cases. He divided claimants
into five disease categories and ordered the presentation of a
random sample from each disease category to the jury, for a
407. Id. at 712.
408. Id. at 710.
409. See.supra note 94 and accompanying text.
410. Memorandum and Order at 7, Cimino v. Raymark Indus., No. B-86-0456-CA, Docket
at 159 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 1990). Again, Judge Parker provided f6r peculiarities raised by
the change in Texas tort law during the period of the case filings. Id.
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total of 150 individual cases. Prior to the trial of Phase III, Judge
Parker increased this sample to 160 cases. At the conclusion of
the sample cases, Judge Parker proposed to hear testimony from
his court-appointed expert concerning the methodological validity
of the sampling technique and statistical approach.41' With minor
modifications, this basic plan governed the trial in Cimsno.
In restructuring the trial plan after the Fifth Circuit manda-
mus, Judge Parker sought to address that court's concerns about
individualization of proof under Texas products liability law With
regard to the revamping of Phase II, he felt "persuaded that a
satisfactory level of individualization can be achieved by asking
the jury in Phase Two to make findings on exposure that are
specific to job site, craft and time.."412 Furthermore, Judge Parker
sought to validate his most innovative proposal, the compensatory
damage sampling technique, through the testimony of an expert
witness. The defendants appealed this revised trial plan, and the
Fifth Circuit denied the appeal without opinion.413 The lack of a
second Fifth Circuit opinion supplies little information concerning
the validity or invalidity of the details of Judge Parker's revised
trial plan.
2. The School Asbestos Litigation Bsfurcated Tmal Plan
In May 1990, after massive briefing from the parties on pro-
posed trial plans, Judge Kelly issued a bifurcated trial plan for
School Asbestos Litgaton, without oral argument or supporting
memoranda. 41 4 By then, Judge Kelly had the benefit of Judge
Parker's experience with various proposed trial plans and the
411. Id. at 7-11.
412. Id. at 2.
413. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
414. See, e.g., Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Order
Governing Conduct of Trial, In re School Asbestos Litig., No. 83-0268, Docket No. 2148
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 3, 1990); Plaintiffs' Motion For Order Governing Conduct of Trial, School
Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 2033 (Jan. 22, 1990). For various defendants' responses to the
plaintiffs' proposed trial plan, see, for example, Response of Defendant GAF Corporation
to Plaintiffs' Motion for Order Governing Conduct of Trial, School Asbestos Litig., Docket
No. 2107 (Mar. 19, 1990); Response of Kaiser Cement Corporation to Plaintiffs' Motion
For Order Govermng the Conduct of Trial, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 2108 (Mar.
19, 1990); Defendant Fibreboard Corporation's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to
Plaintiffs' Motion for Order Governing Conduct of Trial, School Asbestos Litig., Docket
No. 2109 (Mar. 19, 1990); Memorandum of Defendants Georgia-Pacific Corporation and
Uniroyal, Inc. Responding to Plaintiffs' Trial Proposal, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No.
2110 (Mar. 19, 1990).
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Fifth Circuit's reaction to those plans.415 Judge Kelly ordered a
bifurcated trial, with Phase I to include seven issues:
(A) the level at which various kinds of friable asbestos
[are] hazardous in school buildings. (B) defendants' knowledge
of the health hazards of asbestos. (C) defendants' failure to
properly warn or test. (D) defendants' fraudulent concealment
of knowledge of the dangers of asbestos. (E) the defendants'
conspiracy to suppress knowledge of the dangers of asbestos.
(F) punitive damages. (G) common defenses.416
He deferred outlining any other trial phase until the completion
of Phase .417
Judge Kelly's trial plan is notable for two reasons. First, it
substantially tracks the trial plans in Jenksns v. Raymark Indus-
trnes, Ine.418 and Cimsno. In Jenksns, the Fifth Circuit validated
a bifurcated class action plan with a Phase I trial of the state-
of-the-art defense and punitive damages. 419 The first four issues
in School Asbestos Litsgatwn relate to the state-of-the-art defense.
Similar to Jenksns and Cimsno, the punitive damages issue is
scheduled for Phase I.421 In addition, Judge Kelly will try common
defenses during this phase, as Judge Parker did in Cimsno. The
only new Phase I issue in School Asbestos Litgatwn will be a
common conspiracy claim. Thus, Judge Kelly adopted an appel-
late-approved bifurcated trial plan, in which trial of common
defenses and punitive damages occurs first, and that of product
identification, exposure, and actual damages occurs later. He left
open the structure and presentation of these latter issues in a
class action format.
Second, Judge Kelly's trial plan orders the parties to submit
"proposed factual interrogatories to the jury . . and a list by
415. See supra notes 394-413 and accompanying text for a discussion of the trial plans
in Cimmno. At the time the plaintiffs in School Asbestos Litigation filed their proposed
trial plan, the Fifth Circuit had not yet issued the mandamus invalidating that plan.
Judge Kelly was informed of the Fifth Circuit mandamus in various defendants' responses
to the plaintiffs' proposed trial plan. See supra note 414 for various defendants' responses.
416. Pretrial Order No. 235 at 1, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 2225 (May 17, 1990).
417. Id. The order also required the parties to submit a joint pretrial order before
June 8, 1990, but the parties did not meet this deadline, causing Judge Kelly to extend
the deadline to March 1991. Pretrial Order No. 249, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No.
2294 (July 16, 1990) (extending filing deadlines for joint pretrial order); Pretrial Order
No. 239, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 2243 (May 29, 1990).
418. 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986).
419. Id. at 470-71, 474-75.
420. See sd. at 474 (trying punitive damages first in a reverse bifurcated trial under
Texas law is constitutional).
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jurisdiction of which interrogatories are applicable to the law of
that jurisdiction. '421 Judge Kelly intends to apply the law of
multiple jurisdictions to the legal theories in the case.
B. Reverse Bsfurcaton
Courts use Rule 42(b) bifurcation in many complex cases to
separate trial of liability and damages.m In Jenkins, Judge Parker
used reverse bifurcation first to try the common state-of-the-art
defense and punitive damages issues and later to address cau-
sation and compensatory damages. The Fifth Circuit upheld his
trial order against the defendants' challenge that reverse bifur-
cation violated Texas law regarding the relationship of punitive
damages to compensatory damages.4 Two justifications for this
reverse bifurcation procedure apply to mass asbestos litigation.
First, if the defendants prevail on the state-of-the-art defense,
then no need exists for further trial of either causation or
damages. Furthermore, if the plaintiffs do not prove gross neg-
ligence, then the court will eliminate punitive damages from the
case. Second, the award or threatened award of punitive damages
induces defendants to settle prior to trial.424
Judge Parker took the reverse bifurcation techmque one step
further in Cimmno when he reversed all phases of the trial. First,
Judge Parker tried the Phase I Jenksns issues of common affir-
mative defenses, punitive damages, and gross negligence.42s At
the completion of Phase I, Judge Parker reversed Phases H and
III and tried the damages portion before the exposure phase in
the hope that forcing the parties to try damages first would
induce settlement.m When such settlements were not forthcom-
ing, the damages phase began in July 1990.
In staging the presentation of the 160 representative cases in
Phase III, Judge Parker used another innovative procedure. In
421. Pretrial Order No. 235 at 2, School Asbestos Litig., Docket No. 2225 (May 17, 1990).
The court ordered the proposed interrogatories pursuant to Rule 49(a).
422. See Comment, supra note 392, at 744-47 (tracing the history of bifurcation in
personal injury cases and describing the debate surrounding bifurcation).
423. Jenkns, 782 F.2d at 474-75.
424. Such settlement occurred in Jenkins. See McGovern, Mature Mass Tort, supra note
40, at 659-75 (case study of Jenkins).
425. For a list of daily activities during the trial of Phase I, see Ciminmo v. Raymark
Indus., No. B-86-046-CA, Docket at 153-73 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 6-Mar. 29, 1990) (jury voir
dire; trial-day 1 through trial-day 29). The jury returned a verdict on March 29, 1990. See
Jury Verdict, Cimzno, Docket at 173 (Mar. 29, 1990).
426. Order, Cimvno, Docket at 195 (Apr. 11, 1990) (setting jury selection for June 1,
1990).
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order to reduce duplicative testimony on common medical issues,
he tried the initial portion of this phase simultaneously before
two juries. The two juries then split, with one jury trying fifteen
individual cases before Judge Parker and the other jury trying
twenty-five individual cases before another judge. At the com-
pletion of these forty cases, the juries adjourned for deliberation
and their verdicts were not announced publicly.42 The two juries
reconvened to continue separate trial of individual cases until
each jury heard eighty cases in various disease categories. Fol-
lowing this sampling of 160 individual cases, Judge Parker per-
mitted adversarial expert testimony concerning the sampling
methodology. Judge Parker scheduled Phase II, dealing with
exposure by worksite, to begin after conclusion of the damages
phase.4
C. Jury Comprehenswn Issues
The trial of complex litigation involving highly technical or
scientific testimony raises a debate concerning whether such
cases ought to be tried to a jury at all.42 Although some com-
427. See Trals: Verdicts Under Seal sn Ciinno; Values Rumored, 5 Mealey's Litig. Rep.
Asbestos 13 (Aug. 3, 1990) (reporting on sealed verdicts in first 40 Phase III verdicts and
indicating that the court would unseal verdicts after the trial of all 160 cases). Judge
Parker tried 15 mesothelioma cases and received 15 verdicts for plaintiffs. Judge Schell's
jury heard lung cancer cases and returned jury verdicts for 18 plaintiffs and 7 defendants.
When the juries reconvened, Judge Parker was scheduled to try "other than lung cancer"
cases, and Judge Schell was scheduled to try a mixed group of cancer, asbestosis, and
pleural cases.
428. See Order, Cimino, Docket at 195 (Apr. 11, 1990) (scheduling Phase H unmediately
after the conclusion of Phase III).
429. See generally J. CECIL, E. LIND, & G. BERMANI, JURY SERVICE IN LENGTHY CIVIL
TRIALS (1987) (study of jurors in long and short civil cases); M. SELVIN & L. PINcus, supra
note 19 (comparing the characteristics and experiences of jurors in lengthy civil trials
and jurors in similar trials of shorter duration); Arnold, A Historical Inquiry into the
Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 829 (1980) (asserting
that historically parties could not avoid a jury trial in cases involving complicated facts);
Blecher & Damels, In Defense of Juries in Complex Antitrust Litigation, 1 REV. LITIG. 47
(1980) (defending use of juries and offering suggestions for improving courtroom proce-
dures in complex civil trials); Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Let's Not Rush
to Judgment, 80 MICH. L. REv. 68 (1981) (advocating changes to the way in which juries
operate in complex cases); Note, The Right to a Jury Tral n Complex Civil Litigation,
92 HARv. L. REV. 898 (1979) (suggesting ways of dealing with jury incompetence, such as
viewing certain issues as equitable and thus outside the scope of the seventh amendment);
Comment, Complex Civil Litigation and the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Tra, 51
U. Cm. L. REV. 581 (1984) (arguing that a complex case may fall outside of the seventh
amendment).
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mentators urge the use of special juries for complex cases,430
opponents of special juries believe they violate the seventh
amendment. Apart from such constitutional concerns, empirical
researchers are investigating whether procedural changes in com-
plex cases affect jury decisions.43 '
Asbestos mass tort litigation is somewhat anomalous because
the trial of individual asbestos claims is fairly simple now that
the law surrounding them is settled.432 The central problem with
asbestos litigation is not the presentation of individual cases but
the repetition of thousands of highly similar cases involving
duplicative proof of claims. What renders asbestos litigation
complex is the consolidation of thousands of similar cases pre-
sented against multiple defendants. In mass asbestos litigation,
the jury must hear common testimony on issues of negligence,
affirmative defenses, and punitive damages, and must apportion
responsibility for injury among the defendants.
Federal judges use a number of procedures for improving jury
comprehension in complex multiparty civil litigation, such as
bifurcated trials, preliminary and interim jury instructions, in-
terim summations, juror notetaking and questions, detailed jury
instructions, and special verdicts. 4s Although some criticize these
techniques for improperly affecting jury deliberations, these de-
vices generally are recognized for helping jury deliberation in
complex cases rather than prejudicing results.
Judge Parker used many of these devices to guide jury delib-
erations and verdicts in Cim&no. At the outset of Phase I, each
430. See, e.g., Drazan, The Case for Special Juries -in Tonc Tort Litigation, 72 JUDICATURE
292 (1989) (advocating use of special juries of scientific and medical experts in toxic tort
litigation); Luneberg & Nordenberg, Specially Qualified Juries and Expert Non7ury Tni-
bunals: Alternatives for Coping with the Complexities of Modern Civil Litigation, 67 VA.
L. REv. 887 (1981) (delineating the circumstances in which cases would appropriately be
tried before a nonjury tribunal or specially qualified jury); Note, The Case for Special
Juries zn Complex Civil Litigation, 89 YALE L.J. 1155 (1980) (arguing that special juries
can meet the constitutional requirements of the seventh amendment and the due process
clause).
481. See, e.g., Bordens & Horowitz, supra note 393 (empirical study on experimental
jury results in mock mass tort trials).
432. T. WILLGING, supra note 1, at 18.
433. For a discussion of these various techniques, see generally Comm. on Fed. Courts
of the N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Improving Jury Comprehensin sn Complex Civil Litigation,
62 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 549 (1988) (discussing techmques available to increase the likelihood
that a jury verdict will reflect the evidence and the judge's instructions); Heuer & Penrod,
Increasing Jurors' Participation 7.n Trials: A Field Experiment with Jury Notetaknng and
Question Asking, 12 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 231 (1988) (reporting that allowing jurors to take
notes and ask questions increased juror satisfaction and confidence in the verdict and
did not slow the trial).
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juror received a jury notebook containing definitions of legal
terms and concepts, such as the preponderance of the evidence
standard, negligence, ordinary care, proximate cause, gross neg-
ligence, punitive damages, unreasonably dangerous product, pro-
ducing cause, marketing defect, and adequate warnings and
instructions. The notebook defined the concept of gross negli-
gence separately for cases filed before and after the change in
applicable Texas tort law. Separate sections of the notebook
supplied information concerning the products about which the
jurors would hear testimony during the trial. For the four defen-
dants remaining in the case and the seventeen defendants set-
tling, the court supplied product lists and the years the defendants
manufactured those products. The final portion of the jury note-
book contained reproductions of the defendants' product warn-
ings.43
In addition to the jury notebook, Judge Parker instructed the
jury concerning the nature of the case and legal standards at
the outset of trial, permitted interim lawyer summations during
trial, and issued lengthy jury instructions at the conclusion of
trial.4 5 The court supplied the jurors with final jury instructions
after the attorneys for both sides had an opportunity to comment
on the judge's instructions. To help refresh their recollections of
the witnesses, the jurors also received photographs of the wit-
nesses.
Finally, Judge Parker gave the jury a jury form and a twenty-
four-page special verdict form which he went over page-by-page
during jury instructions. 6 The jury form listed each of the ten
class plaintiffs separately and required the jurors to find either
for the plaintiff or for the defendant, to assess compensatory
damages, and to apportion causation among the plaintiff, the four
nonsettling defendants, and the settling defendants.4 The special
verdict form consisted of several interrogatories, four of which
required the jurors to determine dates from which each of four
defendants engaged in manufacturing and marketing activity
relating to their products and a fifth that related to tortious
conduct. Another interrogatory required the jurors to determine
whether to assess punitive damages upon a finding of gross
434. See Juror Notebook, Cimno v. Raymark Indus., No. B-86-0456-CA (used Feb.Mar.
1990 during trial of Phase I).
435. See Transcript of Jury Instructions, Cimino (Mar. 22, 1990).
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negligence. If the jury decided to impose punitive damages as
part of its verdict, the form directed the jury to determine the
multiplier for punitive damages measured against each dollar of
actual damages.
D The Tral Results sn Cimino
Judge Parker tried Phase I of Cimno from February 6 through
March 22, 1990. The trial lasted twenty-nine days, and the jury
deliberated for three days.4a The jury found in favor of nine of
the ten class plaintiffs, awarding compensatory damages as well
as assessing punitive damage multipliers against each of four
defendants. In response to the special interrogatories, the jury
determined that the defendants knew or should have known as
early as 1935 that insulators exposed to asbestos products were
at risk for contracting asbestos-related diseases. 43 9 In addition,
the jury indicated dates from which the defendants knew or
should have known of product risks to household members, craft
members working near or with asbestos products, and household
members of those craft workers. In April, Judge Parker heard
postverdict motions relating to the Phase I trial and verdicts.440
In June 1990, Judge Parker ruled on postverdict motions
concerning Phase I of Cimno.441 He dismissed all claims for
compensatory damages against one defendant but nonetheless
permitted the assessment of punitive damages against that same
defendant. He upheld the jury-assessed multipliers for other
punitive damages and ruled that the jury answers to three of
the first four special interrogatories were immaterial and would
be disregarded. Judge Parker also invalidated jury findings re-
438. See Cimsno, Docket at 153-74 (Feb. 6-Mar. 29, 1990).
439. Jury Verdict, Cimzno, Docket at 173 (Mar. 29, 1990). The jury determined that
Pittsburgh-Corning knew or should have known of the products' risks beginning in 1962.
Id.
440. Order Setting Hearing to Consider Post-Verdict Motions, Cimsno, Docket at 195
(Apr. 11, 1990) (setting posthearing date for Apr. 27, 1990, and setting out five matters
for attorneys to brief). Judge Parker invited argument on the following issues: 1) whether
the jury's answers to Special Interrogatories 2, 3, and 4 are surplusage; 2) the significance,
if any, of the jury's answer to special interrogatory 6; 3) whether there was a basis for
a contributory negligence finding on certain individual plaintiffs other than smoking; 4)
the proper date to be utilized and procedure for calculating prejudgment interest on
individual plaintiff cases; 5) the effect of prior settlements in calculating the punitive
damage multiplier. Id.
441. See Memorandum and Order, Cimsno, Docket at 336 (June 15, 1990); see also
Punitive Multipliers Upheld; Clams Against Carey Dismssed, 5 Mealey's Litig. Rep.
Asbestos 3 (July 6, 1990).
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garding certain plaintiffs' contributory negligence, holding that
the record contained little or no evidence to support the jury's
contributory negligence findings." In late July 1990, Judge Parker
ordered that he would consider the appropriateness of a remit-
titur for the amount of punitive damages assessed against the
defendants, and he invited counsel to brief this issue."3
During July and August 1990, Judges Parker and Schell ad-
judicated the 160 representative cases on the compensatory dam-
ages issue. They tried these cases in groups. In the first round
of trials, forty cases were tried to two juries, with Judge Parker
hearing fifteen mesothelioma cases and Judge Schell hearing
twenty-five lung cancer cases. The juries reached mixed verdicts
for plaintiffs and defendants, and the court placed the verdicts
under seal until completion of the entire sample of 160 cases.
Schell continued trying a group of "other than lung cancer" cases,
and Judge Parker tried a mixed group of cancer, asbestosis, and
pleural claims.& " The judges finished the trial of these cases
during fall 1990.
VIII. EVALUATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Resolving mass tort litigation in a just, equitable, and efficient
fashion is the major civil litigation problem of the 1990's. This
442. Memorandum Opinion and Order, Cimtno, Docket at 336 (June 15, 1990). Judge
Parker dismissed the claims for compensatory damages against defendant Carey Canada,
but found sufficient evidence m the record to support an award of punitive damages
against that defendant. In so ruling, Judge Parker stated:
In Texas, punitive damages must bear a reasonable proportion to actual
damages. Nevertheless, the Court finds that, under the circumstances
of this action, Texas courts would carve out an exception to the general rule
and allow punitive damages without proof of actual damages. The peculiar
facts of this case create the rare circumstance under Texas law where
punitive damages are recoverable and actual damages are not.
Id. at 7. The order also contained lengthy rulings regarding the calculation of prejudgment
interest.
443. Order, Cimno, Docket at 406 (July 16, 1990) (requesting defense counsel to supply
the court with specific factual information relating to remittitur of the punitive damages
awards). The juries awarded plaintiffs a total of $1,806,250 for past damages and $1,72150
for future damages. The average past damage award was $200,694, with $750,000 the
high award and $50,000 the low award. The average future damage award was $191,250,
with future damage awards ranging from $50,000 to $500,000. Opinion and Order, Cimsno
(Nov. 12, 1990).
444. See, e.g., Cimino, Docket at 397 (July 10, 1990) (transcript of trial proceedings
before Judges Parker and Schell). Judge Parker reported that the 15 mesothelioma cases
he tried returned verdicts for the plaintiffs averaging approximately $1,350,000 per case.
Schell's 25 cases split with 18 verdicts for the plaintiffs, whose collective awards totaled
$14 million, and 7 verdicts for the defendants. See Trials: Verdicts Under Seal in Cimino;
Values Rumored, supra note 427, at 13-14 (reporting on the first verdicts m this phase of
Cimno).
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study explores the feasibility of a judicial model that permits
consolidation of thousands of cases for disposition under judicial
auspices. Although other legal reformers pursue solutions through
legislative or administrative means, this project focuses on a
judicial approach to resolving mass tort litigation. The historical
backdrop to this study is the federal courts' pervasive resistance
to adjudicating personal injury claims in an aggregative setting.
Jenksns-Cimno and School Asbestos Litgatwn suggest some in-
roads on judicial reluctance to handle mass tort litigation in a
consolidated fashion. Clearly, the success or failure of these
litigations, and approval or disapproval by appellate courts, will
determine the efficacy of their use as models for future mass
tort litigation.
Because the two litigations that this study describes are on-
going, definitive conclusions concerning the legal validity of many
of the procedures used in these cases are impossible to draw
Any final judgment concerning the possibility of federal consoli-
dated mass tort litigation must await appellate scrutiny At this
juncture, however, courts have resolved some issues with cer-
tainty, and patterns concerning the conduct of these cases are
apparent. To be sure, Jenksns-Cimsno and School Asbestos Lits-
gatson established that certain common issues can be certified
for class action adjudication. For asbestos cases, these common
issues include gross negligence, conspiracy to suppress knowledge
of dangers, and common defenses. The Third Circuit upheld the
validity of a compensatory damages class action, and the Fifth
Circuit upheld the validity of a punitive damages class action.
These cases instruct that the presentation of such classwide
issues in reverse bifurcated proceedings does not violate seventh
amendment jury trial rights or implicate due process concerns.
Apart from the legal validity of these procedures, one may
draw some assessments regarding the judges' goals and their
trial management techniques in Cimtno and School Asbestos Lt-
gatton. A major goal of both judges was to induce the parties
to settle without recourse to trial. Both judges viewed the rep-
etitious litigation of thousands of similar asbestos claims as
inefficient, wasteful, and unnecessary Both hoped to spur the
attorneys to settle their claims by the threat of consolidated
treatment of the asbestos cases, and this prospect was a major
impetus for the judges' desire to certify the class actions. Yet
neither judge assumed an active, interventionist role in settle-
ment; instead, the judges pursued indirect encouragement through
pretrial management of the cases. In Cimsno, approximately a
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dozen defendants settled during various stages of pretrial pro-
ceedings, but four insisted on litigating the consolidated action.
In School Asbestos Litsgatton, this approach resulted in very few
pretrial settlements. Both judges view the failure to achieve
universal settlement as a major frustration in the cases.
With regard to pretrial proceedings, issues that theoretically
might have been problematic proved not to raise insuperable
difficulties during the course of these litigations. After provisional
certification and appellate approval of the two class actions, the
courts and the parties dealt with many class-related issues in a
routine, noncontroversial fashion. Class notice was not a problem
in either case, nor did opt-in and opt-out litigants present signif-
icant difficulties. Although defendants raised subject-matter ju-
risdictional challenges in both instances, the courts either rejected
or deferred these challenges until trial for determination of the
amount-m-controversy requirement. For multiparty litigations in-
volving thousands of claimants and a large number of defendants,
personal jurisdiction challenges were few, and the courts simply
resolved them through the application of standard jurisdictional
principles. In Cimtno, the court severed problematic defendants
and nonconforming plaintiffs from the consolidated litigation for
separate adjudication.
Both judges exercised standard pretrial judicial management
techniques for complex litigation. They designated lead and liai-
son counsel early in both proceedings. Both judges permitted the
use of settlement funds to finance the consolidated proceedings.
The judges used pretrial conferences and hearings sparingly,
preferring to deal with most matters by written motion or tele-
phone conference. Both judges used scheduling orders to direct
the course of pretrial proceedings and relied extensively on their
magistrate judges to handle routine pretrial discovery matters,
nondispositive motions, and some jurisdictional questions.
Judge Parker expressed great disappointment with the volume
of discovery in Cimsno. He indicated that, were he to preside
over another class action or consolidated proceeding, he would
limit discovery to the class representatives rather than permit
dicovery of every claimant in the case. In Cimsno, he made a
number of attempts to limit the scope and duration of discovery;
his most innovative order limited depositions to forty-five minutes
and restricted medical exams to an eight-hour period. These
orders remained during the course of pretrial proceedings, and
the Fifth Circuit did not invalidate the orders in either appeal.
Similarly, Judge Kelly imposed time and place restrictions on
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expert witness discovery in School Asbestos Littgatwn. Because
expert testimony will be the primary means of presenting this
case, the effect of these discovery limitations remains to be seen.
In addition to the extensive use of magistrate judges, Judge
Parker made innovative use of a special master to formulate a
class action plan. Special Master Ratliff's report supplied Judge
Parker with independent advice concerning the feasibility of a
class action disposition of asbestos personal injury claims and
provided an outline of trial staging that informed Judge Parker's
thinking in his subsequent trial plans.
With regard to actual trial staging, School Asbestos Litzgatzon
is to proceed with a reverse bifurcated trial plan used previously
in other mass tort cases, whereas Judge Parker innovatively
staged Cim&no as a reverse trifurcated proceeding. By presenting
the damages phases first, prior to exposure issues, Judge Parker
expected to induce settlement. When settlement did not occur,
Judge Parker utilized the class action rule to try common de-
fenses, gross negligence, and punitive damages, and demonstrated
that a mass tort class action of these issues is feasible.
A second structural innovation in Cimino was the use of two
juries simultaneously to hear common medical testimony and
separately to hear individual cases on compensatory damage
claims. Trying groups of cases, sending juries to deliberate, and
returmng juries to hear further cases is a new technique for
staging multiple cases in a short period. The impact and validity
of these procedures remains to be seen. In addition to these
structural innovations, Judge Parker used almost every known
techmque for aiding jury comprehension, including extensive
pretrial and posttrial jury instructions, jury notebooks, notetak-
ing, interim summations, and witness photographs to refresh the
jury's memory.
These litigations present at least two major unresolved pro-
cedural problems. The first concerns the relationship of applicable
substantive law to the viability of consolidated or class action
procedure. Although not pellucidly clear, the Fifth Circuit man-
damus decision in In re Fibreboard Corp."5 suggests that the
requirements of substantive state tort law override a federal
judge's attempts at various procedural innovations in handling
mass tort litigation. The two Cimino mandamus decisions, how-
ever, suggest that substantive state law does not restrain federal
district judges from experimenting with new ways of consolidat-
445. 893 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1990).
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ing proceedings in personal injury cases. Viewed conservatively,
the first Cimmno mandamus decision implies that appellate courts
will invalidate procedural innovation when such innovation
trenches on the margins of state substantive law. The task of
federal judges seeking consolidated solutions to mass tort liti-
gation is to walk the fine line between permissible federal pro-
cedure and impermissible substantive state law restrictions.
Whether the compromise solution concerning applicable law in
School Asbestos Littgatwn is workable also remains to be seen.
Although applying the different laws of different states to dif-
ferent issues does not trouble Judge Kelly, the spectre of incon-
sistent results looms large. Moreover, the parties have yet to
resolve definitively the applicable law questions. It is too soon
to know whether the most stringent standard will prove to be
workable for a nationwide class action, but School Asbestos Lits-
gatswn at least provides a model for this choice-of-law experiment
in a diversity-based nationwide class action.
Second, the aggregate determination of damages remains a
highly problematic feature of mass tort class action procedure.
Cimsno is the first case to attempt an aggregate presentation of
compensatory damages using sampling methods and statistical
extrapolation to the universe of claimants. Because courts have
never before used this technique in consolidated personal injury
cases, Judge Parker's attempt to present damages in this fashion
is at the frontier of known procedural law. Expert witness tes-
timony concerning the validity of this methodology is crucial to
support any future trial of damages in an aggregate manner.
Appointing an expert to construct the representative sample
before the trial of the cases, rather than using an expert's
testimony to validate the sample after the fact, might have
improved Judge Parker's handling of the statistical sampling
approach. This approach removes the judge from the process of
selecting the sample and makes the process less vulnerable to
challenges of lack of scientific and hence legal validity.
Two final points. A number of defense attorneys believed that
the nonsettling defendants in Cimnno remained in that case in
part to challenge Judge Parker's procedural innovations on appeal
after final judgment. Yet, given the magnitude of the judgments
already rendered and the defendants' exposure to punitive dam-
ages, the nonsettling defendants ironically might be unable to
post bond to bring appeals from the judgments. Finally, the
parallel progress of these two cases suggests a need for better
judicial communication concerning adjudication of mass tort cases.
1991]
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During the course of these litigations, particularly at the trial
planning stages, the courts might have benefitted from each
other's experience with trial planning. Some method for sharing
this information and experience might help to provide useful
models for judges, lawyers, and litigants involved in future com-
plex mass tort litigation.
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Table 1
Incidence of Federal Asbestos Personal
Injury/Product Liability Cases
Terminated Pending Filed Terminated Pending
prior to as of during during as of
District 1/189 111189 1989 1989 1/1/90
All Districts 16601 24877 9841 5252 29466
District of Columbia 3 13 12 5 20
Maine 423 35 23 25 33
Massachusetts 1367 2301 274 348 2227
New Hampshire 2 70 15 16 69
Rhode Island 77 67 14 60 21
Puerto Rico 0 0 1 0 1
Connecticut 733 520 89 259 350
New York Northern 22 434 85 13 506
New York Eastern 16 58 47 5 100
New York Southern 38 940 494 27 1407
New York Western 31 264 136 28 372
Vermont 1 0 0 0 0
Delaware 20 30 16 33 13
New Jersey 178 97 179 69 207
Pennsylvania Eastern 1374 2862 2016 555 4323
Pennsylvania Middle 42 32 64 27 69
Pennsylvania Western 39 107 156 25 238
Virgin Islands 0 3 1 0 4
Maryland 396 562 126 128 560
North Carolina Eastern 69 102 37 38 101
North Carolina Middle 29 25 13 10 28
North Carolina Western 2 37 37 1 73
South Carolina 340 206 95 98 203
Virgima Eastern 172 767 159 103 823
Virginia Western 63 97 77 47 127
West Virginia Northern 12 18 8 4 22
West Virginia Southern 180 162 233 20 375
Louisiana Western 230 56 34 27 63
Mississippi Northern 147 4 3 0 7
Mississippi Southern 1448 1967 234 634 1567
Texas Northern 931 55 95 75 75
Louisiana Eastern 368 164 56 96 124
Louisiana Middle 7 91 12 8 95
Texas Eastern 1297 2964 495 137 3322
Texas Southern 364 643 104 45 702
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Terminated Pending Filed. Terminated Pending
prior to as of during during as of
District 1/1/89 1/1189 1989 1989 1/1/90
All Districts 16601 24877 9841 5252 29466
Texas Western 77 31 13 25 19
Kentucky Eastern 3 36 23 5 54
Kentucky Western 33 78 8 16 70
Michigan Eastern 85 351 61 14 398
Michigan Western 7 2 3 1 4
Ohio Northern 2387 3183 2985 719 5449
Ohio Southern 231 277 17 36 258
Tennessee Eastern 119 67 53 32 88
Tennessee Middle 44 25 10 12 23
Tennessee Western 8 21 11 1 31
Illinois Northern 45 351 70 31 390
Illinois Central 5 31 28 5 54
Illinois Southern 34 45 2 6 41
Indiana Northern 3 8 6 5 9
Indiana Southern 48 19 111 3 127
Wisconsin Eastern 26 21 9 6 24
Wisconsin Western 4 2 0 1 1
Arkansas Eastern 99 62 101 53 110
Arkansas Western 101 35 12 25 22
Iowa Northern 9 6 0 0 6
Iowa Southern 22 904 11 2 913
Minnesota 2 14 2 7 9
Missouri Eastern 32 52 10 24 38
Missouri Western 3 15 11 2 24
Nebraska 155 86 9 4 91
North Dakota 5 4 42 0 46
South Dakota 0 2 2 2 2
Alaska 0 4 1 0 5
Arizona 22 107 28 8 127
Califorma Northern 635 72 2 58 16
Califorma Eastern 20 12 0 12 0
Califorma Central 302 116 12 11 117
California Southern 2 3 0 2 1
Hawaii 365 1082 63 592 553
Idaho 12 9 6 4 11
Montana 18 75 8 4 79
Nevada 6 12 10 0 22
Oregon 55 47 57 13 91
Washington Eastern 54 44 10 25 29
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Terminated Pending Filed Terminated Pending
prior to as of during during as of
District 1/1/89 1/1189 1989 1989 /1190
All Districts 16601 24877 9841 5252 29466
Washington Western 170 15 30 10 35
Colorado 35 40 13 20 33
Kansas 15 29 32 19 42
New Mexico 3 25 37 5 57
Oklahoma Northern 7 535 36 2 569
Oklahoma Eastern 2 0 0 0 0
Oklahoma Western 21 11 10 8 13
Utah 2 6 23 0 29
Wyoming 6 5 1 4 2
Alabama Northern 10 1 1 1 1
Alabama Middle 2 0 0 0 0
Alabama Southern 127 169 15 94 90
Florida Northern 3 1 0 0 1
Florida Middle 173 406 35 76 365
Florida Southern 99 113 55 33 135
Georgia Northern 111 187 85 53 219
Georgia Middle 1 45 0 3 42
Georgia Southern 315 225 221 192 254
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APPENDIX
ALTERNATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION AGREEMENT
September 5, 1986
The Alternate Dispute Resolution Agreement is applicable to
all asbestos personal injury cases filed by Walter Umphrey and
Marlin Thompson in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas from January 1, 1985 through April 1,
1986. If any party wishes to terminate or modify the Alternate
Dispute Resolution provisions, a motion must be made to the
District Court and a hearing held upon the intention of any party
to discontinue the Alternate Dispute Resolution.
I. Monitor. The Court shall designate a special Monitor to
oversee the ADR procedure. The plaintiffs' attorneys shall certify
to the Monitor those cases on the individual plaintiff attorney's
case list which are in compliance with paragraphs I.a through g
of the standing order for asbestos cases in the Eastern District
of Texas dated July 7, 1982.
H. Negotsatwn Eligibility. The Monitor shall provide to Wel-
lington attorneys a list of fifty (50) Walter Umphrey and ten (10)
Marlin Thompson cases per month eligible for the negotiation
process. The list of cases eligible for negotiation shall be compiled
by the Monitor after reviewing plaintiffs' attorney certification.
Wellington shall have sixty (60) days from the date determined
by the Monitor for each case that such case is eligible for
negotiation to review said case in preparation for the negotiation.
At the time of certification, plaintiffs' attorneys shall provide
Wellington attorneys all information deemed appropriate for
proper evaluation of the case including not only the plaintiff's
examining physician's narrative report, but also pulmonary func-
tion studies and the underlying data in connection therewith, the
x-rays, the results of any other tests ordered by such examining
physician, and authorizations for the medical records from other
physicians and hospitals at which plaintiff has been treated in-
cluding company medical files where applicable. Copies of medical
records will be furnished to plaintiff's attorney within thirty (30)
days. Additionally, if Wellington attorneys deem it necessary,
the plaintiff shall be made available for a thirty (30) minute
personal videotaped interview.
During the sixty (60) days following the cases being provided
by the Monitor as eligible for the negotiation, the defendants
may have the plaintiff examined by a physician of their choice
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at the defendant's expense with a travel allowance to plaintiff.
The results of any such examination shall be provided to the
plaintiffs attorney
III. Negotsatwn Perod. The negotiation period shall be forty
(40) days. During such negotiation period, plaintiffs attorneys
shall personally confer with a designated attorney or represen-
tative of Wellington. Plaintiffs attorney and Wellington attorney,
or its designated representative, shall during such period of time
negotiate in good faith and make a bona fide effort to resolve
each case by negotiation. At the conclusion of the negotiation
period, plaintiffs attorneys shall notify the Monitor in writing
for each particular case whether the case has been settled by
negotiation. Upon receipt of such written notice for cases not
settled by negotiation, the Monitor shall prepare a list of cases
which shall be submitted to arbitration for resolution by Arbi-
trators.
IV Arbitratwn Persod. The arbitration period shall be ninety
(90) days from the date certified by the Monitor that a particular
case is eligible for submission to the Arbitrator
V Arbstrator Selectson. The defendants and the plaintiffs shall
each select one person as an arbitrator selector. The two selectors
designated will then meet independent of the attorneys who
chose them, and they will agree on the individual number of and
the Arbitrators who will ultimately decide the cases in the
arbitration phase. The parties shall jointly negotiate with the
individuals selected regarding agreement to serve and compen-
sation for their services. In the event an agreement is not reached
regarding compensation, the parties shall notify the court of an
early date and the court shall enter an appropriate order
VI. Cases Sub3ect to Stay Orders. In any case that the medical
evidence- of a particular plaintiff demonstrates that the plaintiff
is not suffering at the time of evaluation from the disease of
asbestosis or cancer, such as plaintiffs with only pleural plaques
for pleural thickening without restrictive impairment by pulmo-
nary function studies, the Monitor shall place such cases on the
Court's administrative docket and stay these cases for a period
of two years. At any time during the two year period of time,
plaintiff's attorney may, with proper medical justification, move
the Monitor to remove such case from the administrative stay;
at which time the case would immediately be placed on the active
ADR docket. If there is no evidence of asbestosis or other
asbestos-related disease at the end of the two year stay, plaintiff
shall have the option of either dismissing the suit, receiving a
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green card from Wellington which will toll limitations, or re-
questing that the case be placed on the Court's active docket
where it will proceed through negotiation and arbitration and
ultimately, to trial if so requested.
VII. Cases Submitted to the Arbitrator. Within the ninety (90)
day time period for determination of cases submitted to the
Arbitrator, the parties shall by agreement and in cooperation
with the Arbitrator schedule presentation of cases. In the event
an agreement is not possible, the Monitor shall be promptly
notified and the Monitor shall provide the parties with such
schedule. The cases will be submitted to the various arbitrators
on a rotating basis. The Arbitrator shall conduct a hearing and
receive evidence in each case. The matters presented to the
Arbitrator are not controlled by the Federal Rules of Evidence
and may be presented in summary or affidavit form, or by
deposition or live witness, but shall include evidence as to product
exposure, whether the plaintiff suffers from an asbestos-related
injury or disease and any damages to which the plaintiff may be
entitled. The parties may by agreement modify the method of
presentation or establish an agreed procedure concerning the
trial or presentation to the Arbitrator. However, any such agree-
ment shall be first submitted to the Court for approval.
To assist the Arbitrators in making consistent determinations,
there will be seven categories of evaluation on which the arbi-
trator would decide the award amount of damages, if any. The
cases to be considered by the arbitrator would be all those cases
not placed on the pleural inactive docket by the Monitor. The
seven potential findings by the Arbitrator are as follows:
(1) No asbestos-related disease and therefore no recovery by
the plaintiff;
(2) Pleural changes with restrictive impairment;
(3) Pulmonary asbestosis;
(4) Asbestos-related cancer cases;
(5) Confirmed Mesothelioma;
(6) That it is a pleural case with no restrictive impairment
and recommending that it be placed on the pleural inactive
docket.
(7) That a particular case does not fit in any of the enumerated
categories and making an appropriate determination or award.
In determining the appropriate award in each category, the
Arbitrator should consider such factors as age of the plaintiff,
degree of asbestos related disability, extent and type of exposure
to asbestos, smoking history, significant non-asbestos health prob-
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lems relating to any disability, lost wages, dependents, medical
records and other reports, increased risk of cancer, progression
of asbestos-related injury, and pain and suffering. The plaintiffs
shall file with the Arbitrator the amounts and parties of any
prior settlement in a particular case and shall furnish a copy of
such information to the defendants prior to any hearing before
the Arbitrator. Defendants shall receive a credit for all amounts
paid by such settlements and the defendants shall subtract the
total amount of prior settlements from the Arbitrator's award,
if any The arbitrator shall also make .percentage findings relating
to participating, non-settling manufacturers and suppliers in the
arbitration and to non-participating, non-settling defendants. To
determine the effect of the percentage findings on the final award,
the parties shall apply the doctrine of Duncan v. Cessna. The
Arbitrator shall have thirty (30) days from the date of hearing
to render a decision based upon a review of the evidence.
Upon receipt of the decision of the Arbitrator, the parties shall
have twenty (20) days to notify the Monitor whether they accept
or reject the award of the Arbitrator. In the event the award is
accepted, the parties shall provide the Court with an appropriate
order the case shall be dismissed. In the event the award is not
accepted, the Monitor shall assign the case to the docket of the
individual judge to whom the case would originally have been
assigned to take its place on the trial docket. If the case is to
be tried, the plaintiffs waive any claim for punitive damages and
the defendants waive state-of-the-art defense. The matters to be
tried would include product exposure by the plaintiffs, whether
the plaintiff suffer an asbestos-related injury or disease, and
actual damages, if any The procedure to be followed would be
similar to that in Hardy v. Johns-Manville, 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir
1982). The jury, however, will make the appropriate percentage
findings as set out in the decisions of Duncan v. Cessna, 665
S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984) and Moore v. Johns-Manville Sales Cor-
poratwn, as those cases apply the law of the State of Texas.
Should any cases not be settled after proceeding through the
arbitration stage, then each party shall be authorized to conduct
all discovery allowed by the applicable Federal and State Rules
of Civil Procedure except that there shall be no discovery related
to punitive damages or state-of-the-art. No evidence shall be
admitted regarding the amount of any award by the Arbitrator
or that an appeal was taken therefrom.
VIII. Cases which are disposed of by settlement or through
an arbitrator's award shall be paid by defendants within thirty
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(30) days after settlement agreement is negotiated or, where not
appealed, within 30 days after receipt of arbitrator's decision.
IX. Order of Presentatwn. The parties shall prepare and pres-
ent cases through each phase of the Alternate Dispute Resolution
Procedure in the chronological order of their filing. Exceptions
will be allowed by the Monitor where in the judgment of the
Monitor sufficient evidence of hardship exists.
SIGNED and AGREED to on this the -day of September,
1986.
Attorney for Asbestos Claims Facility
(signature here)
(signature here)
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